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PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I seemed to spend ninety percent of my time putting out fires and ten percent thinking 
about why offshore outsourcing collaboration is inherently difficult; and I wanted to 
turn that bucket around and spend ninety percent of my time thinking about the 
complexities of offshore outsourcing and, not least, how to improve such collaboration.  
That was the main reason for taking upon me the challenge of reacquainting with 
academia by enrolling as a doctoral student and writing a PhD dissertation. I have 
given this explanation countless times to people I have met over the latter years. It is 
the first sentence in my elevator speech.  
Roughly three years ago I made a shift from being a practitioner working within it IT-
industry with a primary focus on managing and developing collaboration between 
Danish and Indian IT professionals – a journey that had included expatriation to India 
as a part of the management group of the largest IT offshore outsourcing endeavor that 
any Danish company has engaged in – to becoming a researcher within the field of 
global collaboration and teamwork. 
When I drafted the application for the PhD-fellow position at Copenhagen Business 
School (CBS) I knew that I wanted to dig deeper into the role of trust in collaborations 
characterized by crossing national, organizational, cultural and geographical 
boundaries. I knew I would like to focus my research efforts on trust, as it had become 
clear to me that in global collaborations everything seemed to work out fine as long as 
the actors trusted each other; and when they did not problems seemed to pile up.  
At that time I had no idea what trust was – at least not from an academic perspective. 
Over the last three years I have researched trust and trustworthiness and refined my 
view on these constructs: and I have also expanded my understanding of the empirical 
concept of offshore outsourcing, as well as the related theoretical constructs I introduce 
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in this dissertation, a great deal along the way. The result is this PhD dissertation. It is 
inherently mine, but it would not have turned out the way it did without the 
contributions, support and encouragement from number of people. To these people I 
owe a great deal of gratitude. 
Therefore I would like to thank the people involved in the NexGSD (Next Generation 
Technologies and Processes for Global Software Development) project and my 
colleagues at CBS. I would also like to thank Dr. Ann-Marie Nienaber from Coventry 
University and Dr. Peter Ørberg Jensen from CBS for their valuable and constructive 
feedback at my pre-defense seminar. And I would like to thank the assessment 
committee – Dr. Mette Zølner from CBS, Dr. Sylvie Chevrier from Paris-Est 
University, and Dr. Pamela Hinds from Stanford University – for their efforts in 
assessing this dissertation and for their valuable comments.  
I am very grateful to HCL and Berlingske Media for agreeing to let me conduct 
ethnographic field studies in their organizations. Their openness, which has provided 
me with a practically unlimited access to conduct observation studies and interviews, is 
deeply appreciated – and so is the curiosity and interest I have been met with all along.  
Furthermore, I thank Dr. Anne-Marie Søderberg for supervising my PhD project. 
Throughout the last three years you have helped me develop my arguments; provided 
critical feedback on my writings; engaged with me in numerous fruitful discussions; 
and supported me all along. Thank you. 
I would also like to thank my family and friends for taking an interest in my academic 
endeavors; and for their love and support. In particular, I would like to thank Susanne: 
For your love, support, compassion and encouragement throughout this project – and 
in life in general. It means more to me than words can even begin to describe.  
Finally, to my daughter Laura: Without you, none of all this would matter at all. Thank 
you for sunshine every day.  
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SUMMARY 
This PhD dissertation is an ethnographic field study of the collaboration between 
Berlingske Media, one of the leading media companies in Denmark, and their Indian 
IT service provider, HCL – one of the largest IT service providers worldwide. The 
dissertation studies the day-to-day operational collaboration between actors from the 
client organization and the vendor organization in order to understand how vendor-side 
actors, as individuals and as a collective, can be constructed as trustworthy 
collaborators in the eyes of the client-side actors.  
While trust is the theoretical epicenter of this thesis it is, in acknowledgement of the 
contextual and dynamic nature of trust, subjected to an interdisciplinary analytical 
framework. Thus, the four analytical chapters in Part II introduce four different factors 
that influence the client-side actors’ perceptions of vendor-side actors’ trustworthiness: 
distance, control, culture and boundary spanning. 
The analytical conclusions are summarized in Part III of the dissertation. Based on 
these analytical conclusions a number of practice-oriented suggestions on how the 
client-side actors’ perceptions of the vendor-side’s trustworthiness can be improved are 
presented and discussed. Furthermore, the theoretical implications are presented and 
discussed.  
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RESUMÉ 
Denne afhandling er et etnografisk feltstudie af samarbejdet mellem en et af de største 
danske mediehuse, Berlingske Media, og deres indiske IT-leverandør, HCL, som er en 
af de største leverandører af IT-services i verden. Afhandlingen studerer det daglige, 
operationelle samarbejde mellem aktører fra henholdsvis kunde- og 
leverandørorganisationen med henblik på at forstå hvordan aktørerne på 
leverandørsiden, kollektivt og som individer, konstrueres som troværdige 
samarbejdspartnere, set fra kundeorganisationens-aktørernes perspektiv.   
Tillid er afhandlingens teoretiske omdrejningspunkt, som, i erkendelsen af at tillid er 
en kontekstafhængig og dynamisk konstruktion, bliver analyseret interdisciplinært. 
Således introducerer de fire analytiske kapitler i afhandlingens anden del fire 
forskellige faktorer, der påvirker kundeorganisations-aktørernes opfattelse af 
leverandørorganisations-aktørernes troværdighed: distance, kontrol, kultur og 
boundary spanning.   
I afhandlingens tredje del opsummeres de analytiske konklusioner fra de fire analytiske 
kapitler. Baseret på disse analytiske konklusioner præsenterer og diskuterer 
afhandlingen en række praksisrettede forslag til hvordan kundeorganisations-
aktørernes opfattelse af leverandørorganisations-aktørernes troværdighed kan fremmes. 
Ydermere præsenteres og diskuteres afhandlingens teoretiske implikationer.  
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PART I 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Trust: The Secret Ingredient of Organizational Life 
“Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself 
would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what 
is known with certainty about another person, and very few relationships 
would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof 
or personal observation” (Simmel, 1978: 178) 
Trust is much like water: we cannot live without it. Just imagine driving in urban 
traffic if we cannot trust that when you have a green light cars crossing are faced with a 
red light. And if the light is indeed red, what if you cannot trust them to keep at 
standstill until the light turns green? How can we make electronic payments without 
trusting the underlying payment infrastructure to charge the right amount from our 
credit card and transfer it to the super market’s account? What about cash payments, if 
we do not trust the value of money to be relative stable? What about living in a house 
if we do not trust that the roof will not collapse all of a sudden? Indeed we cannot live 
relatively normal lives without trusting. We trust every day, all the day. And for the 
most part we do so unconsciously.  
In our everyday life we often take for granted that we can indeed trust someone or 
something – and usually we are right. That is, “[w]e are no more likely to ask ourselves 
how trusting we are at a given moment in time than to inquire if gravity is still keeping 
the planets in orbit. However, when trust is disturbed it claims our attention as urgently 
as would any irregularity in the gravitational field” (Brothers, 1995: 3). This does, 
however, not imply that trust is a trivial matter, though the body of literature on 
management theory tends to treat it as if it was. As Möllering (2006) rightly puts it “the 
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burgeoning literature on the formation of international joint ventures and strategic 
alliances in the 1990s regularly included a paragraph or short section, just before the 
conclusion, stating more or less in passing that – besides all sorts of economic and 
technical matters that have to be considered carefully – mutual trust has to be build, 
too” (Möllering, 2006: 3). Trust indeed has a certain taken for grantedness – in our 
daily life as well as in academic literature. Like most cookbooks would not dwell on 
“add salt”, management literature does not dwell on trust. “Add salt”, the recipe would 
say, without specifying how much salt or what kind of salt. It is up to the cook’s 
personal preference and it is considered highly unproblematic. “Add trust”, says the 
management literature, with an underlying assumption that trust is as uncomplicated as 
salt. This is an assumption that I will question in this thesis. 
To stay with the culinary metaphors, trust is masala – a mixture of grounded spices 
used in the Indian cuisine. The interesting thing about masala is that while most 
masalas have some spices in common (typically cumin seeds, coriander seeds, 
cardamom and cloves) there is a wide range of spices that can go into a masala and an 
infinite number of possibilities to combine quantities. Thus, masala is not one well-
defined thing, rather it is a common term for spice mixes and can have radically 
different tastes. In the Indian cuisine a masala can be a trademark of a cook – 
professional or domestic. It is that secret ingredient that makes the cook’s dish a 
signature dish. Much like the masala is the secret ingredient of the Indian cuisine, I 
argue that trust is a secret ingredient in organizational life. That is, we may use trust 
un-reflected on a daily basis, because it is unproblematic, like buying a commercial 
masala product produced in bulk quantities in a supermarket. But when it turns out that 
the dish does not get the taste we expected; when trust gets problematic, we need to 
deconstruct. Was it because of too little cumin, too much chili? Was it because of 
unconscious lack of propensity to trust, because of perceptions of inadequate abilities –
because integrity has not been rendered visible or something completely different?   
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Trust is that secret ingredient to organizational life, which is all so important to work 
as frictionless, effective and efficient as possible within the organization. Nienaber et 
al. (2014) have recently published an article that shows how trust is perpetually 
overlooked in the management literature. This is despite the fact that “virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust” (Das & Teng, 1998: 494) 
and as “it is impossible to monitor every detail in most exchanges, firms must always 
have a minimum level of trust” (ibid.). Trust is indeed a complex construct that 
deserves attention. 
Studying Trust in a Globally Distributed Context 
During the latter years many IT organizations, being IT companies or IT divisions in 
companies from other industries, have begun a journey into becoming global and 
multi-cultural organizations, with staff split across different locations in different 
countries. This indeed introduces a new level of complexity generated by technology. 
While some IT-organizations have established legal entities abroad hiring IT-
professionals to work from offshore on development projects and maintenance, others 
have engaged with partners and thus established offshore outsourcing set-ups. The 
extent of cooperation between geographically dispersed entities varies significantly 
depending on the selected model of cooperation. However, regardless of the nature of 
the selected form of cooperation, the success of the new organizational set-up of an 
offshore office is significantly dependent on team members’ ability to work in 
distributed teams; and this arrangement implies a change from being a physical 
organization towards becoming a virtual organization.  
Stack & Downing (2005) concluded almost ten years ago that companies are 
offshoring increasingly complex IT activities to either their own captive centers or to 
third party vendors. The incredible growth of the Indian IT-service providers over the 
last decade suggests that this tendency has continued. Thus, organizations all across the 
globe are faced with a challenge of learning to lead, learn, communicate, solve 
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complex problems and perform work efficiently and effectively across distance. 
Whether or not firms find actual cost savings in offshoring such complex work has 
been, and is still, the subject of intense debate (Levina & Vaast 2008). While this 
financial discussion is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, I do maintain that it 
implicitly plays a role – not just in this dissertation, but at large in studies of globally 
dispersed work. Researchers from a broad variety of disciplines are intrigued by the 
challenges related to global collaboration, arguably because such collaboration does 
present unique challenges to the smoothness of collaboration.  And by shedding light 
on the related challenges these researchers all contribute to paving the way for more 
effective and more efficient global collaboration – and thus, to improving the business 
case of globally distributed work.  
Indeed, many factors play a role in globally distributed collaboration. For instance, 
within CSCW (computer supported collaborative work) the well-cited article by Olson 
& Olson (2000) has highlighted the impact of geographical distance and the 
importance of establishing common ground, coupling of work, collaboration readiness 
among the stakeholders and collaboration technology readiness. Also, cultural 
diversity, the onshore staff’s motivation for engaging in cross-cultural interaction, the 
offshore unit’s lack of domain knowledge, etc. has received considerable attention 
(Carmel and Agarwal, 2002; Gregory et al., 2009). Within cross-cultural research a 
great deal of focus has also been devoted to globally distributed work, for instance 
Cramton & Hinds (2014) “examines the process through which globally distributed 
work teams attempt to adapt to cross-cultural differences while being constrained by 
the local contexts in which they are embedded” (p. 1); Krishna et al. (2004) 
acknowledges that working across cultures is indeed not a trouble-free endeavor; and 
van Marrewijk (2010) acknowledges that “cross-cultural cooperation of employees in 
geographically-distributed project teams has become an important topic in global IT 
projects” (p. 368) and urges researchers to give more attention to the daily practices of 
practitioners working in such geographically distributed teams. 
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Moreover, research on virtual teams has studied the challenges related to creating and 
sustaining trust, establishing shared meaning and managing conflicts in globally 
dispersed teams (Greenberg et al. (2007); Hinds & Bailey, 2003; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 
1999). However, within the trust research community only very limited attention has 
been devoted to understanding trust as it unfolds in geographically dispersed teams. 
Even though “[t]rust has become widely acknowledged as a crucial factor in inter-
organizational relationships [as it] affects a wide range of relationship qualities, from 
increasing relationship stability to lowering transaction costs for the trusting parties” 
(Kroeger & Bachmann, 2013: 253), trust research is rarely extended beyond the scope 
of co-located collaboration. 
This dissertation is a contribution to academic literature on global collaboration in 
general and offshoring and offshore outsourcing in particular. Engaging in offshoring 
is indeed a case of ‘reconfiguring’ as Jensen et al. (2013) point out by highlighting how 
the offshoring process essentially follows a process with three main stages, namely that 
of disintegration (of how work was originally carried out within the company); 
relocation where the execution of a particular set of tasks is moved offshore; and 
(re)integration, that is the new way of performing work, when integrated into a greater 
whole. Arguably, establishing trust and rendering trustworthiness visible is an 
important aspect of (re)integration. Thus, this dissertation aims at contributing to the 
body of knowledge on offshoring within the fields of international business and global 
work by thoroughly investigating the role of trust and trustworthiness in a case of 
offshore outsourcing. In addition, this dissertation also aims at contributing to the body 
of knowledge on trust literature. As mentioned only a limited focus within trust 
research has been aimed at understanding trust in a global, distributed context and it 
the ambition of this dissertation to add to that body of knowledge, too. Specifically, I 
aim at contributing to the trust literature, with an interdisciplinary and ethnographic 
study, where trust is not an isolated construct. Rather it is contextualized and studied as 
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it unfolds in real life in a globally distributed collaboration and in conjunction with 
other constructs – specifically, distance, control, culture and boundary spanning.  
The Strategic Research Project and my Ethnographic Study 
This dissertation does not stand in solitude. It is a part of a larger strategic research 
project funded by the Danish council for strategic research  (‘Det Strategiske 
Forskningsråd’) under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science. This strategic 
research project – the NexGSD project or in full, Next Generation Technologies and 
Processes for Global Software Development – aims at providing knowledge and tools 
for organizations to excel in software development on a global scale. Thus, the 
strategic research project has two distinct ambitions: One is to understand the 
complexities of doing IT work in an environment characterized by temporal, 
geographical, and cultural differences; and on the basis of such understanding to 
develop new ways of conceptualizing and coping with such differences in global 
projects. The other aim is to design and empirically evaluate next generation 
technologies and processes for global software development on the basis of the 
understanding provided by the ethnographic studies of global work. 
This dissertation aims at contributing to achieving the first ambition, by unraveling 
complexities of globally distributed collaboration and devising new ways of reflecting 
upon and acting in globally dispersed teams. Levina & Vaast (2008) rightly point out 
that “it requires organizational capability to undertake multiparty collaboration 
spanning geographic and temporal distances as well as organizational, national, and 
professional boundaries”(p. 308). I argue that trust is exactly such an organizational 
capability.  
While I conceive of trust as the secret ingredient, the masala, of organizational life, 
certainly no dish is made up entirely of a spice mix. Control, culture and boundary 
spanning are other important ingredients. This is not to say that other constructs than 
these four are unimportant. However, they have appeared as the most important ones 
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and most promising avenues for research in the specific empirical settings that form the 
basis of my ethnographic study. 
Given the fact that the NexGSD strategic research project precedes my doctoral 
studies, one can hardly say that I had total freedom in choosing the topic of my 
dissertation. Indeed, it had to be something that related to understanding the 
complexities of globally distributed work. This bound overall theme definitely 
resonated quite well with me, since I have spent several years working with offshore 
outsourcing in the IT industry. The focus on trust as the central theme emerged from 
my background as a practitioner, as I had experienced – at that time with a very limited 
understanding of trust as an academic construct and thus only with a very mundane 
understanding of trust and trustworthiness – that trust seemed to be pivotal to achieving 
success in globally distributed teams. Thus, before onboarding the ethnographic studies 
I knew that trust would play a role, as I was curious as to the role of trust in globally 
distributed work. The predetermined focus however did not extend to the other three 
theoretical constructs that turned out to have a central role in this dissertation as they 
emerged as important influences on the actors’ ability and willingness to trust their 
counterparts in the other organization. 
The empirical foundation for this dissertation is an offshore outsourcing collaboration 
between HCL, one of the largest Indian service providers with a yearly revenue 
exceeding 5 billion USD, and Berlingske Media, a leading Danish media company 
with a portfolio of more than forty news and service websites, including two of the top 
news sites in Denmark (www.b.dk and www.bt.dk). Berlingske Media also run the two 
corresponding traditional newspapers to these websites (Berlingske Tidende and BT) 
as well as ten other regional or national newspapers and three radio stations. Thus, 
Berlingske Media is one of the largest news companies in Denmark. The collaboration 
between HCL and Berlingske was started in 2012 and includes all IT-operations. A 
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total of more than eighty full time vendor-side employees are working on the 
Berlingske Media account.  
Starting with a Bang 
After I had finalized the formal agreements with the HCL and Berlingske and was 
about to start my ethnographic field studies at the client-side headquarters in 
Copenhagen, something interesting happened: On Friday January 18th 2013 the two 
largest commercial websites (www.b.dk and www.bt.dk) were down for approximately 
two hours in the middle of the day due to a human error, where one of the HCL 
employees assigned to the account had mistakenly deleted all DNS entries. 
Furthermore, due to firewall issues all of the commercial websites owned by 
Berlingske Media were unavailable from around 9.40 AM until around 3 PM on 
Tuesday January 22nd 2013. These breakdowns were covered by the two leading IT 
news sites in Denmark (non of them owned by Berlingske Media) and on those two 
websites one could first read statements from Berlingske Media’s CIO explaining the 
failures and publicly stating that he expected compensation from HCL 
(Computerworld.dk, 2013a). It was later retracted in an article where Berlingske Media 
praised HCL stating that the overall “SLA [service level agreement] fulfillment is 
excellent. It is quite simply extraordinary. They [HCL] deliver a service that meets all 
expectations” (Computerworld, 2013c). 
All IT-professionals know that errors occur. Even in the most robust setups errors are 
bound to happen occasionally and it is generally accepted that while errors cannot be 
completely eliminated IT-organizations should be measured not on the number of 
errors in isolation, but rather on their ability to respond to such errors and get the 
services up and running quickly and on their ability to learn from the errors and make 
sure that the same error does not happen again. However, I found these two errors 
interesting, because they represented major breakdowns in an outsourcing engagement, 
which, at that point in time, had been running for less than a year. Now, I shall refrain 
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from going into details on contractual underpinnings of outsourcing engagements and 
merely conclude that a company that chooses to outsource IT-operations and IT-
infrastructure always inevitably assumes a financial risk and thus renders themselves 
vulnerable. Thus, on an organizational level trust is always needed when outsourcing 
such IT activities.  
 
This dissertation is not about financial risk, nor is the primary focus on the 
organizational level. That is, my primary research interest is to understand the role of 
trust and trustworthiness at an actor level, as the primary trustor is inevitably a person. 
However, the target of trust, the trustee, may be an individual, a team, an organization, 
an IT-system, a process or some other form of artifact – and these errors stood out: I 
speculated, that such occurrences would inevitable challenge the client-side actor’s 
perception of the vendor-side’s trustworthiness, be it at an individual or organizational 
level; or in the processes or IT-systems. As it turns out, this string of errors arguably 
only had a very limited influence on the client-side actors’ perception of vendor-side 
trustworthiness, as they quickly found a solution that seemed to render the errors 
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insignificant, at least seen from a trust perspective. However, it equipped me with a 
conversation icebreaker during my first weeks of observation studies and, as one of the 
vendor-side actors told me on my very first day of observation studies at the 
Berlingske Media headquarters in Copenhagen: “we’re probably quite low on credit 
these days” (Field Notes 20130212), signifying that the client-side actors’ trust in them 
had indeed been reduced.  
Framing the Research Questions 
I started this introductory chapter by highlighting the important role of trust in all 
human life. To a great extent ‘to trust’ is something we take for granted; and the 
importance of trust in everyday life only surfaces, when there is a trust issue. While 
trust is always needed I argue in the lines of Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999) that “trust is 
pivotal in a global virtual team to reduce the high levels of uncertainty endemic to the 
global and technologically based environment” (p. 792), because of the difficulties 
establishing contextual confidence (Möllering, 2006). Rosen et al. (2005) rhetorically 
ask: “Does a failure to make a promised entry in the team’s web archive mean that a 
teammate is struggling with a complex issue, under pressure from on-site management 
to make other issues a priority, or just slacking off?” (p. 259), which signifies the 
challenge of distributed work quite well. Globally distributed work is, in the words of 
Hinds & Bailey (2003) in real danger or being a case of out of sight, out of sync and 
“[w]hen trust is missing, team members are more likely to question others’ intentions 
and make attributions that do not adequately account for situational factors” (Hinds & 
Bailey, 2003: 618).  
Thus, successful collaboration in globally distributed teams is dependent on trust, but 
at the same time trusting those remote colleagues or collaborators is not exactly easy. 
From the body of knowledge on trust we know that to trust is dependent on 
antecedents to trust. In order to trust someone or something, that someone or 
something must render him-, her- or itself trustworthy in some way or another. Thus, 
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positive assessment of trustworthiness is the first step towards creating trust. Recently 
Onora O’Neill gave a TED-talk1 on the topic of ‘What we don’t understand about trust’ 
in which she argued that “[m]ore trust is not an intelligent aim in this life. Intelligently 
placed and intelligently refused trust, is the proper aim. What matters in the first place 
is not trust, its trustworthiness; its judging how trustworthy people are in different 
respects: Are they competent, are they honest, are they reliable” (O’Neill, 2013). I 
believe that O’Neill is right in this claim – at least at an actor level. Arguably, more or 
less trust at a generalized societal level may say something about the society itself, but 
in our everyday lives – including our working life – trust in itself is not an intelligent 
aim. Rather, we should focus on intelligent assessments of trustworthiness. In an 
offshore outsourcing collaboration, as the one that constitute the empirical foundation 
for this dissertation, it is arguably not more trust, as such, we should pursue at an actor 
level, but rather understanding of how trustworthy actors can be rendered visible as 
exactly that, trustworthy. 
Thus, the focal point of this dissertation is to understand how vendor-side actors – as 
individuals as well as collectives – are rendered and rendering themselves trustworthy 
in the eyes of the client-side actors. Two things are worth noting as this point. First, I 
apply a selective focus, since it is primarily vendor-side trustworthiness in the eyes of 
the client-side actors that is being investigated. This is not to say that the perceived 
trustworthiness of the client-side actors and the client organization in the eyes of the 
vendor-side actors is irrelevant. However, I find the avenue of researching vendor-side 
trustworthiness more promising: Partly, because of the financial and operative risk that 
a client faces in an offshore outsourcing context. But also because my ethnographic 
studies have provided much more empirical material to substantiate this client-side 
focus than had I chosen a vendor-side perspective. Secondly, I consciously omit to pass 
                                         
1 TED-talks are a global set of conferences owned by the private non-profit Sapling Foundation. 
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judgment on when it is intelligent to assess an actor as trustworthy and when it is not. 
Rather, my aim is to understand how trustworthiness in globally distributed 
collaboration is affected by distance, by the use of control mechanisms, by culture, and 
by the actions of boundary spanners.  
Research Questions 
Based on the above my main research question reads: 
How can vendor-side actors, as individuals and as a collective, be 
constructed as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-side 
actors? 
In order to answer the overall research question I will, as mentioned above, apply an 
interdisciplinary perspective, where trust and trustworthiness are not isolated 
theoretical constructs, but rather dynamic constructs that influence and are influenced 
by other constructs. These other constructs have surfaced as important themes 
throughout my ethnographic studies and will be analyzed in conjunction with trust and 
trustworthiness in each their chapter. Thus, in the four analytical chapters I aim at 
answering the questions below, in order to finally answer the main research question 
above. 
Sub Research Questions: 
• (1a): What are the perceived challenges of globally distributed collaboration?  
• (1b): How does distance influence the actors’ perceptions of their inter-
organizational counterpart’s trustworthiness? 
• (2a): How are control mechanisms used in the collaboration between client and 
vendor? 
• (2b): How does the use of control mechanisms affect client-side perceptions of 
the trustworthiness of vendor-side actors? 
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• (3): How is vendor-side actors’ trustworthiness affected by enactments of 
cultural boundaries?  
• (4): What is the role of boundary spanners and how do these boundary spanners 
influence perceived trustworthiness of vendor-side actors and the vendor 
organization? 
Guide to Reading 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I consists of this chapter (Chapter 1) 
which introduces the overall research agenda. Chapter II ‘Theory on Trust’ is the main 
theoretical chapter in which I introduce my theoretical standpoint on trust and 
trustworthiness. In Chapter III: ‘Constructing the Field’ I introduce my methodological 
stance in light of my adherence to a hermeneutical perspective on theory of science and 
I elaborate on my own pre-understandings obtained through several years of working 
with offshore outsourcing as a practitioner. This chapter also presents the methods I 
have applied throughout my ethnographic field studies; finally I offer some 
methodological considerations about the multiple roles of the researcher. In Chapter 
IV: ‘Setting the Scene’ I present the two industrial partners, HCL and Berlingske 
Media, in greater detail; and I give an overview of the collaboration in order to 
acquaint the reader with the empirical context in which I am doing my field studies. 
Part II consists of four analytical chapters, which scrutinizes trust and trustworthiness 
in conjunction with another construct: In Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ I 
analyze what challenges distributed collaboration introduces to the actors from both 
organization and how distance and mediated communication affect trustworthiness. In 
Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I take a closer look at the use 
of control mechanisms in the offshore outsourcing collaboration and how the use of 
control mechanisms affect perceptions of vendor-side trustworthiness. In Chapter VII: 
‘Trusting across Cultures’ I delve into how cultural boundaries shape perceptions of 
trustworthiness and in Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness Boundary’ I 
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engage in an analysis of the role of boundary spanners and how they influence client-
side actors’ perceptions of vendor-side trustworthiness. 
These last three analytical chapters are structured in the same way. First, I introduce 
the research question that the chapter aims to answer. Second, I present a literature 
review related to “the other” construct (control, culture and boundary spanning, 
respectively). Third, I relate the theoretical construct to my theoretical stance on trust 
and trustworthiness. Fourth, I provide an analysis leading towards answering the 
particular sub-questions posed. Finally I discuss these findings, highlight theoretical 
and practical contributions and conclude. 
The first of the analytical chapters is structured a bit different. It deals with the 
challenges that the actors perceive that working in a globally distributed environment 
poses. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an initial understanding of these 
challenges, which is then brought into play in the following three analytical chapters. 
Thus, this chapter does not have a separate literature review as it primarily uses the 
theoretical framework on trust developed in Chapter II. 
Part III consists of Chapter IX, where I discuss the overall research question by 
drawing on the findings from the analytical chapters presented throughout Part II. This 
chapter is primarily aimed at connecting the four analytical chapters and answering the 
overall research question. In Chapter X: ‘Conclusion and Future Work’ I sum up the 
theoretical and practical contributions and conclude and I reiterate on the theoretical 
contributions that have been identified and elaborate in the analytical chapters in Part 
II. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORY ON TRUST 
Introduction 
In 1979 the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann noted, “one should expect trust to be 
increasingly in demand as a means of enduring the complexity of the future which 
technology will generate” (Paul & McDaniel, 2004: 184). Indeed, Luhmann was right 
and it is the ambition of this chapter to shed light on the most current discussion among 
trust scholars on this very subject of trust. 
The progression of the chapter will be as follows: First, I will outline the definition of 
trust I adhere to. Secondly, I will introduce how trust is conceptualized in the vast 
majority of trust research. Third, I will discuss what is commonly referred to as 
antecedents to trust. Fourth, I will take a closer look at how trust can be managed. 
Fifth, I will introduce trust as a multi-level construct and argue that interpersonal trust 
is just one level of trust we must take into consideration alongside trust in collectives 
and artifacts. Finally, I will sum of the theoretical perspective on trust that I adhere to 
and relate this to my agenda on researching trustworthiness in an interdisciplinary 
perspective. 
Empirical studies of trust are predominantly conducted in settings characterized by co-
location of actors. Furthermore, the sparse studies of trust in distributed work-
environments draw on the same definitions and conceptualizations as research on trust 
in settings where actors are in physical proximity of each other. Therefore, most of this 
chapter draws on trust studies of co-located people. However, I have included the most 
significant research on trust in distributed teams, which I present below in the section 
on ‘Managing Trust’.  
Defining Trust 
Over the years trust has been researched within many different paradigms within the 
world of social science: For instance, rational choice theorists, such as Coleman 
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(1990), see trust by and large as a question of utility; and neo-institutionalists regard 
trust as a matter of routines (Zucker, 1986) that are largely beyond the individual or 
organizational levels and where trust is conceptualized as “a set of expectations shared 
by all those involved in an exchange” (Zucker, 1986: 54). Others again adopt a process 
view to trust (e.g. Nooteboom, 1996; Möllering, 2006) signifying that trust is a 
dynamic construct and that trust is influenced by reason and by routine, but also by the 
reflexivity of human actors with emotions and at times non-rational behavior. 
As trust has been researched within many different research paradigms over the years it 
has inevitably also been defined in a number of different ways. In 1998 Rousseau and 
her colleagues published a cross-disciplinary review of trust aimed partly at 
understanding whether “scholars fundamentally agree or disagree on the meaning of 
trust” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 394). They arrive at the conclusion that “scholars do 
appear to agree fundamentally on the meaning of trust” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395) 
and that two conditions are essential for trust to arise, namely risk and 
interdependence. 
Rousseau et al. (1998) stress that if an action can be undertaken without any risk 
associated with it, trust is not needed. This signifies that we can only speak of trust in 
cases where the trustor is engaging in a risky endeavor at some level. That is, 
“[u]ncertainty regarding whether the other intends to and will act appropriately is the 
source of risk” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). In this way risk creates an opportunity for 
trust and thereby for risk-taking, which leads to the second condition, interdependence, 
as Rousseau et al. (1998) signify that we can only speak about trust insofar such risk-
taking is necessary in order to achieve one’s interest. That is, if risk-taking and thereby 
reliance on another party is not necessary to fulfill one’s intention, trust is not 
necessary – thus, we only speak of trust in situations where trustor and trustee are 
dependent on each other. In the words of Möllering (2006): “For well-structured 
problem with clear alternatives and expected values, no reference to trust is necessary” 
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(p. 106). Based on these two conditions Rousseau et al. (1998) propose the following 
definition of trust:  
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior 
of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395).  
Over the years this definition has become widely accepted among trust scholars. For 
instance Möllering (2006) adheres to this definition and stresses that we can only speak 
about trust in cases where “some uncertainty and vulnerability that actors have to deal 
with by means other than pay-off calculations” (Möllering, 2006: 32); and Dirks & 
Ferrin (2002) adhere to the same definition “recognizing that researchers have 
operationalized it in different ways and for different types of leadership referents” in 
their well cited work on trust in leadership (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), as well as in their 
equally well-cited work on the role of trust in organizational settings (Dirks & Ferrin, 
2001).  
Based on a comprehensive review of trust-related research published in fifteen top-tier 
journals over the last decade Fulmer & Gelfand (2012) conclude that “the vast majority 
of trust definitions focus on two key dimensions that have been identified in prior 
reviews […]: positive expectations of trustworthiness, which generally refers to 
perceptions, beliefs, or expectations about the trustee’s intention and being able to rely 
on the trustee, and willingness to accept vulnerability, which generally refers to 
suspension of uncertainty […] or an intention or a decision to take risk and to depend 
on the trustee” (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012: 1171). Finally, Paul & McDaniel (2004) 
state that “general consensus has been reached that trust is a psychological state based 
on confident expectations and beliefs that another party will act in a certain manner, 
and that the trusting party must in some way be vulnerable under conditions of risk and 
interdependency to actions by the other party” (p. 186). With almost five thousand 
citations of Rousseau et al. (1998) it seems reasonable to agree with Paul & McDaniel 
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that general consensus has indeed been reached. In the remainder of this PhD 
dissertation I too will adhere to the definition proposed by Rousseau et al. (1998).  
Conceptualizations of Trust and Trust Related Constructs 
The trust literature provides many conceptualizations of trust and trust related 
constructs in the quest to answer the question “what makes people trust each other?” 
However, there seems to be agreement on two things. First, whether people engage in a 
trusting relationship depends on their propensity to trust: and second, trusting can be 
both cognition-based and affect-based. These two topics – propensity and what trusting 
behavior is based on – will be addressed in the following two sections. 
Propensity to Trust 
One of the most famous and well-cited models of trust has been proposed by Mayer et 
al. (1995) who argue that “[t]rust for a trustee will be a function of the trustee’s 
perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity and of the trustor’s propensity to trust” (p. 
720). Later in this chapter I will return to the notion of perceived ability, benevolence 
and integrity in greater detail, but for now I shall devote attention to the last part of the 
sentence, namely the notion of propensity to trust. The model proposes that trust can 
be understood as “a willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on both the 
trustor’s propensity to trust other in general, and on the trustor’s perception that the 
particular trustee is trustworthy” (Lewicki & Brinsfiels, 2012: 31) and signifies that 
trust is not merely a result of concrete assessments of trustworthiness, but also by a 
general propensity detached from the concrete situation. 
A wide range of other trust researchers also addresses this notion of propensity: For 
instance Zaheer & Zaheer (2006) talk about cultural dispositions; Greenberg et al. 
(2007) label them predispositions; Oza et al. (2006) highlight the importance of prior 
experiences in comparable situations and Uslaner (2012) calls it moralistic trust 
defined as “faith in people whom we don’t know and who are likely to be different 
from ourselves.” (p. 73). Uslaner (2012) elaborates: “We can’t base trust in strangers 
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on their trustworthiness, because we don’t know them. We must presume that others 
share our fundamental moral values. We learn trust early in life from our parents and it 
is largely consistent throughout our lives, resistant to many experiences both good and 
bad (…) Moralistic trust does not refer to trust in specific persons, but rather trust in 
strangers more generally” (p. 73). It is referred to as moralistic trust because “like a 
moral value it is relatively stable over time and not based on individual experience. 
Moralistic trusters see the best in people and rationalize away negative experiences, 
continuing to place trust in others even though they might experience disappointment. 
They are not blind to the likelihood of being let down, but go on putting faith in people 
anyway” (Godall, 2012: 97).  
Finally, Ferrin & Gillespie (2010) propose that macro factors such as “national wealth, 
income equality, education, democracy and ‘good’ government, strong formal 
institutions and ethnic homogeneity” (p. 65) have an impact on an actor’s propensity to 
trust. Thus, the notion of propensity has many different names in the body of literature 
on trust, but to a large extent it covers the same phenomenon. In the remainder of this 
dissertation I adhere to Mayer et al.’s (1995) terminology originating from Rotter 
(1967) and call it ‘propensity to trust’.  
By accepting that trusting behavior is not solely based on assessments of 
trustworthiness of a specific other in a specific situation but also on the trustor’s 
propensity, an analysis of trust must also capture the larger context and historicity of 
the actors. However, it is striking that these constructs all conceive of propensity to 
trust as something rather stable; as a “facet of personality influenced by early 
developmental experiences, and by cultural background” (Dietz et al., 2010: 11). I 
argue that this understanding of propensity neglects that many of our experiences in 
life are encountered after these ‘early developmental experiences’ and these are also 
likely to have an effect. In line with my understanding of culture and trust as socially 
constructed phenomena (see Chapter III for a discussion of epistemic stance) I also 
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argue that our social context repeatedly shapes our propensity. The word itself, 
‘propensity’, means ‘a natural inclination’; but claiming that such an inclination is 
‘natural’, in the sense taken-for-granted or undisputed, and not shaped throughout life, 
is unreasonable. Rather than conceiving of propensity as something stable and hard-to-
change, we should conceive of it as being constantly in-the-making. I will return to this 
point in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ where I unfold an analysis of the how 
perceptions and enactment of cultural boundaries influence perceived trustworthiness. 
Cognition-based and Affect-based Trust 
While the trust research categorizes numerous types of trust, they all seem to fall in 
two overall categories, namely, cognition-based and affect-based trust (McAllister, 
1995), which many trust researchers find to be practically inseparable (Möllering, 
2006) as “[t]rust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking” (Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985: 972). Despite this practical mix in everyday life Schaubroeck et al. 
(2011) note that “it is important to distinguish between affective and cognitive 
dimensions of trust (…) [as] these trust dimensions are associated with different 
psychological processes” (p. 864).  
Cognition-based trust “is based on the performance-relevant cognitions such as 
competence, responsibility, reliability, and dependability” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 
864), and within the trust literature there is a wide range of labels for trust that address 
the cognitive dimension of trust. These labels include calculative trust; rational trust; 
contractual trust; knowledge-based trust and performance-based trust (Paul & 
McDaniel, 2004). They are all instances of cognition-based trust but differ in the sense 
that they are more precise as to what they address (e.g. contractual trust addresses 
contracts) or the rationale behind trust (e.g. calculative trust which conceptualizes trust 
as a form of economic exchange). Consequently, though there are differences in the 
detailed level of the conceptualizations they are all based on the notion that 
 33 
trustworthiness is rational and follow a cognitive process consisting of an assessment 
of trustworthiness, leading to preparedness to engage in a trusting relationship.  
As opposed to cognition-based trust, which is based on rational assessments of 
trustworthiness, “affect-based trust refers to the ‘emotional bonds between individuals’ 
that are grounded upon expressions of ‘genuine care and concern for the welfare’ of 
the other party” (Schaubroeck et al, 2011: 864, authors’ italics) and is as such based on 
moods and emotions (Chen et al., 2011) rather than on rationality. According to 
Schaubroeck et al. (2011) affective trust enhances the feeling of psychological safety 
which in turn “enhances members’ willingness to share their knowledge and skills, and 
as a result, they are not only better able to identify and utilize more effective 
performance strategies” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 864). Later in this chapter, in the 
section called ‘Managing Trust’, I will take a closer look at the notion of psychological 
safety. 
While cognition-based trust and affect-based trust in practice are hard to separate, 
research also suggests that the mix of these two types of trust changes over time as “the 
impact of cognitive trust [cognition-based] fades and the impact of affective [affect-
based] trust increases” (Greenberg et al., 2007: 332) when actors get to know each 
other. Consequently, the assessments of trustworthiness also change – from being an 
assessment of what Schaubroeck et al. (2011) calls team potency, consisting of 
assessment of performance and ability to perform, to a state where trusting behavior is 
“more affective and intuitive rather than calculative” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 865). 
This shift from cognition-based trust to affect-based trust bears resemblance to Li’s 
(2011) processual view on trust where initial weak trust can develop into mature 
strong trust insofar the modes of trust changes from being characterized by trust-as-
attitude to being characterized by trust-as-choice, where “trust-as-attitude is a reactive 
and protective psychological assurance of certainty and control, [and] trust-as-choice is 
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a proactive and promotional behavioural commitment to uncertainty and vulnerability 
as an opportunity to initiate a trust-building process” (Li, 2011: 414). 
Li’s (2011) geocentric framework on trust ads another dimension to the discussion of 
cognition-based versus affect-based trust, namely control, which becomes an integral 
part of trust-as-attitude. I will get back to the relationship between trust and control in 
much greater detail in the theoretical framing in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on 
Trust and Control’. 
Antecedents to Trust – Ability, Benevolence and Integrity 
Arguably, trust has a cognitive and an affective dimension though they are intertwined 
in practice. Furthermore – as mentioned earlier – trust is broadly acknowledged as 
being based on three so-called antecedents to trust and characteristics of 
trustworthiness as presented in the work by Mayer et al. (1995). Greenberg et al. 
(2007) explain the relationship between the two trust dimensions and the three 
antecedents to trust like this: 
“Trust traditionally arises in two ways. One is based on rational or 
calculative assessments and is called cognitive [cognition-based] trust. It is 
the result of an evaluation of evidence of performance reliability and 
competence. Cognitive [cognition-based] trust has been modeled as a 
function of the other person's integrity and ability. The second way trust 
arises is based on emotional ties and is called affective [affect-based] trust. 
It is the result of the social bonds developed in a reciprocal relationship in 
which there is genuine care and concern for the welfare of the other person. 
This type of trust is based on assessments of benevolence.” (Greenberg et 
al., 2007: 327) 
Following Greenberg et al. (2007) we can say that if one perceives another to be able 
and have integrity we say that that person has cognitive trust in the other. If one 
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perceives another as benevolent we say that that person has affective trust in the other.  
Ability and integrity relates to the cognitive dimension of trust, and benevolence 
relates to the affective dimension of trust. This does not suggest that all trust 
researchers agree on these trustworthiness indicators, but “the literature suggests an 
overall image of the trustworthy actor as someone who is able, and willing and 
consistent in not exploring the trustor’s vulnerability” (Möllering, 2006: 48). 
Given the fact that the definition from Rousseau et al. (1998) is so widely accepted this 
is hardly surprising. Rousseau et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of people’s 
actions – their behavior – and their underlying motives – intentions – as critical for 
trust to arise and arguably one’s behavior is at least in part a result of one’s abilities, 
and one’s intentions towards another person is affected by one’s benevolence towards 
that person. Finally, one’s integrity can – to a certain extent – be judged by one’s 
actions. Consequently, one cannot talk about behavior and integrity without also 
talking about ability, benevolence and integrity. Thus, ability, benevolence and 
integrity can be considered “base characteristics” of trustworthiness. However, this 
does not rule out the possibility that an analysis of empirical material can reveal other 
antecedents to trust – which is a topic I will return to in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across 
Cultures’ 
The Leap of Faith, Suspension and Active Trust 
As I have argued above we can only speak of trust insofar there is an element of risk 
involved (Rousseau et al., 1998). To trust is inherently a risky business and thus a 
trustor has to cope with uncertainty. This is often referred to as a ‘leap of faith’ 
(Möllering, 2006; Bachmann, 2011) drawing on the philosopher Kierkegaard’s 
vocabulary. Bachmann (2011) explains this as a process in which “a trustor transforms 
fuzzy uncertainty (...) into a certain risk which a trustor is prepared to accept” (p. 207). 
Möllering (2006) has further refined this and conceptualizes such uncertainty-coping 
as suspension, which he finds to be “the essence of trust, because trust as a state of 
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positive expectation of others can only be reached when reason, routine and reflexivity 
are combined with suspension” (p.  110). He further explains:  
“When actors achieve suspension they treat uncertainty and vulnerability as 
unproblematic, even if it could turn out that they are problematic. Luhmann 
[…] describes trust as ‘a movement towards indifference: by introducing 
trust, certain possibilities of development can be excluded from 
consideration. Certain dangers which cannot be removed but which should 
not disrupt actions are neutralized” (Möllering, 2006: 116) 
Möllering’s conceptualization of suspension is widely acknowledged among trust 
scholars (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012) and constitutes a break in trust research, which has 
traditionally considered “the trustor as a rather passive figure who reaches (or fails to 
reach) the state of trust on the basis of ‘given’ factors such as her/his own 
predisposition, the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee, and/or relevant institutional 
safeguards” (Child & Möllering, 2003: 70). This passive path to trust is what Child & 
Möllering call contextual confidence, which they criticize as they are dissatisfied “with 
the notion that the trustor can only draw on ‘given’ contextual variables” (Child & 
Möllering, 2003: 71). Child & Möllering reject that the trustor is a merely a passive 
figure; and argue that actors “can play a more (pro)active role in trust production, 
perhaps especially where the contextual foundations for trust are weak” (Child & 
Möllering, 2003: 71). As a counter-construct to the contextual confidence Child & 
Möllering (2003) introduce the concept of active trust, which they borrow from 
Giddens (1994). 
Möllering (2006) explains that “active trust is trust that needs to be worked on 
continuously by the actors involved through mutual openness and intensive 
communication: it reflects contingency and change in an ongoing process of reflexive 
constitution” (p. 100). In their analysis of Hong Kong managers and subordinates from 
mainland China, Child & Möllering (2003) show that active trust can be used as a 
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strategy in cross-border collaboration in order to strengthen the basis for trust by for 
instance working actively on showing commitment and establishing personal rapport. 
The cornerstone of active trust is that actors play an active role in establishment and 
maintenance of trust. Specifically, this agency is materialized when actors deliberately 
take a leap of faith and through this leap of faith achieve a state of suspension. This 
conceptualization of suspension is chosen to stress that it is not something that is done 
once, nor is it a stable state. Rather it is an ongoing “process that enables actors to deal 
with irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability” (Möllering, 2006: 110). In his earlier 
works Luhmann (1979) labeled this indifference, which Möllering (2006) elaborates on 
as an as-if attitude where one acts as if unknown and uncertain actions of others are 
certain. As-if attitude “means that actors interact with each other as if ignorance, 
doubts and dangers that exist alongside knowledge, convictions and assurances are 
unproblematic and can be set aside, at least for the time being. […] The logic of ‘as if’ 
in trust is specified further as a logic of ‘despite’, ‘although’ and ‘nevertheless’” 
(Möllering, 2006: 115). Consequently, the as-if attitude is a will to trust another person. 
This way trust both starts and stops with the actor, as agency is needed for trust to 
emerge.  
In the remainder of this dissertation I will use Möllering’s (2006) conceptualization of 
suspension as I believe that this best captures the point that trust building and trust 
maintenance are ongoing activities where the trustor is repeatedly taking a risk. The 
trustor is not doing so blindly, but rather as a result of knowing that in order to succeed 
in an endeavor that requires trust he must take upon him an as-if attitude and act as if 
he is indifferent. This does not suggest that he is indeed indifferent, but rather that he 
consciously acknowledges that the situation requires him to act as if he is. Inspired by 
Luhmann’s (1979) term of indifference and Child & Möllering’s notion of agency, I 
suggest calling it: enlightened indifference. 
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Managing Trust 
“We should abandon the belief that trust is a fragile phenomenon which 
exists only in intimate relationships between two individuals, largely beyond 
our influence and control” (Bachmann, 2011: 204) 
By abandoning the notion that a trustor is a passive figure, and stating that a trustor has 
agency and can engage in active trust building by accepting that trust is inherently 
risky and acting with enlightened indifference to achieve suspension, we must also 
acknowledge that trust can to some extent be managed. Trust is, as Bachmann (2011) 
points out, not a fragile phenomenon beyond our influence and control, but rather 
something we, as actors, can influence. This does of course not mean that a manager 
can create trust among his or her subordinate team members, but merely that trust can 
be “self-managed”, so to speak. 
Nevertheless, recent literature on trust clearly suggests a number of ways in which trust 
can be managed within organizations. Common for these managerial techniques is first 
that they stress the role of leaders as trust catalysts. For instance, Greenberg et al. 
(2007) suggest that in order to overcome barriers that are related to team members’ 
disposition to trust it is important that “even before team members first interact, 
managers need to take steps to create a foundation for trust” (p. 328), by making sure 
that every team member has personal characteristics that make trust building possible 
and “if the potential members do not have these characteristics and skills, training 
should be given in these areas in effort to increase the probability of success” (ibid.). 
Following a similar line of thought Schaubroeck et al. (2011) signify that “when team 
members perceive that they are pursuing meaningful, shared objectives through clear 
processes that have been outlined by the leader, they are more likely to develop high 
cognition-based trust in the leader” (p. 864); and Rosen et al. (2005) claim that leaders 
must actively engage in the development of team trust “through shared visions, passion 
for the task, face-to-face contact and the like” (p. 267). On a higher level, Li (2011) 
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concludes that “leadership plays a pivotal role in trust building in organizational 
settings” (p. 415).  
The literature reviewed for this chapter reveals no counter-argument against the notion 
that in an institutional context trust can be managed, though Dietz (2011) claims that 
“any trust encounter anywhere in the world, in any country, in any sector, and in any 
relationship can probably be interpreted accurately using this staged model: there is 
always an assessment (however thorough) of the other party’s trustworthiness which 
informs a preparedness to be vulnerable that, in genuine cases of trust, leads to a risk-
taking act” (p. 215). By saying so Dietz does not as such make a counter-argument 
against the possibility to manage trust, but puts forward an interpersonal view on trust 
that significantly opposes the organizational view on trust that is put forward by 
Bachmann (2011) among others, who argues that it is possible to “make a distinction 
between two different types of trust: trust can, depending on the way it is generated, 
either appear in the form of interaction-based trust or as institutional-based trust” (p. 
206). Rather, Dietz (2011) argues that “for most trust encounters, the two broad 
sources […] – institutional and interactional – not only can co-exist, but probably do” 
(p. 216) and that “most decisions to trust are informed by evidence from both 
interactions and institutions” (p. 216). Summing it up, there is consensus in current 
trust research that trust can be managed, but there is a dispute among trust scholars 
whether “organizations must address interpersonal trust factors if they want to reap the 
benefits of newer work relationships” (Paul & McDaniel, 2004: 184) or if stronger 
focus should be put on institutional factors (Bachmann 2011). 
The second commonality for techniques for managing trust between actors is that trust 
scholars all focus on influencing actors’ “threshold” for taking a leap of faith and 
hereby affect actors’ willingness to achieve suspension positively and take upon them 
an as-if attitude. Below I shall attend to six prevailing ideas and management 
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techniques: Psychological safety, social interaction, task interdependence, reward 
structures, referral trust and swift trust.  
Psychological Safety 
In their recent studies of a multinational bank, where Hong Kong and U.S.-based 
employees were surveyed, Schaubroeck et al. (2011) found that what they call team 
psychological safety plays a significant role when it comes to team performance as 
“high team psychological safety can improve team members’ engagement at work 
because it means that members believe they can participate openly and actively 
without fear of suffering adverse personal consequences, such as being derogated for 
their ideas and observations or for the manner by which they express them” (p. 864). 
Schaubroeck et al. (2011) conclude that team members with a high degree of 
psychological safety “tend to become more psychologically engaged in team tasks than 
are members of teams with lower psychological safety”. This psychological safety is 
largely dependent on how trustworthy the leader is perceived (Schaubroeck et al., 
2011), and it corresponds well with Li’s (2011) notion of “paternalistic leadership, 
delineated by the dimensions of personalized authoritarianism, personalized 
benevolence and personalized integrity, that emphasizes strong personalized trust in 
the network domain by turning an organization into an extended family” (p. 429). 
Another variation of the same is found by Oza et al. (2006) in their studies of client-
vendor relationships in outsourcing, in which they conclude that “transparency 
throughout the project is the most important factor to maintain trust” (p. 352) in the 
sense that “you have to be upfront and honest with your client. You should not hide 
anything from him, whether it is good or bad, whether it is going to earn you a flack 
for that moment. This is very important for the long lasting relationship and to achieve 
trust” (op. cit. p. 351). 
Thus, psychological safety seems to be a common theme with regards to leadership 
focus when it comes to managing trust development. For most scholars this is done by 
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the means of the leader’s personal attributes and work transparency, which is 
consistent with the traditional approach within management studies. Furthermore, on 
the same subject, Rosen et al. (2005) signify the importance of knowledge sharing as 
“creating a team culture of psychological safety begins with reinforcing all forms of 
knowledge sharing within the team” (p. 268). 
Social Interaction 
Within the trust literature the importance of social interaction for building trust is 
repeatedly mentioned (e.g. Chung & Jackson, 2004; Li, 2011; Möllering, 2006) as 
personal engagement is regarded as an imperative means to build trust and because 
trust is constructed discursively. In the words of Möllering (2006): “social networks 
clearly matter for trust as trustors and trustees are embedded in relationships with each 
other” (p. 196). By agreeing on social interaction as inherent in trust building and trust 
maintenance I fundamentally part with the notion that trust is a “rational choice only” 
construct – a notion which Coleman (1990) is arguably the most prominent advocate 
for. However, this does not suggest that irrationality is the dominant feature of trust 
development, but merely that trust has a non-rational side to it – an emotional side, 
which has already been discussed earlier in this chapter by introducing the notion of 
affect-based trust.  
The idea that trust is partly non-rational can be described as ‘I trust him because I like 
him’ in line with the thinking of Lewis & Weigert (1985) who stress that “trust 
succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail” (p. 969). Consequently, a 
professional relationship will grow stronger in terms of trust development insofar the 
involved actors not only engage with each other on a strictly professional level, but 
also invest in getting to know each other on a personal level as such non-task related 
communication is conducive for trust development. 
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Task Interdependence 
Psychological safety and social interaction both have a positive influence on trust 
development. However, much more practical and hands-on matters are also shown to 
be conducive to trust development: In their 2011 article Schaubroeck and colleagues 
found that trust is positively affected when team members are working towards a 
common and well defined goal. Moreover, Chung & Jackson (2011) report that “task 
interdependence has been widely recognised as a characteristic that influences 
employee attitudes and behaviours” (p. 68), and subsequently that a high level of trust 
requires that the work that is to be done by the team is done in a manner where they are 
highly dependent on each other’s contributions. Chung & Jackson (2011) draw on a 
“four-level hierarchy of task interdependence: pooled interdependence, sequential 
interdependence, reciprocal interdependence and team interdependence” (p. 70) where 
pooled interdependence is defined as interdependence in which the team members each 
contribute independently and that these contributions are put together subsequently and 
thus, the team members are independent of each other to perform their part of the 
work. Sequential interdependence is defined as a situation where the one team member 
is dependent on another team member’s delivery to start his or her own. Reciprocal 
interdependence adds a cyclical dimension to the sequential interdependence. Finally, 
team interdependence “is the highest level of task interdependence; it requires that all 
team members work together simultaneously and make job-related decisions 
collectively to complete a project” (Chung & Jackson, 2011: 71). Thus, according to 
the findings of Chung & Jackson (2011) there is evidence that trust building and task 
interdependence is of a reciprocal nature, where more interaction can lead to higher 
levels of trust, but, obviously, at the same time also is more dependent on trusting 
behavior and risk-taking. 
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Reward Structures 
While the influence of psychological safety and social interaction are mentioned in one 
way or the other by many trust scholars the same cannot be said about the influence of 
reward structures. However, it is worth mentioning as rewards are indeed central to 
trust in a professional context, and although not much light has been shed on this 
subject it is particularly important to mention in an empirical context such as the one 
studied in this dissertation, characterized by inter-organizational collaboration, where 
one organization is the client and another is the vendor and revenue streams are thus 
moved between organizations. Here it is plausible that the reward structure 
significantly differs across organizational boundaries.  
Greenberg et al. (2007) find evidence that: “In general, competitive rewards have a 
strong negative influence on trust and cooperative rewards have a strong positive 
influence on trust. Competitive rewards can detrimentally influence the willingness to 
share information. They can also influence the way team members perceive the 
behavior of others and result in negative evaluation of others' integrity.” (p. 329). 
Consequently, if actors are rewarded according to the same success criteria – if they 
are working towards the same common goal, as Schaubroeck et al. (2011) would put it 
– they will easier develop trust than if this is not the case. Greenberg et al. (2007) do 
no specify what they mean by ‘reward’. It can mean a financial reward, but it could 
also be a broader notion of reward including for instance appreciation in different non-
monetary forms. 
Referral Trust 
Jøsang et al. (2006) introduce the concept of referral trust, by suggesting that in some 
instances trust can be transitive: 
“Trust transitivity means, for example, that if Alice trusts Bob who trusts 
Eric, then Alice will also trust Eric. This assumes that Bob actually tells 
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Alice that he trusts Eric, which is called a recommendation.” (Jøsang et al., 
2006: 85) 
The central idea in referral trust is that a trustor is able to trust other, and to them 
unknown, actors (the trustee) by the means of a referral from a trusted actor, who trusts 
the trustee. That is, if a person trusts e.g. his auto-mechanic (1), which Jøsang et al. 
(2006) designates as direct functional trust and another person trusts the person that 
trusts the auto-mechanic (direct referral trust) and thus finds this actors 
recommendation of the auto-mechanic credible (2), then the trustor is said to have 
indirect functional trust in the auto-mechanic (3). This is illustrated below in figure 
2.1. 
 
The notion of referral trust as described by Jøsang et al. (2006) is embedded in the 
Information Systems (IS) research and is not as such a topic within the trust research 
community, nor does it relate much to the extensive body of literature within trust 
research. However, I believe it is worth mentioning as it resonates well with two 
powerful constructs within the trust research community: active trust and swift trust. 
As described earlier in this chapter active trust (Child & Möllering, 2003) entails 
agency among the actors. Thus, trust is not merely built on given and external factors 
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but can also be established by an active effort by the actors. Referral trust is exactly 
such an active effort, where the trustor by realizing his or her lack of knowledge about 
a potential trustee engages with a middleman and by the means of referral seeks to 
build trust in the unknown potential trustee.  
Swift Trust 
The notion of referral trust bears resemblance to swift trust coined by Meyerson et al. 
(1996). In this well-cited work Meyerson et al. (1996) argue that in temporary work 
teams a role-based form of trust, which they label swift trust, can emerge. This form of 
trust is based on roles. Meyerson et al. (1996) argue that “[i]f people in temporary 
systems deal with one another more as roles than as individuals – which is likely 
because the system is built of strangers interacting to meet a deadline – then 
expectations should be more stable, less capricious, more standardized, and defined 
more in terms of tasks and specialties than personalities” (p. 173). Thus, Meyerson et 
al. (1996) argue that a personal relationship is not necessary in temporary work groups 
as long as the tasks, objectives and roles are clearly defined as “the care of valuable 
things can be entrusted to individuals who seem fit to these institution-driven 
categories” (p. 175).  
Arguably, swift trust does not only apply to temporary work groups, but also to long-
term relationships, where people deal with each other as roles rather than as individuals 
(see Möllering, 2006: 67). Furthermore, the notions of swift trust and referral trust 
bears resemblance to one another as they are both occupied with establishing trust 
based on referrals – on one side to referrals about individuals on the other to referrals 
about common goals and well-defined roles within the system.  
Summing Up: How Can Trust Be Managed? 
In this section I have attended to the question on how trust can be managed by drawing 
on a number of scholars’ work. I have introduced six different themes related to 
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managing trust: Psychological safety, social interaction, task interdependence, reward 
structures, referral trust and swift trust. While the first notion presented, psychological 
safety, has a certain generic and meta-level flavor to it, other notions are indeed more 
practical and hands-on. A common denominator is that psychological safety seems to 
be the goal for the five other notions in the sense that they all are aimed at establishing 
exactly that, a feeling of psychological safety among the actors – each in their own 
way. 
Before moving on to discussing trust at different levels, there is, however, one thing 
that is worth noticing, namely that the understandings of how to manage trust are 
somewhat different: Some scholars argue that in order to establish a trusting work-
environment it is necessary to bring the actors closer together by the means of social 
interaction and a high degree of task interdependence. Other scholars argue that trust 
can indeed be established without such closeness by the means of intermediaries, either 
in the form of a reference person or by an organizational setup with well-defined roles 
and common goals. Arguably, there are different paths to manage development of trust.  
Researching Trust as a Multi-Level Construct 
At the outset of this chapter I pledged adherence to the definition of trust from 
Rousseau et al. (1998), where trust is understood as a psychological state. This clearly 
suggests that a trustor is a human actor insofar psychological is something we can only 
talk about for individuals. That is, machines do not have an inner life. However, this 
does not exclude that a trustor can also be a collective of individuals (Fulmer & 
Gelfand, 2012) 
The second half of the definition from Rousseau et al. (1998) does not suggest that the 
trustee, the one in whom the trustor trusts, has to be either an individual or a collective 
of individuals. The definition merely reads that we say that we trust when we are in a 
psychological state where we are prepared to accept a certain risk and vulnerability 
“based upon positive expectations or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). 
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This ‘another’ can be an individual. It can also be a collective of individuals (e.g. a 
team, an organization or another community) and it can also be a non-human actor – 
for instance a machine, a process, a report or some other artifact though the vast 
majority of trust research is occupied with understanding trust at an interpersonal level 
(Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012).    
So far I have, for the most part, dealt with trust as most trust scholars do: at the 
interpersonal level with the notable exception, namely the section on managing trust, 
where most literature covered look at trust at a collective level. However, despite the 
fact that trust in non-human actors or collectives of individuals and by collectives of 
individuals has received scarce attention over the years it is arguably an important 
aspect of trust. Thus, I agree with Fulmer & Gelfand (2012) when they claim that a 
“truly multilevel view of trust will ultimately inform both researchers and practitioners 
on this fundamental process in organizations” (p. 1214).  
In their comprehensive review of trust literature Fulmer & Gelfand (2012) make a 
distinction between trust at a level and trust in a referent. Trust at a level denominates 
who the trustor is, which in their review is divided into three levels: Individual, team 
and organization. Trust in a referent denominates whom the object of trust, the trustee, 
is. In their review they distinguish between the same three levels again: individual, 
team and organization. As their purpose is to understand prior research in an 
organizational context they have omitted trust in artifacts from their literature review. 
However, I argue that trust artifacts should also be taken into consideration – 
especially when investigating an empirical context of global IT-work, as artifacts play 
a predominant role in such a context; one may for example consider the reliance on 
technology for communication and coordination. 
Furthermore, the distinction between ‘the team’ and ‘the organization’ in Fulmer & 
Gelfand’s (2012) literature review is unclear as they fail to define what exactly 
constitutes a team, respectively an organization. A common understanding of a team is 
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a group of people that work close together, but one could say the same about an 
organization. Thus, in order to understand what constitutes a team and an organization, 
we must make a distinction between how close actors work together. Rather than 
making such a distinction a priori, I argue that we can all-together understand trust by 
merely distinguishing between an individual level on one hand and a collective on the 
other hand, where the latter encompasses both teams and organizations. By doing so I 
adhere to the established distinction between interpersonal and institutional trust of 
which Bachmann (2011) is a prominent exponent.  
Thus, when I turn to analyze trust I will do so by understanding trust as a multi-level 
construct with two types of trustors (individuals and collectives) and three types of 
trustees (individual, collective and artifact). However, it should be duly noted that the 
trustor as a collective can only be inferred by looking at individuals and listening to 
individual actors’ voices. From here a collective trustor may or may not be inferred (I 
will get back to that issue in more detail in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’).  
Summing-Up: Theoretical Perspectives on Trust 
In this chapter I have outlined recent achievements within trust research as well as 
commonly accepted notions about trust. By doing so I have also outlined my 
theoretical stance on the construct of trust.  
Throughout this dissertation I will adhere to the definition of trust as proposed by 
Rousseau et al. (1998), where trust is defined as a psychological state in which a trustor 
is prepared to accept risk and vulnerability, which is then reflected in his or her actions. 
A trustor is willing to accept such risks and uncertainties based on his or her propensity 
to trust as well as conscious or unconscious assessments of – in the case of a human 
trustor or a group – the trustee´s perceived ability, benevolence and integrity; and in 
the case of a non-human trustor on the ability and integrity of the trusted artifact.  
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The three antecedents to trust – ability, benevolence and integrity – are repeatedly 
referred to by trust researchers and I have argued how these three antecedents are 
intertwined with the definition itself. However, this does not rule out the possibility 
that other antecedents to trust can be found in specific empirical contexts (which is a 
point I will return to in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting across Cultures’). 
I have also introduced the notion of active trust coined by Child & Möllering (2003), 
which suggests that development of trust does not solely rely on given factors, what 
Child & Möllering (2003) calls contextual confidence, but also on the trustor’s agency 
used to actively engage in trust building. By adhering to the notion of active trust I also 
agree that trust can be managed. That is, in order to develop and maintain trust we can 
actively engage in activities that support trust building and we can build organizational 
structures that pave the way for trusting relationships. The cornerstone of managing 
trust seems to be that the trustors perceive the context as safe, which can be catered for 
by social interaction, a high degree of task interdependence, collective reward 
structures as well as the possibility to make use of referral trust and swift trust.  
Researching Trustworthiness in an Interdisciplinary Perspective 
At outlined earlier the aim of this dissertation is to research trustworthiness as 
trustworthiness is the basic condition for trust to emerge – and to do so in an 
interdisciplinary perspective by including sociological theory on control; theory on 
culture and cross-cultural team work; boundary spanning literature and to a certain 
extent also scholarly work from the CSCW (computer supported collaborative work) 
tradition That is, the dissertation aims to understand trustworthiness in a concrete 
empirical setting and how the constructs control, culture and boundary spanning 
influence trustworthiness.  
Most trust related research is engaged in understanding trust by applying a quantitative 
approach. McEvily & Tortoriello (2011) recently conducted a review of trust literature 
where they found 207 different measurements of trust (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011: 
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27). In their conclusion they ask whether the expanding body of research on trust will 
have an enduring impact on organizational literature. As an answer to this question 
they assess “that the answer depends critically on the state of measurement practice 
going forward. Unless the ‘Balkanisation’ of measures that is currently endemic to the 
field is replaced by a more coherent and unified approach, we believe that the potential 
will be severely constrained” (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011: 41). While I am not 
occupied with quantitative research the number of measurements do however pose a 
problem that should be addressed in qualitative research too: If measurements are so 
diverse how can we as qualitative researchers claim that our understanding of 
constructs, such as assessments of ability, benevolence and integrity, are reasonable? I 
argue that by laying forward elaborate descriptions of the empirical context and 
making room for the empirical actors’ own accounts I do circumvent this problem to a 
certain extent, as I provide a basis for the reader to judge whether my interpretation of 
trustworthiness assessments is reasonable and in line with the definitions and 
constructs I adhere to (a point which I will attend to in greater detail in Chapter: III: 
‘Constructing the Field’).  
Additionally, most trust research is occupied with understanding outcome rather than 
process. That is, trust scholars are by and large interested in understanding to what 
extent trust is present in a given empirical context. My aim is (again, unlike the 
majority) to understand trust building as a process. Instead of asking questions such as 
“Is trust present and why / why not” I aim to understand the foundation of trust, 
namely trustworthiness. Hereby, my research questions are more related to the process 
of developing and maintaining trust, rather than to the outcome at a specific point of 
time. Thus, my research questions evolve around a curiosity on how a foundation for 
trust can be established by looking into how actors’ assess each other and certain 
artifacts in terms of antecedents to trust.  
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Furthermore, I aim at doing so by applying an interdisciplinary perspective, where trust 
and trustworthiness are not isolated theoretical constructs, but rather dynamic 
constructs that influence and are influenced by other constructs. These other constructs 
that will be presented in this dissertation is control, culture and boundary spanning. As 
a combined literature review on trust as well as these three other constructs would 
result in a massive literature review, I have opted for an alternative approach, where I 
have laid out my understanding of trust in these chapters and where the theoretical 
foundation for the other three constructs will be presented in the beginning of the 
chapters in which they will be put to analytical use. 
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CHAPTER III: CONSTRUCTING THE FIELD 
… As a Consequence of Practice Experience 
During the three years I have been working on producing this doctoral dissertation I 
have on numerous occasions found myself in a situations, where fellow researchers 
have critically asked ”How do you know that trust is important?” when I have 
presented my research agenda.  
Indeed, a substantial number of researchers interested in global software development 
and virtual teamwork adhere to grounded theory and as a consequence they would 
argue, as one did, that “You should start at a higher level and apply a grounded 
approach so you don’t risk forcing theory onto your empirical subject”. While I do 
believe that this is a noble idea, I am also convinced that it is practically impossible to 
detach oneself from earlier experiences – academic as well as practical. Therefore, let 
me start by outlining my own professional background. 
I have been working in the IT-industry for quite a few years. Over the years I have 
been trusted with a variety of roles: First, helpdesk and support, later on business 
analysis, project management, enterprise architecture and even occasionally a bit of 
programming. Early 2009 I took up a new challenge, when I accepted an offer from my 
at that time employer, a leading financial institution in Denmark, to move to Bangalore 
in India to join a team of four other native Danish colleagues and eight Indians in the 
management team of the largest – both at that time and now almost six years later – 
offshore outsourcing engagement embarked upon by a Danish IT-organization.  
During my expatriation to India I was heavily involved in the day-to-day management 
of the collaboration between the two organizations, including optimization of processes 
related allocation and de-allocation of Indian consultants, performance measurements 
as well as numerous other things relating to the overall collaboration. Furthermore, I 
was heading the expansion and daily management of a BPO (business process 
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outsourcing) function. As a natural consequence of my occupation I got a first hand 
understanding of the challenges related to collaborating across distance, culture, time 
zones and organizational boundaries; as well as a good taste of the differences between 
working and living in my home country of Denmark and in India. 
After repatriating to Denmark I was put in charge of a team of twenty-five Indian 
consultants assigned to a department consisting of nearly hundred Danish employees. I 
remember my first meeting with the Senior Vice President, who was leading the 
department: He explained to me that they had – in accordance with the senior 
management’s strategy – been expanding the offshore team over the last three years 
and it had now grown to a size where there was one Indian consultant assigned to the 
department for every four Danish employees. He also voiced his concern that the 
Indian consultants were not performing adequately and that the Danes in the 
department were generally dissatisfied with their Indian “colleagues” as they found 
that the Indians did not take responsibility and that the time invested in knowledge 
sharing exceeded the output in a way where the majority of the Danish employees felt 
that “if I have to spend so much time specifying work for the Indians, I might as well 
do the whole task myself”. It sounded exactly like a challenge for me and I took the 
job. 
I was charged with the overall responsibility for the performance of the Indian 
consultants in a staff-augmentation outsourcing engagement where the client side took 
all management responsibilities with regards to performance and the Indian consultants 
were considered “extra hands” – an extension to the Danish department, so to speak. 
My job included allocating qualified Indian consultants for tasks and projects in the 
Danish organization and making sure that they performed as expected and in 
accordance with what was agreed. In some cases I was managing the tasks and projects 
they were assigned to and in other cases the day-to-day management resided under 
another member of the department’s management team in Denmark.  
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After embarking on my new job I quickly found out that what the Senior Vice 
President had told me was not at all an exaggeration. Most of the Danish employees I 
spoke to did nothing to conceal the fact that they would rather avoid working with the 
Indian consultants. On the other side the Indian consultants were disappointed that they 
were only assigned the most trivial tasks and that they were by and large treated as 
inferior by their Danish counterparts who were not perceived as helpful and who – in 
the eyes of the Indian consultants – would often just neglect emails from them. The 
Indians were often sitting idle waiting for something to do and despite the fact that the 
Danes – management as well as employees – knew of this, nothing was done. The one-
to-five ratio had been dictated by the CIO’s office and it was quite simply easier just 
having twenty-five Indian consultants sitting idle than to put an effort into making 
good use of them. 
During my stint as manager for the team I implemented a broad range of initiatives 
aimed at integrating the Indian consultants more in the department: I changed the way 
Danish employees and Indian consultants coordinated efforts; I took upon myself the 
responsibility for a large number of tasks in order to be able to get the Indian 
consultants in the loop and to integrate them in the department; I started 
communicating the strategies and visions of the department to the Indian consultants 
and urged the Senior Vice President to include the team of Indian consultants in 
department meetings which, as a consequence, were changed to being conducted in 
English instead of Danish and with video-support; and I started to introduce elaborate 
reports and assessments of the quality of tasks completed in order to make the 
contributions and qualities of the Indian consultants more transparent.  
Over a period of fifteen months I was basically in the driving seat of a significant 
change in the way the offshore collaboration was executed on a day-to-day basis. 
Gradually I saw how the negative stories about the Indians lack of competence faded 
and positive stories about their contribution emerged instead. Over this period of time 
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the work climate changed dramatically: The Indian consultants were to a larger degree 
considered a valuable asset and they were, themselves, telling me how they found the 
new responsibilities that were bestowed upon them motivating and how they were now 
happy to be a part of the department and saw a future for themselves in their current 
jobs. 
What had changed? Why were the Danish employees all of a sudden talking about 
their Indian colleagues and acknowledging their competences and efforts? Indeed, I 
had ramped out a few of the Indian consultants, whom I did not believe were 
technically strong or communicatively capable to become a success in the department, 
but the vast majority of Indian consultants were the same as when I started. My 
assessment was, and is, that the most significant change was that I had successfully 
managed to redefine collaboration from something that was characterized by 
annoyance of the presence of “the strangers” to something characterized, at least to 
some extent, by group effort and a we-are-in-this-together mentality.  
One late Thursday afternoon I was sitting in the office in Copenhagen when I 
overheard a conversation between some of my Danish colleagues. It was close to 
deadline of a new release – a situation all IT-professionals know is notoriously 
stressful. My Danish colleagues had found out that one of the Indian consultants had 
made a mistake, which could potentially delay the release. Their conversation was 
striking: There is no doubt in my mind that had the same situation occurred a year 
earlier the Danish employees would have been nagging about how the Indian 
consultant were not taking responsibility and were not capable of doing the job, but 
now it was all different: One of the Danish employees stated that it was really late in 
India (3.5 hour time difference) and that the Indian consultant had been working long 
hours. They all agreed that she had made a mistake but in the same breath 
acknowledged human fallibility and reasoned that while the mistake was indeed 
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serious and the Indian consultant was at fault, they should help her out, so she did not 
have to spend the whole night in office.  
What happened? The Danish employees seemed to exhibit a sense of collegiality, they 
reasoned that the Indian consultant had done her best and furthermore that her normal 
performance was high and that she was a dependable person. This incident, as well as 
others, made me wonder what had changed. My conclusion was that we had managed 
to create a work environment where the Indian consultant’s efforts and abilities were 
rendered visible and that this change had caused a higher level of trust between the 
actors – and it lead me to conclude that trust seemed to be the differentiator.  
Now, I have never been known as a strong finisher and at that time I felt that I had 
done my share of work. The Danish/Indian collaboration had changed a lot – and all to 
the better. Indeed, much more work could be done to further improve the collaboration, 
but I felt it was time to move on. Around the same time the opportunity to engage in 
research as a PhD fellow as Copenhagen Business School arose and I thought: Over 
the last couple of years I have been spending ninety percent of my time putting out 
fires and ten percent thinking about why offshore outsourcing is so difficult and how it 
can be improved. Why not turn the bucket around and spend ninety percent of my time 
on understanding the inherent difficulties of such collaboration and how it can be 
improved? 
From the outset I knew that my project would be about trust in global collaboration and 
this brings me back to the critical question I started out this chapter by laying forth a 
question I have often been asked: “How do You know that trust is important?” 
One could argue that I cannot know that trust (and trustworthiness) is relevant to study 
in the given empirical context beforehand. I disagree. The vast body of literature on 
trust (see Chapter II) argues that trust is necessary in all human endeavors. We simply 
cannot live productive lives without some level of trust in our surroundings – humans 
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as well as artifacts. Thus, trust and trustworthiness is of course also significant in the 
concrete empirical context I am studying: an offshore outsourcing collaboration 
between a Danish media company and an Indian IT-service provider with global 
presence. This does not suggest that trust and trustworthiness is a problem, in the 
mundane understanding of the word, in this specific context – not at all. But it does 
suggest that trust and trustworthiness is worth studying from a theoretical perspective 
as well as from a practical perspective: My own background as well as a vast body of 
literature (see for instance Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Rosen et al., 2005; Greenberg et 
al., 2007) suggests that building and sustaining trust in distributed team work is by no 
means a trivial matter.  
Furthermore, I do not suggest that by studying trust and trustworthiness, I have chosen 
the most important and pressing issue in my specific empirical context. Arguably, 
deciding objectively on what is most important is impossible as the focus is relying on 
the eye of the beholder. Hence, other researchers with different practical and academic 
backgrounds than mine would most certainly identify other topics as important.  
Being an Existential Hermeneutist 
In the first pages of this chapter I have outlined by own practical background and 
argued that out background will inevitable influence how we construct the field and 
make sense of empirical observations. Thus, it will probably be of no great surprise to 
the reader when I say that I adhere to the hermeneutical school of thought. In this part 
of the chapter I will unfold my epistemological stance in greater detail: If we accept 
that preconceptions are inevitable, we are in need of a methodology that can help us 
understand the relationship between our own personal history and the interpretations 
we make as researchers and enable us to productively make use of our preconceptions. 
The hermeneutical dialogue is such a methodology. I find it to be a promising one.  
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Lifeworld, Being-in-the-World & Belonging 
Within hermeneutics there are two different schools of thought that dominate the 
discussion. Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009: 57) call them the objectivist school and the 
alethic school. What separates these two schools of thought is primarily the discussion 
about whether or not one can think of the world as something external to the observing 
subject. The objectivists accept this subject-object duality where the alethic 
hermeneutist reject the same.  
The most significant scholars belonging to the alethic school of thought are the 
existential hermeneuticians – Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer. Each with their own 
concept – Husserl’s ‘Lifeworld’, Heidegger’s ‘Being-in-the-world’ and Gadamer’s 
‘Belonging’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 81) – they argue that the experiences of a 
human being makes it impossible to separate the individual observing from the 
observed.  
“The existential hermeneuticians who entered the stage from the 1930s 
rejected the difference between subject and object, and oriented their interest 
towards what Heidegger (1962) called Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-
sein). We are irrevocably merged with our world, already before any 
conscious reflection, and the polarization between a thinking subject and an 
object is therefore a dubious secondary construction. Consequently, the 
concept of understanding in objectivist hermeneutics is called into question, 
since it builds on the polarity between an empathizing subject and a (human) 
object for empathy” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 80) 
The concept of experience is the fulcrum of existential hermeneutics. It is the 
“fundamental, always already given, something with which every exploration of reality 
or mental processes must start” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 55). Two things are 
important to notice: First, experience is never a passive observation of events. On the 
contrary it is an active engagement in the world, where the idea that one can observe 
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facts free of interpretation, is refused. Rather experience is active in the sense that the 
understanding that observation of something result in, is shaped by prior the observers 
prior experience. This leads us to the second important thing to notice, namely that 
experience is never in singular. It is never one perception that shapes experience, but 
rather a string of events that connects the observed “with the whole life of the 
individual, making up an organic part of this” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 55) 
Following the concept of experience is also that existential hermeneuticians do not 
distinguish between meaning and significance. Thus, what the intent of something 
written, spoken or enacted cannot be separated from how it is interpreted. Again, this 
aligns with the argument that there is nothing that is objectively observable and 
therefore it simply does not make sense to speak of an inherent meaning, as something 
that can be deduced, as it will always be affected by the interpreter’s experience. 
Another way of elaborating the difference between the objectivist school of thought 
and the alethic school of thought is by focusing on the naming. Alvesson & Sköldberg 
(2009) write that they “have chosen to designate this hermeneutics alethic, with a 
neologism derived from the Greek aletheia, or uncoveredness – the revelation of 
something hidden” (p. 58). Thus: “Alethic hermeneutics dissolves the polarity between 
subject and object into a more primordial, original situation of understanding, 
characterized instead by a disclosing structure. That is, the basic idea concerns the 
revelation of something hidden, rather than the correspondence between subjective 
thinking and objective reality” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 57). This stands in stark 
contrast to the objectivist school of thought, where focus is to reveal an objective 
reality.   
Though there are also differences between the concepts of the existential 
hermeneutists, that is Husserl’s ‘Lifeworld’, Heidegger’s ‘Being-in-the-world’ and 
Gadamer’s ‘Belonging’ they all have a common focus on the inseparability between 
subject and object, due to experience. In the following I shall use Husserl’s term: 
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Lifeworld, when referring to this inseparability. This for a couple of reasons: It is, I 
believe, the most commonly used and understood term of the three; it is more elegant 
than Heidegger’s term; and it is not a part of our common everyday vocabulary as the 
word belonging and thus we do not risk confusing the scientific concept with the 
mundane use of a word.  
Let me end this section by explicitly adhering to the school of thought and concepts of 
the existential hermeneutist; I believe that separating object and subject will result 
analytical results that fail to incorporate the “wild card” that the researcher’s own 
experience and thus it is only by explicitly accepting experience, that we can avoid 
giving an unduly ultimate power to the researcher.  We are all in a sense “victims” of 
our own historicity and our analytical results inevitably affected by our experience. 
The Inevitability of Preconceptions 
I speculate that when colleagues are asking how I know that trust is important they do 
so due to the influence of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which – especially 
among CSCW researchers is an often-used methodological stance. Strauss & Corbin’s 
(1998) warning about creation of theory: “one must remember that because emergence 
is the foundation of our approach to theory building, a researcher cannot enter an 
investigation with a list of preconceived concepts, a guiding theoretical framework, or 
a well thought out design. Concepts and design must be allowed to emerge from the 
data” (p. 34, original emphasis). This warning seems to influence a lot of researchers’ 
methodological perspectives. However appealing this may seem, I must maintain that 
believing that one can conduct fieldwork with no preconceptions is and illusion. As 
Gadamer (2004: 244) reminds us meaning only occurs on the basis of already 
established expectations and being open to new understandings does not require 
neutrality nor does it require self-annihilation but rather that one explicates one’s own 
prejudices (Gadamer 2004: p. 288). This means that whatever ‘reality’ the researcher is 
faced with it is always already interpreted; it is a product of the researcher’s past and 
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preferences and never an objective reality, which seems to be exactly what Glaser & 
Strauss are striving to reach. As Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009) point out “data never 
come in the shape of pure drops from an original virgin source; they are always merged 
with theory at the very moment of their genesis” (p. 17). 
As Gadamer (1975) says: “The meaning exists at the beginning of any […] research as 
well as at the end: as the choice of the theme to be investigated, the awakening of the 
desire to investigate, as the gaining of the new problematic” (p. 251). Or as Thomas & 
James (2006) put it: “why is the researcher there at all? There must be some 
assumption that the chosen topic is a worthy field for study […] There can be little 
doubt that some process of verification—albeit implicit rather than explicit—is going 
on” (p. 783). Thomas & James (2006) continue by elaborating on the problems 
surrounding the notion of grounded theory: 
 “There is a central problem in the search for grounded theory. It is that 
there is no untethered spirit existing in the minds of researchers which will 
enable them neutrally and inertly to lay some cognitive framework over the 
data they collect to allow them to draw ‘theory’ dispassionately from this 
data, this ground. These researchers are human beings who walk, talk to 
friends, tend their gardens, watch television, read books, go to lectures. They 
have histories of friendships, relationships, of household life of one kind or 
another. They understand guile, happiness, sadness, envy, deceit, irony. 
Their heads are full of notions—notions about equality, justice, freedom, 
education, the future, hope, fraternity, charity, feeding the cat and parking 
the car. These are precisely the things that comprise and give structure to 
their mental lives. They are what make the drawing of themes from the data 
possible. They are not things which can be put to one side temporarily for 
the purpose of discovering grounded theory”. (Thomas & James 2006: 783) 
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In the introduction to their classic book ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ Glaser & 
Strauss (1967) claim that they “believe that grounded theory will be more successful 
than theories logically deduced from a priori assumptions” (p. 6), but as we have 
learned from Gadamer “a priori assumptions are un-eliminable, and this condition – far 
from being a source of anguish – is what the qualitative researcher should expect: a 
priori assumptions are what make study (a) worthwhile, and (b) possible” (Thomas & 
James 2006: 782) and consequently “there is, in other words, no ‘ground’ when 
interpretation is being spoken of” (Thomas & James 2006: 785). 
The inevitability of prejudice does however not imply that we cannot learn anything 
from Glaser & Strauss. Indeed, they do bring forward a very valid point that having 
read too much about a particular area prior to empirical work may put the researcher in 
a tough spot, where it is hard to see beyond the already known theories. However, too 
weak an insight into the research field also has its drawbacks, such as the possible 
reinvention of the wheel (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 17). That is, a research outcome 
that brings nothing new to the table, simply because the researcher is unaware of work 
already performed by other researchers. Consequently, what the researcher may see as 
novelty may be old news to other researcher within the same field.  
In all fairness Glaser & Strauss do advice against coming underprepared. According to 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009) it is stated in a note (in Glaser & Strauss 1967: footnote 
3) that “the researcher does not approach reality as a tabula rasa. He must have a 
perspective that will help him see relevant data and abstract significant categories from 
his scrutiny of the data” (p. 17). However, it is not clear how one can know what 
constitute such a perspective. Neither is it clear how one as a researcher can reassure 
oneself of actually having this.  
Elsewhere Glaser & Strauss states, according to Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009), that an 
“effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and facts on the 
area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not be 
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contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas. Similarities and convergences 
with the literature can be established after the analytic core of categories has emerged” 
(p. 37). Again, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to determine when “the analytic 
core” has emerged –and may I add, ignoring “facts” on the area seems to be a rather 
dangerous strategy that may very well result in missing out significant events and 
interactions simply because of lack of basic understanding. Also, refusing to prepare 
on such facts may bring about questions relating to the researcher’s abilities or 
engagement by the people she is studying. The researcher may be perceived as 
ignorant – and in turn, this may jeopardize the access to do empirical research. 
Last, but not least, there is a real risk that lack of preparation will result in trivial 
knowledge (see Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 29 for examples) that does not contribute 
to neither researchers nor practitioners: “There is an imminent risk of belabouring the 
obvious” or producing “mere reformulations of what the actors themselves are saying 
or of the researcher’s own common-sense ponderings” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 
33). 
While there is hardly any fix for preparing too little (beside the obvious: preparing 
more and better!) the hermeneutic tradition does have a solution for how to go about 
one’s past experiences and readings: Rather than refusing one’s own prejudice 
hermeneutists accept it, brings it to the front stage and tries to use it productively in 
what is referred to as the hermeneutical dialogue. “This is a ‘dialogue’ between the 
initial understanding, based on the theoretical concepts, and the new facts and findings 
that were extracted from the texts” (Breeman 2012: 154). This is indeed “the 
hermeneutic method’s core activity” (Breeman 2012: 154) that hermeneutists use to 
both question what the texts (or in my case, primarily observations and interviews) tell 
based on their prior experiences and at the same time listen to, and make sense of, what 
is told. Through this constant movement between preconceptions and new experiences, 
new understanding is developed. Breeman (2012) explains that “during the reading of 
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the texts, the interpreter initially asks questions which are directly derived from his 
preconceptions. Concurrently, however, the interpreter should also look for new ‘facts’ 
that contradict the preconceptions and push him to specify or adjust his conceptions” 
(p. 154). 
Consequently, by adhering to a hermeneutic methodology, where the researcher 
acknowledges his own history and proactively tries to expose his preconceptions and 
uses his intellect to make sense of the empirical observations and provide transparency 
to the sense-making process, one must reject the approach suggested by grounded 
theorists, where one should enter the field in, if not tabula rasa state then, a self-
imposed state of amnesia or deliberate ignorance, and where data’s dependency on 
theoretical and practical background is perpetually ignored. 
Doing Ethnography 
The majority of research efforts aimed at understanding trust are conducted using 
quantitative methods, often in the form of lab experiments. However, recent research 
on trust has called out for more qualitative approaches to study trust and to study trust 
in real-life scenarios (Möllering, 2005) in order to not just expand the understanding of 
trust in itself, but also to understand how trust is established, maintained, repaired and 
broken in specific contexts. Moreover, researchers have started casting doubt on the 
values of surveys in terms of analyzing trust (Smallbone & Lyon, 2002; Welter & 
Alex, 2012)  
According to Wilson & Chaddha (2009) “it is generally acknowledged that 
ethnography enables social scientists to uncover relationships that have not been 
explicitly spelled out in theoretical formulations” (p. 550) and thus I am setting out to 
engage in ethnographic research in order to understand trust and trustworthiness in the 
context of offshore outsourcing of IT work. In other words, my ambition by doing 
ethnography is to provide “a detailed, in-depth description of everyday life and 
practice” (Forsey, 2010: 567) in the case companies in order to understand the 
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complexities of distributed collaboration across distance, culture, time zones and 
organizational boundaries. 
When conducting empirical research on a delicate and complex matter such as trust 
and trustworthiness it is of utmost importance to gain insights into how trust is 
established, maintained, confirmed, repaired and broken, in situ, as opposed to a 
“bird’s eye view” (Hazen, 1993: 16) where we are not only likely to “miss the more 
intimate sounds of people speaking, singing, or crying out to one another” (ibid.); but 
also confined to develop our understanding on the basis of retrospective interview data. 
Thus, in order to understand trust and trustworthiness as it unfolds I employ an 
ethnographic approach, defined by Crang & Cook as “participant observation plus any 
other appropriate methods” (Forsey, 2010: 566). 
Forsey (2010) elaborates that included in the ‘other’ category are interviews, focus 
groups, video or photographic work, statistics, modeling, archive work, and so on” (p. 
566). Consequently, participant observation is only one aspect of doing ethnography, 
which can purposefully be supplemented by interviews and other methods. Hereby, I 
also adhere to Forsey’s (2010) notion that surveys and archive work cannot stand alone 
as “it is difficult to imagine arriving at adequate understandings through survey work 
or by research that does not seek some form of deep contact that engages with the 
cultural and structural content of a person’s life” (p. 567).  Furthermore I agree that 
interviews are a necessary supplement to participant observation to gain in-depth 
understanding of the everyday life and practices observed (Forsey 2010) as well as the 
actors’ sensemaking. 
Thus, while the ethnographic study in this dissertation consists first and foremost (at 
least measured by the hours invested) of participant observation to gain a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon by investigating it within a real life context (Cassell 
& Symon, 2004) semi-structured interviews have also been conducted to gain in-depth 
understanding of the context of practices observed; and to grasp the “complex pattern 
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of organizational, work-group, professional and interpersonal loyalties” (Cassell & 
Symon, 2004: 21). Finally, document analysis of company-internal documents as well 
as publicly available information has established a basic understanding of the 
organizational environment and the respective organizations’ strategies. These three 
methods will be elaborated in greater detail in the sections below. 
Getting Access to the Field 
From the very outset of my PhD project it was decided that I should engage in an 
ethnographic field study of collaboration between a client based in Denmark and an 
Indian IT-service provider. In line with many other researchers it proved difficult to 
identify industrial partners that were willing to open their offices, not only to 
interviews, but also to participant observation. 
After quite a struggle and a process that took several months the Indian IT mastodon 
HCL appeared as a potential industrial partner, who were willing to provide access and 
took an interest in my research project. After finalizing the contractual agreement 
between CBS and HCL the work on getting “the other side” in place started: As I sat 
out to study an interorganizational collaboration confirmation from HCL was not 
enough, I also needed acceptance from one of their Danish clients. Luckily, Berlingske 
Media, one of the largest media companies in Denmark also took an interest in my 
project and the empirical object of my research was settled.  
In hindsight neither HCL nor Berlingske Media were difficult to convince, but before 
closing the deal with these two companies, we – my supervisor Professor Dr. Anne-
Marie Søderberg and myself – had been in contact with several IT-service providers 
and after finalizing the agreement with HCL I had also been knocking at the door of 
several of HCL’s clients in Denmark. Most were interested, but due to various timing 
issues as well as attitude Berlingske Media ended up being the selected partner. When 
that was settled it was agreed that I should start participant observation at Berlingske 
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Media’s headquarters in Copenhagen and subsequently conduct participant observation 
and interviews at the Operation Management Center (OMC) in Chennai, India.  
Observations 
The ethnographic study was conducted over a twelve-month period starting in 
February 2013. During this period of time approximately five hundred hours of 
participant observation has been conducted. I have observed office-life at the client-
side IT-department in Copenhagen, Denmark as well as in the Operations Management 
Center (OMC) at the suppliers premises in Chennai, India, including numerous virtual 
meetings mediated through phone or Skype between representatives of the 
organizations; physical meetings related to the outsourcing collaboration; local staff 
meetings; and substantial number of informal conversations with the staff. 
Even thought my primary contacts at the client’s organization were keen on having me 
“hanging around” we mutually agreed that the best way to kick-start my observation 
studies would be to come by and present myself, the purpose of my research and my 
methods at their bi-weekly department meeting a few days prior to my first day as 
participant observer. At this meeting I presented myself with a strong emphasize on my 
practical background. I knew beforehand that only a few of the employees came with 
an academic degree and I speculated that emphasizing my practice experience would 
help gain legitimacy in this particular setting. I also presented my area of research, but 
only at a very high level: I explained that I was interested in global collaboration 
within the IT industry, but I avoided mentioning my primary interest in trust (I will 
come back to why later in this chapter). My assessment of the first presentation was 
quite simply: “That went really well” (Field Notes 20130208). Several of the 
employees were curious about my research and me; and no one seemed uncomfortable 
with having me around.  
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Observation Venues 
Hanging around the Office in Denmark 
On Tuesday February 12th 2013 I arrived at the office at 9.30 AM as agreed with my 
contact person. I was equipped with an access-card that would enable me to move 
freely around in the office; I was registered in their systems and given an email address 
which was included in the IT-departments as well as the company-wide groups 
enabling me to read all communication sent via these distribution lists, view other’s 
calendars and book interviews; and I was given access to the intranet as well as a 
variety of reports and tools related to the IT-departments work and communication 
with the service provider. By and large I was inducted in the department as if I was 
employed in the company and I was given access to an abundance of data.  
 
After these initial formalities I went to sit with the IT-ops – the Director of Operations 
and the three service managers who are the primary touch points between the 
remainder of the client organization and the service provider (which I will describe in 
greater detail in the next chapter). The three service managers all took a great deal of 
interest in my research and we spent some time talking together. For me this was ideal, 
as I wanted to get off to a good start with them and make sure that they were 
comfortable having me around. I explained to them that I would appreciate if they 
invited me for all relevant meetings they had and if they could let me shadow them as 
much as possible. They all agreed – and indeed followed through: Over the time I have 
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spent at the client’s premises they have been very forthcoming with regards to inviting 
me for their meetings – physical as well as virtual.   
I spent the first couple of weeks shadowing (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007) the service 
managers and I quickly became a natural part of their work environment – or at least, I 
did not sense that they were behaving unnatural when I was around: I did not 
experience any change in the ongoing conversations when I came back after for 
instance getting coffee; on several occasions they asked me in a very inclusive manner 
“are you coming?” when they left their desks for meetings; I became a part of the 
social environment and spoke with them about family, leisure time, football, travelling 
and a lot of other stuff. They were indeed accommodating and did not seem to be 
affected by my presence. This can probably be attributed both to my approach, to their 
personalities, but I speculate that the fact that they were working in an open office 
environment, where everybody could listen in was an important factor too as they are 
simply quite used to having “strangers” in close proximity during work hours.  
After spending a couple of weeks with the service managers I arrived one morning in 
office and saw that “my” desk was occupied by somebody else – a colleague of theirs 
who are for the most part working in one of the client-side offices in Jutland. As there 
was free seating in the department, there was nothing unusual in him taking the desk, 
as he needed to work with the service managers. I took the opportunity to move to 
another group of desks, where the Indian vendor-side employees were sitting. They 
knew me beforehand and knew the purpose of my stay, so a polite question on whether 
it was ok that I sat in “their” are was all it took. I had considered for a while when I 
should move to observe other actors, so the fact that “my” seat was taken came in 
handy as I all of a sudden had a natural reason for shifting desk. The Indian vendor-
side actors bid me welcome and much like my experience with the client-side service 
managers they did not seem to take much notice of my presence. I stayed in their part 
of the office two weeks before moving on.  
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The third group I sat with was the native Danish vendor-side employees – and again, 
they bit me welcome, were ready to talk, but their daily work seemed uninterrupted by 
my presence. After spending a little less than two weeks in their part of the office I 
shifted strategy and started changing seat more frequently. Sometimes I would plan 
before coming in to the office where I would spend the day, depending on who I 
assessed would be more relevant to follow, sometimes I chose my desk more at 
random: If someone greeted me good morning with more than the simple “good 
morning” I would ask if I could sit there and in other cases I simply sat where there 
was most activity. As my focus on the service managers intensified and I discovered 
that the vast majority of communication between client-side and vendor-side actors 
would go through them, I decided to predominantly sit close by them, as I had 
discovered that I missed out on impromptu meetings, when I sat elsewhere. 
Observing Meetings in Denmark 
From the outset of my observation studies I had agreed with my contact persons that I 
would observe meetings related to the collaboration between the client and the vendor 
and during the time I spent in the Copenhagen office I was indeed invited for quite a 
lot of meetings – specifically change board meetings, service delivery meetings, 
department meetings and various ad hoc meetings. In addition to meetings with 
participation of the client-side service managers I also participated in the steering 
group meetings. My meeting participation is listed in table 3.1 below. 
Observing meetings have given me valuable insights into how the actors from the two 
organizational entities communicate. Throughout my observation of meetings I have 
attempted to be the famous “fly on the wall”, who for the most part is unnoticed.  I 
assess that I have succeeded in this – at least for the most part. There are however 
some instances, where my presence have been noticed and where I have been taken in 
as an active part of the meetings. These instances will be discussed later in this chapter 
in the section on ‘Methodological Considerations’.  
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As the majority of these meetings are aided by ICT there is inevitably a challenge in 
observing meetings that relates to the fact that one side of the meeting is more 
observable than the other(s). That is, as most of the meetings are conducted as phone 
meetings, the location in which I am present is more observable than the other 
location(s): I can see how the actors situated at the same location as myself are 
communicating offline by for instance muting the phone line, miming and making 
gestures, whereas similar physical expressions and on-location communication at the 
other location(s) is rendered invisible.  
Lunch and Learn 
From the outset of my field studies at the client’s office in Copenhagen I have taken all 
opportunities to mingle with both client-side and onsite vendor-side employees for 
lunch. From the very start I noticed that having lunch with the actors provided a good 
platform for learning more about their thoughts about the collaboration and also to 
establish report with the actors. During these lunches I have often been asked about the 
progress of my studies and the actors have curiously asked if I had found anything of 
interest and if I could share my insights (a point I will return to later in this chapter).  
Additionally, these lunches proved beneficial to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
what I had observed and I have repeatedly enquired about significance and meaning of 
things I had observed and hereby encouraged the actors to elaborate on my 
observations. It is a well-established truth that such informal conversation can be 
highly informative: People are relaxed and have more time to talk than any other time 
of day and I would go to the extent of saying that the lunches perhaps contributed with 
the most valuable insights of all the situations I have observed. Thus, after having 
lunch with two of the service managers one day in June 2013 it seemed natural to 
accompany the vendor-side service manager for a second lunch, when he saw me in 
office and asked “are you joining for lunch?” 
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Accompanying Client-Side Delegation to India 
In September 2013, six months after starting my observation studies at the client’s 
headquarters in Copenhagen I was invited to accompany a client-side delegation 
consisting of the CIO, the Director of IT-operations, two service managers, the 
development manager, chief architect and two project managers on week-long trip to 
the OMC in Chennai, India. 
During this trip I decided to shadow the two service managers in all their meetings. As 
a consequence, I was unable to attend some of the meetings with a more strategic 
direction between executives from the client and the vendor, as the two service 
managers (and to a certain extent also the Director of IT-Operations) were primarily 
involved in meetings with a more operational agenda: During the week-long visit I sat 
in on all the meetings that the service manager’s had with the various operational 
teams as well as meetings with the incident managers and the change manager. In all of 
these meetings both client-side service managers were present as well as the vendor-
side service delivery manager, who bears the direct management responsibility of the 
operational deliveries as well as being HR manager for the vendor-side consultants.  
At the outset of these meetings I would let the client-side and the vendor-side actors 
meet and greet first. Afterwards I would quickly introduce myself, and my reason for 
participating. I did so in order to ensure that the vendor-side consultants knew why I 
was sitting in the corner of the room taking notes. However, in four of these meetings, 
I did not introduce myself, for the simple reason that no one else did. Below is an 
excerpt of my field notes from the beginning of two of these meetings: 
”We start the day by entering the big conference room. After a while [the 
two client-side service managers] and myself leave the room to go to 
meetings with the track leads in the 'Amber' meeting room. After half an 
hour we start with a group of five. They enter and sit down. There is 
absolutely no communication from [the two client-side service managers]. 
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Non, whatsoever! The Indians take initiative to shake hands. The meeting 
starts with [one of the vendor-side actors] presenting after [one of the client-
side service managers] has done the initial formal greeting where he says 
that it is good to meet them. But nothing in the [client-side service 
managers’] attitude reveals that they actually do. It's a really weird start of 
the meeting”. (Field Notes 20130911) 
”A little after 12 the security team comes in. No one says hi. Everybody just 
sits there. 15 minutes later the security team lead starts talking and present 
the other people in the room”. (Field Notes 20130912) 
Not presenting myself felt strange. While I do know that the vendor-side service 
delivery manager in his capacity as manager for the OMC-team had mentioned to them 
that a researcher would be accompanying the client-side delegation, I did not know 
how much they knew about me. Additionally, I found it awkward to sit in the room and 
observing a meeting without so much as a ”hi” being exchanged. Nevertheless, given 
the fact that I, as a participant observer, should make as little “noise” as possible I 
found it more suitable to follow the leads of the actors – if they would not take the 
initiative to greet each other in some form or another I would refrain from doing so too 
– despite the awkwardness I felt. 
In addition to shadowing the two client-side service managers I also participated in 
several social arrangements during the visit at the OMC, including two dinners with 
the client-side delegation and executives as well as operational managers from the 
vendor-side. But the social aspect of the trip also included breakfasts, after-hours 
drinks, dinners as well as one very long – and very liquid – evening with the client-side 
delegation. During these social events I had a change to talk a lot and in a very 
informal way with the client-side delegation about their perceptions of the 
collaboration with then vendor and the perceived value of such visits. While I do 
believe that I had managed to establish rapport the client-side actors much earlier than 
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this trip the outcome of the these talks definitely helped fuel the post-India-trip 
interviews I conducted during late September and early October 2013 after getting 
back to Copenhagen. 
Hanging Around the Office in India 
In January 2014 I returned to Chennai to conduct observation studies and interviews at 
the OMC. The vendor-side service delivery manager had been very accommodating in 
letting me have a desk at the OMC and to freely engage with and interview vendor-side 
actors. Just as in the client’s headquarters I was given an access card, which allowed 
me to move freely around in the OMC. During the visit I sat near some of the vendor-
side actors with most interaction with the client-side actors, including the service 
delivery manager himself, the change manager and one of the incident managers and 
from that position I could follow the everyday-work-life at the OMC.  
The service delivery manager had informed the OMC staff that I would be doing 
observation studies as well as interviews; so all vendor-side actors I met with had an 
idea about the purpose of my visit. Most of them also knew me from my last visit and 
everybody seemed happy to take time to talk to me and asked me about my 
background, my research and my findings.  
In office I spent a great deal of time interviewing the first day and by the means of 
these interviews as well as my contact persons help I managed to get involved in the 
more social aspects of the work-day, where I accompanied different vendor-side actors 
on coffee breaks and for lunches all throughout the week. This gave me an opportunity 
to talk to them in a more informal setting, which helped me to understand their 
professional backgrounds, education career goals and dreams as well as – in some 
cases their personal backgrounds.  
From my own earlier professional experience working in India I knew that colleagues 
in India often go out together in the evening. This was not the case here, which one 
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explained to me was because of the timings of their work: As per the client-side’s 
request the vendor-side actors mostly worked according to Danish work schedules, 
which, because of the time difference, meant that they would not be leaving office 
before nine or ten in the evening. Consequently, and also because of significant 
commuting time, most would be eager to get home to their families as quick as 
possible after work. I was however invited out for dinner one evening by the service 
delivery manager, who took the chance to ask me about my findings, but also took the 
opportunity to ask more in-depth about how, according to my observations, the client-
side felt towards the collaboration in general. Later in this chapter I will offer my 
thought on the dilemma of ‘giving back’ without interfering and influencing the 
empirical object under study. 
Field Notes – in a Variety of Formats 
From the outset of my observation studies I have been keeping an elaborate log of my 
observations. In total more than 100 pages of field notes have been produced and I 
have attempted to write as elaborate notes as possible, where observations that did not 
seem apparently relevant have been noted alongside incidents that had an immediate 
impact on my understanding of the empirical case under investigation. 
During my observation studies I implemented a practice of going through my field 
notes of the day at the end of each workday highlight observations that I deemed 
significant in order to focus my attention in the coming days and weeks of observation 
studies and to make sure that I could ask the actors to elaborate on my observations 
during interviews and informal talks around the office. 
As mentioned above lunches have been an excellent source of knowledge. The same 
goes for impromptu chats in the corridor; on the way to and from meetings; when 
stumbling upon someone in the coffee kitchen; and at the local bar for after-hours 
drinks on Fridays. All these situations have one thing in common, namely the distance 
between and my computer. Thus, throughout my observation studies I have often been 
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in situations where I could not take notes directly on my laptop. As a consequence, in 
addition to notes taken directly in a text editor on my computer, I have repeatedly 
found myself in situations, where I had to take notes on a scrap of paper or on my 
phone as soon as possible after the observation. I have also used the voice note 
function on my phone in several instances – twice by rushing to the rest room and 
recording my notes. Such notes have also been scrutinized at the end of the work day 
and roughly transcribed in my field notes master document.  
Interviews 
As I have argued earlier in this chapter, I regard interviews as a necessary supplement 
to participant observation to gain in-depth understanding of the everyday life and 
practices observed. In this regard I have used interviews to present my observations 
and to get the actor’s elaborate perception of significant observations. This practice has 
helped me gain a more thorough understanding of my own observation, but has also on 
a number of occasions changed my immediate interpretations. 
Furthermore, I have used interviews as a “conversation kick starter” in the sense that I 
have repeatedly found that introducing specific observations opens a deeper and more 
nuanced conversation than more abstract questions which the actors typically provide 
shorter, less elaborate and – I speculate, often – standardized answers to.  
Throughout all interviews I have followed a similar structure. First, I have told the 
actors what the purpose of the interview would be and in cases where I interviewed 
actors that were unfamiliar with me or my research I would also briefly introduce 
myself and the overall purpose and methods of my research. Second, I have asked the 
interviewees for permission to record the interview, which, in all instances has been 
granted. Third, I have emphasized that I would conduct the interview more as a 
conversation than as a question/answer-session and elaborated on the semi-structured 
form of the interviews by explaining that while I had prepared some high-level 
question I did not have a fixed scheme of questions to be answered. The semi-
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structured form allowed the interviewees to elaborate and steer the discussion into 
areas they perceived as relevant (Gertsen & Søderberg, 2011).  
In total I have conduced thirty-one of such formal semi-structured interviews, each 
lasting approximately one hour, with employees and managers from the client 
organization as well as the supplier organization. All interviews have subsequently 
been transcribed and coded into various themes and sub-themes. These themes are 
reflected in the analytical chapters: One such theme is about ‘distance and 
trustworthiness’, one about ‘trustworthiness and control’, one about trustworthiness in 
an interorganizational and intercultural setting’ and one about ‘boundary spanners and 
trustworthiness’. Below in table 3.2 is an overview of the interviews conducted. 
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Document Analysis 
In addition to participant observation, informal conversations and semi-structured 
interviews scrutiny of company-internal documents as well as publicly available 
information has established a basic understanding of the organizational environment. 
With regards to the publicly available information I have used a wide range of sources 
including the two companies own websites to establish an understanding of the 
organization and history of the organizations. In addition the book by the former CEO 
of HCL, Vineet Nayar, entitled Employees First, Customers Second: Turning 
Conventional Management Upside Down (2010) has proved beneficial to understand 
the vendor’s organization as seen from the point of senior executive management and 
throughout my field work to engage with vendor-side actors to discuss some of the 
philosophies of their employer. 
A significant source of information that I have used to engage with the client-side 
actors has been a series of article published in the Danish online IT media 
Computerworld.dk and Version2.dk: Less than two weeks before I started my 
observation studies the collaboration between the client and vendor was put under 
significant pressure as the client’s media sites were unreachable for a longer period of 
time due to technical errors by the vendor. This resulted in six articles in the 
abovementioned media, where members of the senior management of the client’s 
organization discussed the technical shortcomings publicly (which I will return to in 
greater detail in Chapter IV). These articles provided a good foundation for discussing 
the collaboration with client-side actors, as dissatisfaction had been made public by the 
management. 
In addition to publicly available information the client organization also gave me 
access to a lot of company-internal information including processes, policies, reports 
and measurement tools used in the collaboration between the client and the vendor. 
These artifacts has helped me establish a more elaborate understanding related to 
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governance and the forms of communication that are used in the collaboration than 
what would have been possible had I “only” had access to participant observation and 
interviews. 
Methodological Considerations & The Role of the Researcher 
So far in this chapter I have introduced my own professional background; I have 
unfolded my epistemic stance and I have outlined how I have engaged with the 
empirical subject of my dissertation. In the remained of this chapter I will, on the basis 
of my epistemic stance and the methods I have applied, discuss the most important 
methodological considerations related to doing ethnographic field work, including, but 
not limited to, the role of the researcher.  
Observing the Unobservable 
When conducting ethnographic field studies of globally dispersed teams a fundamental 
challenge relating to the observations occur: Given the nature of the collaboration a 
large part of the communication between the dispersed parties is difficult, if not 
impossible, to observe. While it is indeed possible to observe video meetings and 
phone conferences by being present at one of the locations (and thus missing out on 
what happens outside the reach of the technology used, such as conversations with the 
phone muted) and also possible to observe physical meetings, the same cannot be said 
about one-on-one phone conversations, emails and instant messaging. That is, a large 
proportion of what defines the collaboration as globally distributed is by and large 
unobservable. 
During recent years there has been attempts to conduct virtual ethnography (Randall et 
al., 2007) where the “screen life” of the actors is being recorded and subsequently 
analyzed. I have not engaged in such a practice for a number of reasons: First, it 
requires a technological setup, which, I assessed, would not be accepted by the IT-
security departments in the two organizations I have been engaging with. Additionally, 
I speculate that if they would accept it, it would take a lot of time and effort to 
 81 
negotiate this access, which would take time away from other relevant observation 
studies and probably impose a delay on the start of my ethnographic field studies.  
Second, I am of the conviction that virtual ethnography with regards to the privacy of 
the actors and their level of comfort differs significantly from ordinary participant 
observation; as everything they do on their computers will be documented. This stands 
in stark contrast to the type of participant observation I have been engaged with as I, as 
a human observer, can document using my own vocabulary – in text or speech – and 
thus the documentation will always be a matter of interpretation and with limited 
possibility to revisit what actually happened. This, I argue is significantly different 
than participant observation where I would for instance videotape the room I am 
observing. In my opinion this distinction is important and resembles the commonly 
discussed topic of CCTV, where there is a vast group arguing against the use of such 
technologies, arguing it is surveillance. Placing a police officer at the same spot on the 
other hand is not regarded as surveillance, but rather framed positively, as protection. 
Third, and most importantly, I argue that the incompleteness that follows the lack of 
ability (and wish) to follow all the digital traces of the actors, is in fact much similar to 
ordinary co-located observation studies, insofar actors in a co-located environment, 
also talk on the phone, use instant messages and emails with co-located colleagues, and 
engage in discussions outside the physical reach of the participant observer eyes and 
ears. In such cases, I suspect that no one would advise that the participant observer 
takes measures to vade in on such communication! 
While I argue that there are able reasons for not engaging in virtual ethnography this, 
however, does not reject that it is indeed a challenge: Virtual communication is 
paramount in distributed teams and if one is not about to engage in virtual ethnography 
one has to obtain an understanding of such communication in a different way. What I 
have done is to make elaborate field notes of what is being talked about and how the 
actor’s behave (i.e. do they show frustration, aggression, seem relaxed etc.) when 
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talking on the phone within the reach of my ears and eyes. Furthermore, I have made it 
significant themes in both interviews and through informal conversations to gain an 
understanding of the actor’s use of technology. By and large their use of technology is 
quite simple: The vast majority of communicative tasks are done through phone 
meetings (which I have observed in significant amounts); via email or through the use 
of standard reporting tools. That is, only very few actors engage in instant messaging 
and phone conversations with their counterpart in the other organizations. Thus, the 
benefit of actually engaging in virtual ethnography would quite possibly be low and 
not justify the amount of preparation, negotiation, technological implementation and 
the possible risk of being conceived of as surveillance. In the analytical part of this 
dissertation I will get back to the use of technology in much greater detail. 
The Emergence of Themes: Asking about Trust – without Asking about 
Trust 
Although I adhere to a hermeneutical epistemological stance and thus reject the idea 
most predominant within grounded theory that researchers should discover (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) empirical phenomena and subsequently theorize without a pre-defined 
theoretical perspective, as I do not believe that this is at all possible, I do agree with 
grounded theorists to a certain extent in that the researcher should make a substantial 
effort in avoiding that a personal, professional and academic interest is imposed upon 
the actors in the field, as there is a risk that this forced agenda is given more attention 
than it maybe deserves. That is, if I as a researcher approach the actors in the field with 
a clearly defined agenda of researching trust and trustworthiness, there is a chance that 
they overemphasize the relevance of trust to accommodate me.  
From the outset of my fieldwork this challenge has been at the top of my mind and as a 
consequence I chose to deliberately describe my research interests towards the actors 
in a very broad way. That is, though my primary interest is to study trust and 
trustworthiness I have made a point of not directly asking about trust during interviews 
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and informal conversations, in order not to force an agenda of trust onto the 
interviewees. In some cases the actors themselves have started to talk about trust when 
asked about for instance the collaboration and the relationships, and I have used these 
opportunities to explore the topic deeper. Also, inspired by Meyer et al. (1995) I have 
enquired about the antecedents to trust – ability, integrity and benevolence – and asked 
actors to elaborate on their assessments of these three constructs during both interviews 
and informal conversations.  
During the time where I did participant observation four sub-themes emerged and 
became important aspects of my dissertation. These four sub-themes, which I devote 
each a chapter to, were not based on pre-determined theoretical interests from my part, 
but are to a certain extent guided by my practice experience within the IT-outsourcing 
industry and to a certain extent guided by what I – in lack of better words – would call 
“obvious subjects”. First, distance is an inherent feature in cross-locational 
collaboration by definition and thus the topic of “what technologies to use and how” is 
in a sense natural. Second, control is tightly coupled to trust. Thus, the topic of control 
was in my mind at a very early stage, but ended up being overwhelmingly more 
significant than I had first imagined. Third, culture was something that the client-side 
actors repeatedly brought to the table. Throughout the first months of participant 
observation I was repeatedly confronted with the client-side actors’ perception about 
the role of culture – that is, national culture – and therefore, this became one of the 
dissertation’s central themes. Fourth, boundary spanning was a theoretical theme that I 
was convinced from the outset would become central, but also a theme which the 
actor’s themselves, without me prompting for it, addressed repeatedly. Due to the 
organizational setup of the collaboration, including hierarchies, processes and 
governance structures I also regard boundary spanning a “obvious subject” alongside 
use of technology as the actors – due to the organizational setup – experience that the 
collaboration happens through these boundary spanners. 
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Striking a Balance between ‘Remaining Neutral’ and ‘Giving Back’? 
The researchers neutrality has been a reoccurring theme throughout my fieldwork, 
where I, on several occasions have experienced how difficult it is to remain neutral, 
while at the same time being open to giving something back to the actors, who are 
investing their time in talking to me. When I worked on “closing the deal” with HCL 
and Berlingske Media I assessed that emphasizing my background within the IT-
outsourcing industry would contribute positively to their willingness to allow me to 
conduct an ethnographic study in the respective companies. I succeeded in obtaining 
the access I wanted and I believe that my industry background has helped me gain 
initial confidence at the managerial level in both organizations and that this has opened 
up doors for me that would otherwise have been difficult, or maybe even impossible, to 
crack open. But it was indeed at a cost. For example, before a conference call with a 
handful of HCL account managers, which was arranged in order to help me get access 
to their clients, the Managing Director of HCL in Denmark wrote this to the account 
managers: “The research will help us immensely in optimizing our delivery approach 
with Danish clients (…) if we can make sure Thomas gets access to the information he 
needs”. A similar line of reasoning was expressed by the senior management at 
Berlingske Media, who clearly expected that I would not “only” contribute with a 
research project, but also with practical insights that would be immediately usable. For 
instance, at one point in time the Director of IT-operations at Berlingske Media told me 
that he would like my input on re-designing the governance of the outsourcing 
engagement – something that was clearly out of scope, seen from the perspective of my 
doctoral research, which I explained to him and he accepted.    
Early in my observation studies two incidents prompted my attention towards the 
challenge of remaining neutral: First, I attended a meeting at the client-side office with 
participation from the client organization only. The agenda was do discuss how certain 
administrative processes could be made more efficient. In the middle of the meeting 
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another client-side actor enters the meeting room to convey that there were significant 
problems with the DNS, which, in this instance meant that no one could access their 
email. This was the second time this problem occurred (first time with significantly 
more severe consequences, which I will get back to in the analytical part of the 
dissertation) and allegedly caused by a human error, from the same person who caused 
the first instance of the problem. The focus of the meeting participants changed 
completely: The right people were in the room and this was an urgent matter – I stuck 
around to see the intensity grow. Half an out later the problem was sorted out and 
operations were back to normal. During this half hour the actors had repeatedly been 
on the phone with the vendor-side actors at the OMC to solve the problem. Finally, 
they could relax. One of them asks with a very tired voice “How the hell can he make 
that mistake twice” (Field Notes 20130213). Then he looks up and around the room. 
No one says anything. Finally, he looks at me and I can’t help myself cracking a joke: 
“At least he is consistent” (ibid.), I said. Everybody in the room laughed and while I 
think that this remark contributed positively to my acceptance in the group and helped 
grow confidence, it was hardly a suitable comment to make by someone who is their to 
observe participants in a neutral fashion.  
The second incident occurred a few weeks later, where one of the vendor-side actors 
asked me curiously: “Are you their guy or ours”(Field Notes 20130226). While I 
assess that the question was not posed because the actor felt uncomfortable in any way, 
it still made me think a lot about how I should position myself when engaging with the 
empirical actors. Together, these two incidents made it crystal clear to me that it 
required a conscious effort to remain neutral, both in terms of refraining from 
comments like the one above, but also but repeatedly making sure that the actors were 
aware that I was “no one’s guy”, but rather a researcher pre-occupied with 
understanding their practice as it unfolds, rather than making value judgments about 
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what works well, what does not, who is right and who is not. Throughout the remained 
of my field research I have repeatedly mentioned this to the actors.  
Remaining neutral is indeed not easy, especially not in situations, where I have felt that 
I could contribute to the benefit of not just one party, but to the benefit of the 
outsourcing engagement. I have done my best to refrain from interfering, but 
nevertheless found it appropriate on some occasions. One of these occasions was when 
I accompanied the client-side delegation during their visit at the OMC in Chennai, 
India. The Ganesh Chaturthi Festival – arguably, the most important Hindu festival in 
South India – coincided with the visit at the OMC and the vendor-side management 
had invited the client-side delegation to accompany them to one of the sites for the 
celebration of this festival. As these sites are extremely crowded during the Ganesh 
Chaturthi festival the client-side delegation had been advised to leave their belongings 
in the car. After attending the festivities one of the client-side actors went with one of 
the vendor-side manager to a mall, where she ended up buying a quite expensive saree, 
which is a traditional Indian dress. Incidentally, she had moved to the other car to go to 
the mall, but had forgotten her wallet in the first car and the vendor-side manager 
offered to pay the saree, which she accepted. The following day she had withdrawn 
money to pay back, what she had perceived as a loan, but the vendor-side manager 
refused to take the money and told her that it was his pleasure buying her the saree.    
Later that evening I accompanied the client-side delegation for dinner and during that 
dinner she told her colleagues what had happened. She clearly felt bad about the 
situation and mentioned several times that she felt bad that he paid for the saree, 
especially because she speculated that it was a very expensive gift relative to his 
income. I followed the discussion for a while without saying anything, but it was clear 
to me that she really felt bad about the situation. Finally, I decided to remedy the 
situation and I told her, based on my own past experiences working with Indian IT-
vendors, that I was convinced that his employer would reimburse him for the saree and 
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that such gifts are customary. That seemed to ease her mind. But while such an 
intervention on one side can be regarded as a nice gesture towards her it is arguably 
also an interference, which affects the interplay between the actors. By interfering I 
had changed a situation where the client-side actor felt gratitude, bad conscience and 
perhaps a feeling of “owing him one” by exposing that this is customary and arguably 
a highly calculative gesture. I had interfered – but given that she felt really bad about 
the situation, I felt I some sort of moral obligation to do so. In this case the moral 
obligation towards another person, outweighed the moral obligation to remain neutral. 
Was it the right choice? I do not know! 
Another occasion where remaining neutral has been a dilemma occurred first on 
February 26th 2013 approximately three weeks after I initiated my observation studies. 
Throughout my fieldwork I have repeatedly been in similar situations. Thus, this 
situation is just one example of challenge I have had numerous times. On that 
particular day an excerpt of my field notes read: 
After the meeting [the client-side service manager] asked me what I would do in 
the particular situation. He enquired about two things: One example is that [the 
vendor-side change manager] is not clearing up changes in remedy [which is the 
IT-system that is used for handling incidents and changes to the IT-
infrastructure], which means that changes that has been accepted still “hang” in 
the system. [The client-side service manager] has asked [the vendor-side change 
manager] repeatedly, he said. One time he asked [the vendor-side change 
manager] to clear it up and gave five examples. Result was that [the vendor-side 
change manager] got rid of the five, but nothing else. The other subject we 
discussed was that [the client-side service manager] does not think that [the 
vendor-side change manager] is preparing the change meetings well enough. All 
the stuff that the change manager is supposed to do with regards to making sure 
that there is an impact analysis and that standard information is provided is not 
done, according to [the client-side service manager] [] 
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What [the client-side service manager] asked me [after the call had ended, but 
while we were still in the meeting room with other meeting participants] was this: 
“Thomas, I assume that you know something about this. How do I cope with him? 
How do I make him understand what he has to do?” I was a bit surprised about 
his question, as he had not approached me like this before. And I did not want to 
give a too in-depth and concrete answer, in order to keep a distance, to avoid 
“doing consulting”. I explained that based on my experience getting offshore 
consultants to be proactive is often difficult, as they are not trained that way; 
many are used to following orders and that’s it. Both [the vendor-side Danish 
service manager] and [the client-side service manager] found this to be a good 
word: ‘Proactive’. I suggested that instead of writing emails with specific items 
that should be removed he should instead take steps to implement a process that 
put’s it clear that it is [the vendor-side change manager’s] job and that he would 
be measured on it, for instance by measuring process adherence once a week. 
They both found this to be a good idea and agreed that [the vendor-side Danish 
service manager] would be in charge of implement such a process. 
With regards to the other problem – the perception that [the vendor-side change 
manager] does not prepare well before the meetings – I suggested that it may be 
because he is not aware that it her job and what they expect of him; or that it may 
be because he does not have the legitimacy among the technicians to tell them 
that they need to make impact analysis and so on. [The client-side service 
manager] said that it is a “standard ITIL thing”. He is very much using a 
rationalistic approach (“read the ITIL framework and you know it’s your job”) and 
my explanation about legitimacy seemed to be wasted on him. (Field Notes 
20130226) 
The above excerpts serves as an example of a situation I have been in numerous times 
during the course of my fieldwork, where actors from both organizational entities ask 
me about advice or insights. In some instances it has been easy to reject answering, 
namely when actors ask about insights directly related to my fieldwork. In such 
instances I have merely pointed to the confidentiality between researcher and 
informant and told that I never share such details with other actors. That has in every 
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single case been accepted and understood. But in cases where I am asked about advice 
based on my prior professional experience in working with and managing offshore 
teams it is more difficult to refuse to answer – after all there is no such thing as a free 
lunch: I early on assessed that if I wanted to keep and expand the privileged access I 
had in both organizations I also needed to give something back.  
During the initial talks with my contact persons at the two organizations I agreed to 
conducting meetings and giving presentations, where I would disclose practical 
implications to the involved parties; and I have done so on a number of occasions. But 
one thing is to disseminate observations and analytical results to senior managers; 
another is to establish a relationship with “people on the ground”, who during my 
fieldwork took a great interest in discussing the challenges they met when 
collaborating across organizational boundaries, time zones, national borders and large 
geographical distances on both an abstract level as well as a very concrete, situated 
level. I assessed that ‘giving back’ to a large extent was about contributing as a 
conversation partner and to some extent as an advisor in the everyday-settings. 
Consequently, I needed to strike a balance where I on one am being open to helping 
them out but on the other side am making sure not to become some sort of a 
management consultant. I found that balance in always being open to listen to their 
questions and offer my immediate response based on my own practical experiences; 
and always explicitly stating that my responses were based on my own experiences 
from my prior jobs and never engaging further in these challenges than an immediate, 
verbal response. This sort of contribution furthermore had the positive side-effect that I 
could ask even more in-depth questions as they were clearly willing to spend a lot of 
time chatting with me in office as long as they felt that they got something useful back. 
To me there seems to be a trade-off between remaining completely neutral and getting 
the access that any researcher doing anthropological field studies is probably yearning 
for; and there is no doubt in my mind that had I refrained from giving back to the 
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actors the way I did, I would not have had the open access and confidentiality of the 
actors that I had – quid pro quo.  
Text, Dialogue and Sub-interpretations 
“What is interpreted is not ‘facts’ or ‘data’, but text. The text can be literal, 
consisting of written or spoken words. It can also be figurative; in that social 
acts are regarded as meaningful symbols, taking the text as model (…) Facts 
emerge from the text via a process of interpretation. They are results, not 
points of departure. Thus, we see parts of the text as something, or more 
precisely as – in some sense – meaningful signs, whether we are reading a 
text written in letters of the alphabet or in social acts.” (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009: 61) 
Traditionally hermeneutists have been occupied with interpretation of actual texts. 
However, as the Alvesson & Sköldberg quote above suggests the term text can also be 
understood in a broader way, namely as written texts as well as both spoken words and 
social actions. Also, it is worth noting that Alvesson & Sköldberg considers facts as the 
outcome of text interpretation and not as the input. This underpins the existential 
hermeneutical position very well: Texts – literal as well as enacted – are subjects to 
interpretation and thus they do not have inherent meaning. The outcome of such 
interpretation is facts, but not universal or objective facts; rather they are subjective. In 
order to make sense of texts and produce credible interpretations Alvesson & 
Sköldberg (2009) stresses that hermeneutists need to engage and “use the procedure of 
asking questions to the text, and listening to it, in a dialogic form” (p. 62). This 
approach is fundamentally different from both a positivist approach and from grounded 
theory insofar hermeneutists “neither take a monologist stance similar to that of 
positivism, nor do they proceed via a passive reception of the text as in grounded 
theory” (ibid.) 
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In line with the hermeneutical tradition, where understanding is obtained on the basis 
of one’s own pre-understanding’s meeting with a new text I have used both the 
informal conversations as well as the formalized interviews to test sub-interpretations, 
understood as the continual formulations of understanding that emerge during the 
process of interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). That is, whenever I have 
arrived at an interpretation of a specific situation I have sought to triangulate the 
interpretation, by applying data triangulation (Denzin, 1978) to elaborate my 
understanding by getting the perspective of other actors as well as methodological 
triangulation (Denzin, 1978) to substantiate, reject or refine my understanding by 
using other methods. That is, the sub-interpretations derived from observation are 
triangulated by the use of document analysis and interviews and vice versa.  
The purpose of such triangulation is not based on a logic of validation, but rather on a 
logic of argumentation (Madison, 1988). That is, the purpose has never been to obtain 
a uniform account of specific incidents, but rather to understand – and acknowledge – 
how different actors employ different sensemaking to specific situations. Throughout 
my fieldwork, I have aimed at engaging with a broad variety of actors, acknowledging 
that organizations are indeed “collective storytelling system[s] (Hazen, 1993: 15) in 
order to merely rely on formalized interviews, where I am not only likely to “miss the 
more intimate sounds of people speaking, singing, or crying out to one another” 
(Hazen, 1993: 16) but I would also be confined to develop my understanding on the 
basis of retrospective interview data. 
Hazen (1993) emphasizes that if “we hear (or read) only loud, articulate, respectable, 
or directive voices, we confine our possibilities, limit our range, zero in on only one 
goal, forfeit chances of individual and collective development” (p. 16) and thus, 
participant observation not only gives a broader perspective, a polyphony, but, in a 
sense, also contributes to workplace democratization, by giving voice to the silent. One 
can of course see this as an objective in itself, but even if one does not, I maintain that 
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Hazen (1993) is right in saying: “When we listen to polyphonic organization, we hear 
harmony, dissonance, clash, counterpoint, silence, complex rhythms” (p. 22). Not only 
does this make way for a richer and more nuanced research output to the benefit of 
scholars, it can also provide valuable insights for the industrial partners, who may often 
pay too little attention to the more silent people in their organization. Thus, in the 
analytical chapters I have strived to give voice to both the loud actors, but also to the 
more silent one’s in order to provide analytical conclusions that are as elaborate as 
possible. I have aimed at engaging in a dialogue with broad range of actors from the 
polyphonic organizations to develop my understanding of the texts (being actual texts, 
observations, conversations or formal interviews) and hereby challenging my own sub-
interpretations to a point where I believe I have captured the logics of argumentation 
from all involved parties; and I have subsequently made my best effort to let all such 
voices be heard in my analysis.  
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CHAPTER IV: SETTING THE SCENE  
Introducing the Industrial Partners 
The collaboration between HCL and Berlingske Media constitutes the empirical 
foundation for this dissertation. In this chapter I will therefore introduce the two 
industrial partners. I will do so by outlining the history and markets of the two 
organizations, by describing the physical locations in Copenhagen and in Chennai, 
where the respective actors are located, and by elaborating on the nature of the client-
vendor collaboration. I will do so in order to establish a foundation for the remainder 
of the dissertation. However, this initial presentation of the empirical settings will be at 
a somewhat high level. More detailed descriptions will be introduced in the analytical 
chapters, when they are needed.  
HCL Technologies 
History and Market Position 
The company history starts in 1976 when Hindustan Computer Limited was founded 
by Shiv Nayar as a barsaati – the Hindi word for a garage start-up – focused on the IT 
hardware market in India. During the first 15 years HCL was almost entirely focused 
on hardware development with only little activity outside the borders of India. Inspired 
by the first wave of IT outsourcing to India in the late eighties (Nayar, 2010), HCL 
Technologies was established in 1991 to tap into the rapidly growing IT services 
industry. Under the umbrella of HCL Enterprises, HCL Technologies and HCL 
Infosystems are now individually listed on the Indian stock exchange. In terms of both 
revenue and staff HCL Technologies is significantly bigger than HCL Infosystems and 
is now contributing with 5,26 billion USD, which is approximately two-third of HCL 
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Enterprises’ total revenue. HCL Technologies are and employing more than 95.000 
people worldwide (HCL, 2014).2 
HCL is currently the fourth largest Indian IT company only surpassed by Tata 
Consulting Services with more than 300.000 employees and revenues in 2013 grossing 
14,44 billion USD (Tata Consultancy Services, 2014), Infosys with approximately 
175.000 employees and a 2011 revenue of 8,24 billion USD (Infosys, 2014) and Wipro 
with 150.000 employees and a 2011 revenue of 7,3 billion USD (Wipro, 2014). Much 
in line with their biggest competitors named above, HCL’s business is mainly focused 
on providing outsourcing services within engineering, IT development and application 
services, IT infrastructure operations and application management as well as various 
kinds of business consulting including business process outsourcing (BPO) and 
knowledge process outsourcing (KPO).  
The industry for providing outsourced IT services has indeed grown tremendously over 
the latter years. In the case of HCL the number of employees has been tripled since 
2005 and the yearly revenue is now six fold of what it was just seven years ago. When 
Vineet Nayar took over as CEO in 2006 HCL had a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of thirty per cent. Indeed in many industries this would be an impressing 
number, but not within this particular industry. Nayar explains the situation as it was in 
the spring of 2005: 
“I just knew that our company, HCL, was in a tough spot and that we had to 
do something fast or we were in danger of being out of the race all together. 
I had been the head of the company for only a short time and was still trying 
to grasp what it meant to lead such a large enterprise (…) the company had 
                                         
2 This dissertation is only occupied with HCL Technologies. However, as HCL Technologies are 
known in the industry merely as ‘HCL’ I will use the same acronym. Thus, when referring to HCL 
Technologies, I will do so by the acronym HCL and when I refer to HCL Enterprises I will write this 
in full. 
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thirty thousand employees, operations in eighteen countries, yearly revenue 
of about $700 million, and a healthy compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
of about 30 percent over the previous five years. But behind these fairly 
impressive numbers lay a difficult reality (…) Once one of India’s corporate 
stars, HCL was growing more slowly than the market leader in its industry 
(a company which had achieved a 50 percent CAGR over the last five years) 
and slower than its immediate rivals, losing market share and falling behind 
in mindshare, too.” (Nayar, 2010: 3)  
During the 1990’s HCL had established themselves as the market leader in India, they 
were “the leader of the race, holding the number one position ahead of its Indian peers” 
(Nayar, 2010: 4), but in the years from 2000 to 2005 this had changed: Several 
competitors experienced better growth rates and was literately racing past HCL. Nayar 
speculated that “perhaps we felt satisfied with the growth we had accomplished. 
Perhaps we believed we were doing the best we could do. Perhaps we were offering 
the wrong mix of services for the changed marketplace” (Nayar, 2010: 4). Ultimately 
the declining market share led to a commitment to change, which Nayar elaborates on 
in his autobiographical account entitled ‘Employees First, Customers Second – turning 
conventional management upside down’ of his years as CEO of HCL.  Today, HCL 
has a stable position as the fourth biggest IT-service provider in India and they have a 
substantial footprint in the global industry for IT-outsourcing. 
Company-internal Trust from the CEO’s Perspective 
Before commencing into an empirical description of the client’s organization I believe 
that the abovementioned autobiographical record (Nayar, 2010) deserves a bit of 
attention for one particular reason: It is all about trust! The objective of the 
abovementioned commitment to change was to “turn conventional management upside 
down by putting employees first” (Nayar 2010: 16) as Nayar puts it, which – according 
to Nayar – requires trust.   
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At a so-called ‘Blueprint Meeting’ during summer of 2005 Nayar presented his 
thoughts on challenges of HCL and his initial ideas for a future strategy for HCL to the 
top 100 managers in the company. In his own words it was a bold strategy that 
suggested dramatic changes in the way HCL would do business and consequently a 
risky endeavor for the company.  
In hindsight, I wonder why I thought they would trust me at all (…) Why 
should they trust me? Just because I was asking them to? No. That is not a 
reason to trust anyone, especially in today’s world. Employees have 
distrusted managers since there have been employees and managers, but I 
was sure the distrust that ran within the organization was deeper than ever 
before” (Nayar 2010: 59) 
At the ‘Blueprint Meeting’ Vineet Nayar was met with skepticism from the top 100 
managers. They did not trust him to be heading such a dramatic change and in that 
meeting he “realized that our first job would be to build trust throughout the 
organization” (Nayar 2010: 63). And so, the idea for the ‘trust through transparency’ 
initiative was allegedly born. Vineet Nayar explains that:  
“At HCL, we focused on one specific trust-building action: pushing the 
envelope of transparency. As we did, we found that most people within the 
organization know very well what’s wrong with a company, sometimes even 
before management does or, at least, before management is willing to admit 
it. When you bring this information out into the open and make the 
challenges public, employees feel included. They start to see that the 
problems of the company are really their problems, too, not just those of the 
management. They realize that if management is willing to share important 
information, even the bad stuff, and encourage open conversation about the 
facts, its intentions can be trusted. Very quickly, you will start seeing some 
positive action at the grassroots level even before management can decide 
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on actions and solutions. Many times, we saw employees start working on 
problems without being asked to do so.” (Nayar 2010: 10) 
At the center of the ‘trust through transparency’ initiative was opening up the window 
of information, as Nayar puts it, by doing four things: Making financial and project 
reporting from all the business units available to everybody in HCL; establishing an 
open online forum where everybody could ask questions to the CEO and the rest of the 
top management; rethinking performance evaluations completely; and putting focus to 
how employees could be enabled the best way possible.  
To make the reports from the business units available to the whole of HCL essentially 
meant to grant the whole company access to see how the business units are performing 
individually and consequently to compare performance across these units. According 
to Nayar (2010) the idea was that such an initiative would “help build a culture of trust 
– showing that we had nothing to hide and were willing to share both the good and the 
bad, just as one would in a strong family” (p. 71), but of course also at the risk of 
having company internal data leaked outside the HCL premises. In addition, Nayar 
(2010) explains that “opening the window of information shed a lot of light on the role 
of the manager. Some found themselves exposed to the glances of the passerby from 
the streets and canals of the company. People saw that some of the managers were little 
more than the aggregators and brokers of information. These managers’ entire 
authority lay in their control of the information. As soon as everyone had access to it, 
their position might come into question.” (p. 72)  
This particular theme, about power distribution and its effect on the levels of trust 
within the organization, is repeatedly addressed by Nayar in his autobiography and 
indeed also reflected in the last part of the book’s title, ‘turning conventional 
management upside down’. Nayar (2010) adds that in a traditional management system 
the leader holds too much power and this “prevents the organization from becoming 
democratized and the energy of the employees from being released” (p. 13). By 
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making financial information, that customarily is only accessible to the head of the 
business unit and his or her superiors, available to all employees in the organization, 
Nayar claims that a higher level of trust in the organization will be established; that 
employees will be more passionate about their job; and elaborates that the “speed of 
thought, of change, and of implementation gets suffocated by too much hierarchy, 
whatever it may be.” (Nayar 2010: 163). Vineet Nayar stepped down as CEO of HCL 
in January 2013 and now acts as a special consultant to the company. However, there is 
not indication that his legacy on putting employees first is discarded. Rather, it is 
something that is still mentioned in both company presentations and on their corporate 
website.  
Thus, there are substantial indications that trust is an important construct in the intra-
organizational collaborations at HCL – at least by the account of the former CEO. 
Whether the importance of trust is embedded in practice “on the floor” or rather a 
strategic discourse aimed at branding the company cannot be inferred. Such an 
investigation would indeed be interesting. However, it lies beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, as it is not my ambition to examine trust and trustworthiness within the 
organizational boundaries of HCL, but rather in an inter-organizational context. In this 
perspective it is interesting to see if, and how, this agenda of trust through transparency 
also extents to HCL’s collaboration with their clients – in this particular case, 
Berlingske Media. Is ‘trust through transparency’ solely a company-internal discourse 
or does it influence collaboration with clients too? Is transparency also the means to 
establish trust between the client and the vendor organizations – and their respective 
employees? Or are other means used to establish trust in the client-vendor 
relationships?  
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Berlingske Media 
The Company History: 1733-2014 
Today Berlingske Media is one of the two leading media groups in Denmark spanning 
two daily paid nationwide newspapers, both among the top five newspapers in 
Denmark, as well as ten local newspapers published on a daily or a weekly basis; and 
three radio station. In addition Berlingske Media owns and operates more than 40 
stand-alone web media, such as sweetdeal.dk, bilzonen.dk and netdoktor.dk.  
The company was founded almost three hundred years ago, in 1733, when Ernst 
Henrich Berling established a printing house a couple of blocks from where the 
Berlingske Media has its headquarters today. In 1749 the first newspaper was printed, 
just one year before the founder dies. In 1765 the company moves to the current 
location in Pilestræde, and over the next 150 years Berlingske grows: By 1847 the 
paper is published twice a day six days a week; in 1914 the first newspaper with photos 
are published, and in 1916 Berlingske adds another paper to its portfolio: B.T. Up until 
1968 Berlingske has, with the exception of a few short periods, been growing ever 
since the first newspaper was published. But in 1968 the publishing house starts to lose 
both market share and circulation numbers and by 1982 is has lost its equity and is on 
the verge of bankruptcy. The company is then taken over by large corporate investors, 
including A.P. Møller Mærsk and Danske Bank, and the company is no longer in the 
hands of the Berling family. 
Over the last thirty years Berlingske has been expanding by establishing niche 
publications within sports and culture, by acquiring local newspapers; establishing 
free-of-charge daily newspapers; and over the last fifteen years by establishing a 
footprint within online media. Berlingske Media has had many names, and almost too 
many to mention, over the years. On the streets they are commonly known just as 
‘Berlingske’, but over the last decade they have changed names from ‘Berlingske 
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Tidende’ to ‘Det Berlingske Officin’ and last in 2008 to the current name, ‘Berlingske 
Media’.  
Just as the names have changed over the last fifteen years, so has the ownership. In 
2000 Berlingske was purchased by Orkla Media in Norway, hereby making Berlingske 
a part of one of the five largest media conglomerates in the Nordic countries altogether. 
In 2006 Berlingske was bought by British owned Mecom Group Plc. (from here: 
Mecom). Mecom also acquired the Dutch media conglomerate Wegener. On June 30th 
2014 it was made public that Mecom had sold both Berlingske Media and Wegener to 
the Belgian media group De Persgroep. The acquisition currently awaits approval from 
the Dutch competition authorities as well as the Mecom shareholders. The acquisition 
is expected to be finalized around New Year 2014-15. Today Berlingske Media 
employs more than 2.300 people and has a net turnover exceeding three billion Danish 
kroner per year (Berlingske Media 2013) 
From In-house IT to Full-Scale Outsourcing to Offshore Outsourcing 
In 2007 Berlingske Media engaged in a full-fledged outsourcing of their IT 
infrastructure, IT operations and IT development. From having more than seventy IT-
employees in 2006 they went to having just one in 2007, when they engaged with CSC, 
one of the largest IT-service providers in Denmark and worldwide. All IT activities – 
infrastructure, operations and application development – were outsourced to CSC and 
all IT-employees except one were transferred to the CSC. As customary in such 
outsourcing engagements the transferred employees were at first charged with the same 
tasks and responsibilities, but over time they were given other assignments or laid off. 
Over the following years most of them were given new job responsibilities and the 
client’s IT-activities were thus enrolled in the vendor’s delivery model.  
The remaining employee in the client’s strongly reduced IT-department, the Director 
of IT-operations, was put in charge of building a new IT-organization in-house with 
profiles that were proficient in managing and governing outsourced IT. In parallel with 
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former client-side employees being transferred to new assignments with other clients 
of CSC, the Director of IT-operations established an in-house IT-department with new 
employees, who had not experienced “the old days” with in-house IT. Thus, when 
Berlingske Media in 2011 decided to change to a new vendor, HCL, there were only 
about twenty employees left, who had been part of the in-house IT department.  
When HCL was chosen as the new vendor it was decided that eight of these 
approximately twenty employees should be transferred from CSC to HCL. By doing so 
they were also physically moved from CSC’s Danish headquarters and were again 
working in Berlingske Media’s headquarters in central Copenhagen – a location they 
had left five years earlier.  
When HCL took over as Berlingske Media’s service provider in 2012 the hardware 
infrastructure was moved to the Netherlands and all operational activities were moved 
to Chennai in India, except those performed by the eight former client employees and a 
handful of HCL’s native Indian employees who were deployed onsite on a rotation 
basis. Berlingske Media’s Operations Management Center (OMC) was established in 
building 3 in in one of HCL’s campuses outside the city center of Chennai. The OMC 
will be described in greater detail later in this chapter. 
The Client-Vendor Collaboration 
Offshore Outsourcing 
The collaboration between HCL and Berlingske Media can be described as an offshore 
outsourcing engagement (Contractor et al., 2010) encompassing primarily 
infrastructure operations and application management. That is, HCL is running the 
hardware that is being used by Berlingske Media and the vendor is responsible for 
making sure that the systems, applications and databases that run on this hardware are 
kept up to date and that smaller changes are implemented. HCL is also responsible for 
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the networks in Berlingske Media, but end user computing is managed by Berlingske 
Media.  
With regards to applications development, HCL is only to a limited extend involved: 
Most of the development is done by Berlingske Media in collaboration with their 
development team in Kiev, and HCL is only involved in application development tied 
to back-end applications such as Berlingske Media’s ERP system. 
The offshore outsourcing collaboration is organized such that the contractual 
agreement specifies certain service levels that are to be met by HCL with regards to for 
instance response times, online time and resolution time (which I will get back to in 
Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’, where a variety of service 
levels are described in greater detail). For these specified services and corresponding 
service levels HCL receives a fixed sum of money on a monthly basis, insofar they 
meet these objectives. While there are also certain contractual obligations with regards 
to staffing it is important to note that Berlingske Media does not as such have any say 
in whom HCL hires to staff the OMC. Thus, the OMC staff is not handpicked by 
Berlingske Media, but rather employed by HCL to provide a service to the client. 
Organizing 
The offshore outsourcing collaboration is organized as follows. On the client side the 
Berlingske Media internal IT-organization (depicted in Figure 4.1 below) is comprised 
of sixteen people of which four are dedicated to IT operations and the rest are focused 
at development, project management and higher-level management, for example the 
CIO. Berlingske Media has engaged with an outsourcing partner in Ukraine for web 
and mobile development and with HCL in India for IT-operations, including both 
infrastructure and application management. The latter cooperation is the sole focus of 
this dissertation. The OMC employees are essentially interfacing with employees from 
Berlingske Media in two different ways: In cases where changes to applications 
managed by the OMC need to be introduced to cater for new web or mobile 
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development or changed requirements within the client organization, they are 
interfacing with the client’s project managers; and on operational aspects they are 
connected to the four employees in the IT-operations department – a Director of IT 
Operations and three Service Managers. These four people have, like the project 
managers, managerial responsibilities; thus, all “hands-on” work is done at the OMC. 
Finally, the senior management, given their overall responsibility, also has a stake in 
the HCL collaboration. 
 
At the vendor’s premises in India the client has an Operations Management Center 
(OMC) comprised of approximately eighty HCL employees dedicated to servicing this 
specific client. As mentioned above, the OMC provides a broad range of services 
including application management; technical infrastructure; and data center 
management and is exclusively responsible for all of the client’s IT operations. The 
HCL employees are divided into functional groups, based on technologies such as SAP 
and Wintel; and on functional areas such as change management, incident 
management, security and storage. The OMC is organized in these teams, sixteen in 
total, who each have a team leader. In some teams the team leader is only concerned 
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with team management, while in other, smaller, teams the team leader is also 
performing operational tasks.  
Depending on the functional areas these team leaders either report to the Service 
Delivery Manager for Application Development or to the Service Delivery Manager 
for Operations. The Service Delivery Manager for Operations is also the overall Head 
of the OMC, and thus the Service Manager for Application Development also reports 
to the Head of the OMC. Finally, the native Danish HCL employees working out of 
Copenhagen are all reporting to a Service Manager, who is also native Danish and 
stationed in Copenhagen, and he reports to the Service Delivery Manager for 
Application Development. These organizational relations are depicted below in figure 
4.2.  
 
Office Descriptions 
Berlingske Media – Copenhagen, Denmark 
The headquarters of Berlingske Media is located in (the old part of) central 
Copenhagen. Berlingske has been residing in central Copenhagen since the first 
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newspaper was published in 1747 and less than twenty years later, in 1765, Berlingske 
moved to Pilestræde, where the current headquarter is located. Over the years 
Berlingske has expanded and the headquarters now consists of several buildings build 
together. The apartment where the Berling family lived is still maintained as a kind of 
museum. (It is named “De Gamle Stuer” - The Old Rooms). 
The IT-department is situated on the third floor - two floors below the canteen that sits 
on the top of the building complex. This department consists of a total of 24 desks in 
groups of four. All employees in the IT-department are placed here, including the CIO, 
who has de-selected an office on the first floor, where the rest of the top management 
is located. Like all other IT-employees he sits in the open office landscape.  
When I first visited the department, I was told that there was free seating, but that the 
various sub-groups tended to sit close together as this was more convenient. During my 
first days as a participant observer I discovered that while free seating may be an 
option, it is rarely used. Mostly people sit at the same desks. Despite this the desks are 
kept tidy and without any personal artifacts – such as family pictures – as well as paper 
work. The office is groomed for anyone sitting anywhere. On two of the walls there are 
cabinets with locks, where all employees can store their items, such as documents and 
ring binders.    
The 24 desks are in groups of four in a rectangular room: At the far end of the room the 
department head and member of the senior management team with the dual title of 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Information Officer (CIO) sits alongside the 
Projects Director, who is also the contract responsible with regards to the HCL 
collaboration responsible for the overall collaboration with HCL. The project managers 
occupy the next group of tables. Next to this is a group of tables “belonging” to the in-
house web-developers; then, the local HCL employees; and finally the IT operations 
people.  
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Above the IT operations’ group of desks is a large TV screen and a camera. The 
equipment is for video conferencing and I was told when I enquired on one of my first 
days as participant observer that the equipment was by? the project managers and the 
in-house web-developers in order to communicate with their developers in Kiev. The 
idea was that whenever Danish staff needed to communicate with one or more people 
in Kiev they could go to that part of the office space and talk using a video system that 
would be “always on”, meaning that there would be a permanently connected video 
connection between Copenhagen and Kiev. I was told that people found this annoying 
and eventually it was given up. Now, the IT operations people have occupied the group 
of tables in front of the equipment, and thus it cannot be used at all by the project 
managers and web-developers communicating with people in Kiev. No such 
communication facilities have been introduced to facilitate the collaboration with HCL 
in India. In the rare events that video meetings are held with vendor-side actors in India 
they will take place in one of the video-equipped meeting rooms that are in the 
building (which I will get back to in much greater detail in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by 
Distance’).  
At the very end of the rectangular office space is a coffee room and a small wardrobe 
as well as two couches and a low table. The couches are rarely used during the day, but 
if one goes to the coffee room one can quite often see people having one-on-one 
meetings or talking on the phone. It seems that the employees usually go here, when 
they need to talk on the phone. It? the office phone conversations are very rarely 
observed. And in the cases, where people talk on the phone at their desk it is usually 
very short conversations, kept at a low volume. Most of the time the office is very 
quiet, and all you can hear is the sound of fingers touching the keyboards. Especially 
the mornings are very quiet. Usually a bit more verbal communication is heard across 
the room after lunchtime.  
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HCL – Chennai, India 
The OMC is located on a HCL campus outside Chennai in the state of Tamil Nadu in 
India. The area is called Sholinganallur and it is known as an IT industry area, where 
several of the largest Indian and international IT service providers have campuses. The 
campus is not more than a few years old and it is HCL’s ambition that the campus 
expands significantly over the next years as they expect to hire more people as well as 
move employees from other campuses in the Chennai area to this new campus. 
Currently, the campus consists of six buildings and more than 3500 employees are 
working there.  
Berlingske Media´s OMC is located in building five on the third floor. Like all other 
OMC’s for other clients one has to go through the main gate, where access control is 
performed; through the lobby of the building where a second access control is 
performed by the means of gates where an access card is required; and finally in order 
to enter the OMC one has to swipe an access card too. The OMC is essentially one 
large square room, which can accommodate up to one hundred people. The room is 
divided into functional areas, which means that employees working together in teams 
are sitting next to each other. In the corner of the room, two desks are placed a little 
away from the others. This is where the two OMC managers sit. Much like the 
Berlingske Media head office in Copenhagen it is very quiet at the OMC. The HCL 
employees make sure to move close and talk quietly, in order not to disturb their 
colleagues. Most of the desks have a few personal items and each employee has his or 
her own desk equipped with landline phone and a computer. 
In addition to the large open office, there are two meeting rooms inside the gates of the 
OMC reserved solely for employees at the OMC. One of these rooms is equipped with 
both phone conference system and video conferencing equipment, while the other only 
has phone conferencing equipment. Outside the OMC, at the isles there are several 
meeting rooms for all purposes, which the employees can book too. Some are only for 
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physically co-present meetings, while other rooms have state of the art video 
conferencing equipment and others again have phone conferencing equipment. While it 
is easy to get lost on the isles in the big building, where all doors look the same, one is 
never in doubt where one is, when entering the OMC. The room is literally packed 
with signs and posters from Berlingske Media.  
Summing Up and Moving On 
In this chapter I have introduced the two industrial partners, whose collaboration is the 
focus of attention in my ethnographic case study. I have briefly outlined the history of 
the two companies and their position in the market. I have also touched upon the 
notion of trust through transparency as formulated by the former CEO of HCL, Vineet 
Nayar; I have described the outsourcing journey that Berlingske Media started in 2007, 
and I have briefly sketched the office-layout in Copenhagen and in Denmark. 
Arguably, technologies available and the use of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) is an integral part of global collaboration. However, it is also a 
subject I have not devoted much attention to in this chapter, as this is the main topic of 
Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’, where I focus on communication and 
collaboration across distance using ICT. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER V: CHALLENGED BY DISTANCE 
Introduction 
One of the many manifestations of globalization is the increasing tendency for western 
firms to strategically outsource activities to Asia (Windrum et al., 2009) and 
throughout the last two decades it has become increasingly popular to engage in 
offshore outsourcing (Contractor et al., 2010) of IT activities, which the empirical 
foundation for this dissertation is yet another instance of.  
Success in such endeavors dependent significantly on the participants’ abilities to work 
in distributed teams; and a large body of research within several academic fields has 
been devoted to understanding the inherent complexities of distributed teamwork (see 
for instance Olson & Olson, 2000; Hambley et al., 2007). Much of this research 
mentions the importance of trust in virtual teamwork, but without making much of it. 
On the other hand, there exists a large body of research on trust (Saunders et al., 2010) 
but within trust research only limited attention has been devoted to virtual 
collaboration. 
In traditional collocated work-environment we easily get to know each other. We eat 
lunch together; share personal details about our family, interests, vacation; gather for 
social activities after hours and so on. By simply being collocated we are bound to pick 
up a lot of contextual knowledge: We know who is present and when they arrived. We 
know when they leave and we get an impression of whether they are hard working or 
more easy going. Do they take long lunch breaks or are they grabbing a sandwich at 
their desks? How many are they talking to over the course of the day? And who? 
Moreover, we gain insights into our colleagues’ moods and we can relatively easy spot 
if they are happy, angry, sad, tired, stressed out, overworked and so on.  
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There is an almost endless list of things we can pick up from simply being collocated. 
All this contextual knowledge happens automatically and for the most part 
unconsciously. All we need to do is be there. This concept of ”just being around” is 
referred to as passive face time by Elsbach et al. (2010). 
Kimberly Elsbach and her colleagues (2010) conclude that by just being around we 
tend to spontaneously and unconsciously draw positive conclusions about the character 
of our colleagues: We assign personal traits such as reliability, dedication, 
accountability merely based on co-presence. Elsbach et al. (2010) furthermore 
demonstrate that employees that are not physically present miss out on promotions and 
salary increases, due to the lack of these spontaneous, positive conclusions. Thus, 
being the virtual colleague can be quite challenging with regards to establishing a 
positive impression of one self and the work one performs and additionally damaging 
to one’s career. In a similar vein Hinds & Bailey (2003) conclude: “When trust is 
missing, team members are more likely to question others’ intentions and make 
attributions that do not adequately account for situational factors” (p. 618) as lack of 
close proximity is a hindrance to establishment of shared context, familiarity, 
friendship and homogeneity among the actors.  
From quite a different branch of literature the former CEO and Chairman of General 
Electric Jack Welch assesses that the one’s that will be promoted into leadership roles 
are the ones that are consistently seen and measured as this creates familiarity and 
trust. Not because they are “stars during every ‘crucible’ moment at the office” (Welch 
& Welch, 2007: 92) but rather because they are “present and accounted for. And their 
presence says: Work is my top priority. I’m committed to this company. I want to lead. 
And I can” (ibid.) – it appears that the complexities of geographical distribution and its 
influence on trust is also acknowledged by managerial practitioners.  
Thus, it seems that distance indeed matters, as Olson & Olson (2000) concluded in 
their widely cited article from 2000. However, much has happened since Olson & 
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Olson did their empirical studies some fifteen years ago. Communication technology 
has developed and matured drastically and Olson & Olson (2000) were definitely right 
when assessing the future of collaboration technologies: “Good design and more 
horsepower in the infrastructure will solve a number of the limitations of current 
distance technologies. Greater bandwidth will solve the disruptive influence of today’s 
delays in audio and video transmission. Greater bandwidth will allow for larger, 
smoother, more life-size displays of remote workers, making their interaction more 
similar to the flow of proximal interaction” (Olson & Olson, 2000: 143). Today, we 
have high-quality video meetings with unnoticeable lack, cutting clear and undisrupted 
audio where groups of people can interact from different location at our disposal. We 
have video-enabled chat services such as Skype, Microsoft Lync and IBM Sametime. 
We have a broad variety of web-conferencing software available and it is safe to say 
that Olson & Olson’s (2000) projection that “advances in technology suggest that with 
careful human factors in design, there may be technical ways to come closer to some 
aspects of the face-to-face work” (Olson & Olson, 2000: 143) has come true. 
But even though the technical achievements over the past fifteen years are impressive 
does that mean that it has become easy to collaborate across distance? A vast body of 
literature (see Berry (2011) for an elaborate review) suggests that technological 
advancement in it self does not guarantee smooth, frictionless collaboration. Rather, 
we should – as Ceci & Prencipe (2013) suggest – focus on how we collaborate. That is, 
we need to pay attention to how do we organize virtual teamwork. Ceci & Prencipe 
(2013) identify two generic approaches, namely to “(a) decompose activities through 
the definition of standard and stable interfaces among its components to reduce 
interdependencies; (b) create opportunity for ongoing communication for actors 
involved in the pursuit of interdependent activities” (Ceci & Prencipe, 2013: 326). 
However, as Brusoni et al. (2001) point out, perfect decomposability requires perfect 
understanding of all interdependencies, which is a rare case. Consequently, actors have 
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to communicate when collaborating in virtual teams in order to succeed in performing 
the tasks they are set out to do, which, as emphasized by Hinds & Bailey (2003), is a 
challenge in distributed teams. 
In this chapter I will investigate what the perceived challenges of distributed work are 
seen from the perspectives of the actors in the client organization as well as the vendor 
organization. Subsequently, I will enquire into how trustworthiness is established in the 
collaboration between the actors from the two organizational entities, characterized, for 
the most part, by physical distance.  
Thus, in this chapter I seek to answer the two questions below: 
• What are the perceived challenges of globally distributed collaboration? 
• How does distance influence the actors’ perceptions of their inter-
organizational counterpart’s trustworthiness? 
 
In terms of theory, this chapter will draw on the theoretical framework developed in 
‘Chapter II: Theory on Trust’. Consequently, trust is conceptualized as “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 
395). Moreover, “trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking” 
(Möllering, 2006: 44). Thus, trust has a cognitive and an affective dimension and trust 
is based on assessments of the trustee’s trustworthiness –on assessments of their 
ability, integrity and benevolence (Möllering, 2006), where ability and integrity relates 
to the cognitive dimension of trust, and benevolence relates to the affective dimension 
of trust.  
In addition to answering the two above-mentioned research questions I will – based on 
the empirical findings and the theoretical framework – discuss whether there are 
unexploited opportunities for advancing trustful relations between the actors from the 
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two different organizational entities by engaging the concept of active trust (Möllering, 
2006). 
The progression of this chapter is four-fold: First, to describe the availability and 
utilization of technology and thus elaborate the empirical description provided in 
‘Chapter IV: ‘Setting the Scene’ however, with a specific focus on the role of 
technology; second, to understand the perceived value of co-location; third, to 
understanding the perceived challenges of geographically distributed collaboration as 
perceived by the actors; and fourth, to discuss the possibility to advance trust in the 
concrete empirical setting. Furthermore, by describing the technologies available and 
how the actors engage in using technology and by developing an understanding of 
these challenges this chapter also establishes a foundation that will be used in the 
subsequent chapters, where I engage in interdisciplinary analysis of trust and control; 
trust and culture; and trust and boundaries, respectively. 
Technology: Availability and Utilization 
Technologies Available at the Offices in Copenhagen and Chennai 
When entering the IT-department at the client’s headquarters in central Copenhagen 
one finds oneself in a large shared office, where all IT-employees are seated, including 
the department head and member of the senior management team with the dual title of 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Information Officer (CIO). The tables are 
grouped in clusters relating to functions and organizational affiliation. This way the 
COO/CIO and the Head of IT-operations are sitting together; the client-side IT-service 
managers are sitting together; the native Danish vendor-side actors is in close 
proximity with each other; the onsite vendor-side actors ditto. In the same way the 
client-side project managers and internal developers are grouped in clusters relating to 
their current project affiliation. 
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Up until summer 2013 there were free seating in the department. While this was not 
used in practice – almost everybody was taking the same seat every day, week and 
month – it meant that the desks were highly impersonalized. No personal artifacts 
would be on the tables and all work-related paper was put in the employee’s lockers at 
the end of each day. All client-side actors are equipped with laptop computers and 
company-issued mobile phones and thus, they are not confined by technology to 
working in a specific location. At the client’s headquarters there are also several 
meeting rooms equipped with video conferencing equipment and additionally a lot of 
meeting rooms with phone conferencing hardware.  
At the Operations Management Center (OMC) in India the vendor-side actors are all 
located in a large room that can accommodate up to 100 people at the same time. The 
vendor-side actors are grouped by functions. Each desk is equipped with a landline 
phone as only the management team has company-issued mobile phones, though quite 
a lot of vendor-side actors are making themselves available for incoming calls on their 
personal mobile phones, judging from their email-signatures where their mobile phone 
numbers are listed. In terms of computers some employees are equipped with laptops 
while others are working on desktop computers. In general, the OMC managers and 
team leads as well as other functions, such as change management and incident 
management, are equipped with laptops, making it possible for them to bring their 
computer to meetings and to work from home when required, while employees that has 
a lesser need for mobility are equipped with desktops. 
Within the OMC there are two meeting rooms. One is equipped with a phone 
conference system, whereas the other has equipment for video conferencing as well as 
hardware for phone conferencing. Additionally, there are several meeting rooms with 
similar facilities outside the OMC – but at the same floor – which can be booked by the 
vendor-side actors. 
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Technology Utilization 
The fact that all actors, both client-side and vendor-side, have computers is hardly a 
surprise. And the fact that all these computers are connected to high-speed corporate 
Internet connections is probably not a great revelation either. The computer is the 
central means to communication between the actors – as in so many other 
organizations. What is interesting is what happens “under the hood” of this vehicle of 
mediated communication, so to speak. 
The computer-mediated communication is essentially four-fold: Email, chat, browser-
based software and ad hoc file sharing. In the following I will go through the 
utilization of each of these types of communication.   
Email is king. It can be said that easy! Every single actor I have asked about the 
primary means of communication vis-à-vis distributed collaboration highlights email 
as the most used communication tool. There are several reasons why email is the most 
predominantly used means of communication. First, email is documentation. Several of 
the actors on both sides highlight this and explain that they see a distinction between 
for instance phone conversations and emails. One vendor-side actor explain that “I call 
up the client and ask them for approval, they approve on the phone [and] then I just 
drop an email stating that as per your approval we’re restarting the server” (Interview 
#22). By working this way the vendor-side actors have their back covered, so to speak, 
if there, at any point in time, should arise questions as to why they have acted the way 
they did. The client-side actors also recognize this dependency on documentation. 
However, they have a slightly different understanding. While the vendor-side actors 
express the need for documentation as a proof of acting according to orders and in a 
timely manner, should something go wrong, the client-side actors believe that the 
vendor-side actors are using emails to be able to revisit the correspondence in cases of 
doubt. One client-side actor says: 
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“Indians like to have everything in writing. […] I think it may be because 
they won’t say that they don’t understand it […] which is why it is best to 
have everything in writing so they can go back and see what I asked for.” 
(Interview #17 – client-side actor) 
Secondly, email can help avoid language barriers. Several of the vendor-side actors 
have told me that they are deliberately using email, because they feel that their client-
side counterparts have a hard time understanding the Indian accent, when speaking 
over the phone. And a few of them explain that they, themselves, face difficulties 
understanding the Danes in verbal communication. This is supported by some of the 
client-side actors who also express that they find it difficult to understand the Indian 
accent, when communicating verbally with their Indian counterparts. Thirdly, several 
actors from both organizational entities express that there is a mental barrier to 
contacting people they don’t know from the other organization, which makes it easier 
to write an email than to pick up the phone.  
In addition to emails, chats are also used. With regards to internal communication 
between vendor-side actors (Danish as well as Indian), their computers are equipped 
with Microsoft Lync, which is heavily utilized. With regards to interorganizational 
communication between vendor-side and client-side actors they are using Google 
Hangout. However, the latter is a very recent development. For the first 18 months of 
collaboration instant messaging was not possible due to technical and security reasons: 
The client is to a wide extent using cloud based services including Google’s mail 
service, Gmail, and hence the use Google’s instant messaging and video-chat service 
‘Hangout’ for chats. However, at the vendor organization ‘Hangout’ was not possible 
due to internal policies on security and Internet-usage. This was changed for the OMC 
employees post a client visit to the OMC in September 2013. Hence, at this point in 
time the option to use instant messaging is a fairly new possibility for 
interorganizational communication between the actors.  
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Among the vendor-side actors there seems to be general consensus that chatting is a 
useful and fast way of communicating. However, in the client organization there are 
divergent opinions on communicating via instant messages: On one hand some share 
the opinion of the vendor-side actors and on the other hand some clearly state that they 
prefer not to use instant messengers – “I don’t do stuff like that” as one of the client-
side actors puts it (Field Notes 20130226). 
Finally, browser-based software and ad hoc file sharing are also essential to the 
communication between client-side and vendor-side actors. Such tools are used to 
communicate in a standardized way. For instance, requirements specifications are 
communicated by the means of document templates; ongoing status reporting is 
communicated via browser-based interfaces and standing reports are communicated via 
power point templates. (The role of such artifacts will be analyzed further in Chapter 
VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’) 
Apart from computer-mediated communication tools, some actors also use phones for 
on-to-one communications across organizational boundaries. During my observation 
studies at the client’s headquarters I have listened in on numerous phone calls and it is 
evident to me that phone calls are by and large only used in two scenarios: In cases of 
complexity that has surfaced after a longer mail correspondence and in cases of 
urgency. That is, until a certain issue has either proved to be difficult to handle via 
emails or if the issue needs immediate attention everything is handled by email or in a 
few cases by chat. For instance, one of the vendor-side actors, an incident manager, 
charged with the responsibility of coordinating that incidents and problems reported 
are resolved according to the service level agreements explain that when critical 
incidents arise even in the middle of the night she will call her counterpart at 
Berlingske Media because “The client also feels that if something happening in their 
environment […] they want them to be the first people to know that” (Interview #22). 
However, she also states that even though she is required to call her client-side 
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counterpart as well as the OMC manager there is a difference: With regards to calling 
her own manager (the Head of the OMC) she says that “we definitely wake them [up]” 
(Interview #22), but concerning the client-side counterpart she “really give it a thought 
whether I should call him or not” (Interview #22). This reluctance to call the client-side 
actors on the phone is similar for many vendor-side employees, who state that they 
prefer communicating in writing – even during normal business hours. 
When more than two people are included in the communication the actors make use of 
emails as well as phone and video conferencing. In the cases of phone and video 
conferencing there are primarily three instances where these are used: Urgent issues, 
standing meetings and project meetings.  
In urgent cases, such as breakdown of business critical systems or services, the parties 
will typically arrange phone conferences where the vendor-side manager bearing the 
responsibility for resolving the issue will report to the client-side managers as well as 
his or her own managers on the progress at agreed intervals, for instance every hour or 
every two hours depending on the urgency and impact of the issue at hand. Such 
meetings are also used for coordination – in cases where resolving the issue is 
dependent on client-side involvement. In cases where this is not the case there will 
typically only be a single conference call and the remained is status information sent 
via email at specified intervals. For standing meetings, such as the weekly change 
board meeting and the monthly service delivery meeting phone conferencing is 
typically the preferred choice of media. However, after the client delegation’s visit to 
Chennai in September 2013 this seems to have changed: During the visit the OMC 
manager showed one of the video conferencing rooms to a selected group of the client-
side employees and suggested that they could consider using video for the coming 
service delivery meetings. This was agreed upon (Field Notes 20130927) – and 
eventually effectuated.  
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Interestingly, there was a perception among some client-side actors that video meeting 
was not possible due to lack of video conferencing facilities at the OMC. One client-
side actor explained that “they [the vendor-side actors] don’t have any meeting rooms 
with video down there, except for a large conference room which they only use on 
special occasions […] It [video conferencing] should definitely be utilized more. It 
gives a better sense of face-time” (Interview #6). 
With regards to phone conferencing, I have repeatedly experienced that the audio 
quality for phone conferences being unstable. Most of the time the connection is quite 
good, but sometimes it is muffled. In contrast, the quality of the videoconferences is 
consistently high; the picture is clear, the audio is good and the lightning in the rooms 
permits good visuals.  
Finally, with regards to project meetings video is the preferred medium for project 
start-up, where a video meeting of the duration of approximately one hour is agreed 
upon and executed. For the remained of the project’s life meetings are typically held 
via phones and most communication and coordination is done via emails and chats.  
The Perceived Value of Co-location 
In terms of the technology available the actors have a wide range of up-to-date 
communication technologies available at hand on a daily basis: Emails, telephones, 
instant messengers with the option to have both textual as well as one-on-one video 
meetings, phone conferencing equipment and video conferencing equipment. All of 
these technologies work seamlessly except for phone conferencing, which in some 
cases can have a lower quality. However, even with quite good technology available 
we are not near the ‘paradise’ that Arthur Mee projected a little more than a century 
ago. 
“If, as it is said to be not unlikely in the near future, the principle of sight is 
applied to the telephone as well as that of sound, earth will be in truth a 
120 
paradise, and distance will lose its enchantment by being abolished 
altogether.” (Mee, 1898: 345)  
Throughout my fieldwork it has been clear that the actors from both organizations 
value face-to-face interaction with their counterparts immensely. The value of co-
location has repeatedly been brought up during interviews and furthermore 
substantiated by the means of my observation studies, where I have had amble 
opportunity to observe how the actors repeatedly turn to co-located counterparts – to 
the familiar faces conveniently present. 
Actors from both organizational entities explain that co-location makes communication 
and collaboration easier. One vendor-side actor claims that being “somewhere near to 
them [the client-side actors], it is always easy for me to go and interact (Interview #9)”, 
while another elaborates that it may also be “more effective in a way.  That is the 
reason we have a guy over here [in Denmark] all the time” (Interview #5). A third 
vendor-side actor with almost fifteen years of experience from various Indian service 
providers adds that it is a common contractual agreement in all larger IT-outsourcing 
arrangements he has experienced: “any service provider whatever you’ll do is there is 
support you from onsite, any industry will make sure there is one guy” (Interview #10). 
The notion of co-located work being easier and more convenient is supported by the 
client-side employees, who find it more convenient to interact “directly with them 
instead of writing short messages on instant messenger and [sending] emails” 
(Interview #6) as one puts it.  
“What is it that is easier when being collocated?” I ask them. Predominantly the 
answers are: ‘being available’ and ‘understanding’. The first, ‘being available’ is 
perceived as a value in itself as eases communication, while the latter, ‘understanding’, 
is twofold: On one hand it is about the ease of communicating and learning about 
technical and domain specific issues. One the other hand co-location and face-to-face 
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interaction are seen as means to gaining understanding of the people who from the 
other organization.  
Understanding 
“If I am here, we all sit in a room, to make me understand the requirement, it 
will take only an hour, exactly an hour” (Vendor-side actor, Interview #5) 
One of the vendor-side actors tell me that gaining a thorough understanding of a 
requirement passed on from the client-side to the vendor-side can take several weeks 
when they are not co-located – something that can be done in an hour when they are. 
On a similar note one of the client-side actors express that he has a clear preference for 
apprenticeship as he has experienced positive outcome of that way of passing on 
knowledge earlier in his career as there is a “greater risk of misunderstanding when 
communicating in writing compared to when you sit together and can easily ask for 
clarification” (Interview #6). 
This is furthermore supported by the one of the client-side managers in charge of the 
outsourcing agreements who explains that the initial phase of the cooperation with the 
vendor consisted of a six month transition period (that ended up lasting more than a 
year) in which key staff from the vendor was brought onsite for knowledge transfer. 
Among the client-side actors there is agreement that this transition period has been 
“vital” for the success of the collaboration and they furthermore point out that such an 
intense knowledge transfer can only be successful if the vendor-side employees are 
onsite and “sitting on the lap of our people [the Danish employees]” (Interview #6) as 
one puts it.  
One aspect of understanding relates to the technical and business domain specific 
knowledge. Another relates to the human aspects, which is brought up repeatedly by 
the vendor-side actors. One of the vendor-side actors who has been onsite for both the 
transition and is now again back in Copenhagen explains the value of collocation like 
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this: “So we are asked to be here and I came to understand how these guys [the client-
side actors] work, so I can do a great job now” (Interview #5) and another vendor-side 
actor elaborates that:  
Yes, basically what I do is once I came here I used to observe the people 
basically, how they talk, how they speak, how they communicate […] you 
need to, as a service provider […] you need to understand them first and 
then you need to mingle with different kind of people.  […] As a service 
provider this also is a part of your job getting to know them and their 
mindset and their culture and then you have to modify yourself a bit and then 
you need to do your service. So, that he will be happy [and] I will be happy” 
(Interview #10 – vendor-side actor) 
This notion, that the vendor-side actors, as representatives of the service provider, need 
to understand the mindset, culture and the way the client side employees work – and 
subsequently adjust themselves to fit in is very predominant among the vendor-side 
actors, who uses terms like ‘modify yourself’, ‘adjust’ and ‘mold oneself’ (a subject 
which I will return to in much greater detail in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across 
Cultures’). The same notion is only to a limited extend found among the client-side 
actors; a few emphasize the importance of finding common ground and “understand 
their [the vendor-side actors’] way of working” (Interview #14), but most of the client-
side actors have a very process-oriented and technical focus and do not consider the 
more humanistic perspective explicitly. To them, understanding is primarily related to 
the subject matter rather than to the human aspect. 
Being Available 
In addition to ‘understanding’, the notion of ‘being available’ is also repeatedly 
brought up by the vendor-side actors as an explanation as to why co-location is 
important. One vendor-side actor explains that being onsite means that he will be the 
natural contact person for the client-side actors. A senior vendor-side employee with 
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onsite experience and managerial responsibilities for a smaller group of offshore 
consultants explains that: “Developing personal relationship is important, but as I said, 
as a service provider you should have the very, very less response time to make 
anybody happy” and elaborates that whoever is onsite “will be the go-to guy, of 
course” (Interview #10) and further elaborates that in order to obtain “effective 
communication there has to be some physical presence” (Interview #10) and 
exemplifies that “if there is a critical issue coming like a breakdown happens or a 
server is down or the internet is down that time obviously it’s a very critical issue that 
someone is present” (Interview #10).  
A part of the explanation for the importance of ‘being there’ refers back to 
‘understanding’ namely, that understanding complex matters is easier when being co-
located. But another part is referring to ‘being there’ as something that has value in and 
for itself. Several of the vendor-side actors that are, or has been, onsite explain that 
they act as intermediaries between the offshore team at the Operations Management 
Center (OMC) in Chennai and the client-side actors in Copenhagen, in order to 
smoothen the cooperation: On one side they are the client’s go-to guys and on the other 
side they can act as intermediaries for their colleagues working in the OMC.  When the 
offshore staff members have questions and needs for clarification they are quite often 
using the onsite vendor-side actors, who are first explained the situation and then they 
will approach the client-side counterpart on behalf of the OMC.  
Likewise, the client-side actors often use the vendor-side actors stationed onsite as 
intermediaries when they need to bring something up with the offshore vendor-side 
employees, as “this is much easier than communicating with India” (Interview #6). 
Mostly, the Indian vendor-side employees stationed onsite are approached with 
subjects within their work domain. The same applies for the native Danish vendor-side 
employees, who are repeatedly used as go-to guys by the client-side employees and 
thus acts as intermediaries between the client-side and the offshore vendor-side actors 
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on subjects relating to their work domain. There is, however, one notable exception, 
namely the service manager, who has the management responsibility of the rest of 
native Danish vendor-side employees and act as “the glue” (Field Notes 20130212), as 
he expresses it himself, between the client-side and the vendor-side actors. His role is, 
in his own words, to “make the ends of the pipes meet” (Field Notes 20130212) and 
over the course of my observation studies it has become crystal clear that this is exactly 
what he is used for. In addition to being involved in a wide range of standing phone 
meetings with India he is on average called over to one of the client-side actor’s desk 
and presented with some issue once or twice per day during my observation studies. 
Most of the time he will accept the task and promise to communicate, discuss or raise 
the issue with the OMC. Being available seems to be not just a part of his job, but 
virtually his full time occupation. 
Judging from the emphasis that actors from both organizations put on co-location it is 
clear that distance has not lost its enchantment. Despite the fact that the actors have 
multiple modern and well-functioning technologies at hand distance still matters. 
Below we shall have a closer look at the concrete challenges they face when 
collaborating across distance, namely ‘difficulties going directly’, ‘knowledge gaps’ 
and ‘lacking transparency’. 
Communicating at a Distance: Three Challenges 
While co-location of the actors from the two organizations results in the actors being 
available and understanding each other this is not the case when the actors have not 
had a chance to work in close physical proximity. This lack of exposure to co-location 
leads to three challenges that will be elaborated below. 
Challenge I: Going Directly 
During my interviews several people have used the term “putting a face” to the other’s, 
when asked to elaborate on why it is more cumbersome to collaborate with people they 
have met face-to-face as opposed to people they have only interacted with via mediated 
 125 
communication. For instance, one of the client employees explain that “it is important 
to put face on” as she feels “closer to them – and they feel closer too” (Interview #17). 
One of the vendor-side employees, and one who performs a role that requires a lot of 
client interaction, recollects the how the collaboration changed after meeting her client-
side counterparts: “I started feeling free to call in for any issues. Before I met them I 
used to have a fear […] so after meeting there is a change” (Interview #19).  
Another vendor-side employee, also with substantial interaction with some of the 
client-side employees explains that she used to think: “what are they going to think 
about me, why is this girl so much pestering” (Interview #22), But after she met with 
her client-side counterpart, she realized that “he was a really cool guy” (Interview #22) 
and that meeting in person was “definitely really important. And after he left from here 
I really did not hesitate to call him for any issues” (Interview #22). 
In a similar vein some of the client-side actors have addressed the value of meeting 
their counterparts. For instance, one client-side actor characterizes an vendor-side actor 
with whom she is interacting with on a daily basis as a “strict lady, who always goes 
by the book” (Interview #17) and assesses that “if I had not met her, I would almost 
not dare writing an email to her. But now that we have met, I think it’s easier” 
(Interview #17). Thus, the reluctance to approach “faceless” counterparts is similar for 
a number of actors from the client-side as well as the vendor-side. What they all 
express, in each their own way, is that the physical face-to-face meeting, even if these 
are rather short, humanizes their counterparts and makes it easier to make contact 
directly – that is, by phone. And in cases where they need to communicate with a 
‘faceless’ person from the other organizational entity they would do so in writing – 
either by email or in some cases by chat.  As one vendor-side actor puts it: “I don’t 
know him in person, so rather than talking with him on the phone I prefer messaging 
on communicator with him” as he is more “comfortable on a communicator” 
(Interview #22) in such instances. 
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Thus, the actors perceived a challenge related to ‘going directly’, which is caused by 
lack of adequate interpersonal interaction. This absence of interpersonal interaction is 
explained by two factors. First, as elaborated above, there seems to be a mental barrier, 
which can be overcome by physical proximity. To paraphrase Goffman (1959), one 
could say that the actors refrain from offering a positive self-image as long as they are 
communicating using technology and they maintain a depersonalized mode of 
communication as long as they have not met in person. Consequently, physical 
distance becomes mental distance. 
However, the actors also express another dimension of the challenge of the ability to be 
‘going directly’ – one that is indeed has a much more pragmatic connotation, but 
nevertheless is important: The availability of technology. That is, in order to conduct 
video-based meetings or to have phone conferences meeting rooms has to be booked, 
which some actors perceived as challenging. As one vendor-side actor puts it these 
video conferencing facilities “has to be book[ed] and it’s very cumbersome” (Interview 
#21) as the rooms need to booked well in advance. Thus, impromptu video meetings 
are not an option – unless there is an operational crisis, in which case other bookings 
will be overruled.  
This is in stark contrast to the interaction with co-located actors. Another vendor 
employee explains that: “if it is in our team anytime we can talk to them and we can 
make them understand what actually we are going to convey. So that thing is very easy 
here, but whereas with the client we have to schedule a meeting” (Interview #24). 
Therefore, as he continues: “First we’ll initiate with the mail trails and if this getting 
continuous mail trails then we’ll go for a meeting” (Interview #24). Thus, emails are 
the default way of collaborating. At least up to the point where the actors realize that 
the complexity of the matter inhibits successful collaboration via emails. 
To sum up, the actors find it difficult to approach their counterparts from the other 
organizational entity, when they have not met face-to-face, as encounters in physical 
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proximity facilitates communication that allow the actors to get to know each other. 
Furthermore, going directly is a challenge due to scarce technological resources in the 
form of meeting rooms with video equipment and phone conferencing systems.  
Challenge II: Knowledge Gaps 
In line with other studies (e.g. Dibbern et al., 2004; Madsen et al., 2013) asymmetric 
knowledge across the geographical and organizational boundaries poses a significant 
challenge to the collaboration between the client-side and vendor-side actors in the 
context of the offshore outsourcing collaboration that constitutes the empirical 
foundation for this dissertation. 
During my observation studies as well as in interviews it has repeatedly been brought 
to my attention that the client-side actors believe that the vendor-side actors working 
from offshore lack important knowledge about the client’s business and the impact that 
technological changes and failures have on the business. One of the client-side actors 
explain:  
“Even though we have executed a giant knowledge transfer lasting more 
than eight months, there is still a lack of overview of what they [the IT-
systems] do and how they are interconnected. I don’t think anyone has that 
now, except for myself and a few others in our department [in Denmark]. It 
is not easy to communicate via these channels. I think there is a big 
difference” (Client-side actor, Interview #6) 
Consequently, he has “given up on getting them [the vendor-side actors] to understand 
how things are connected” (Interview #6) and he furthermore states that he is 
repeatedly consulted on things that he had expected that the vendor-side actors would 
be able to figure out themselves, which he attributes to the distance, as “one has 
another kind of dialogue when one is sitting next to people and talking directly to them 
compared to writing short messages on instant messenger or email” (Interview #6). 
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This point of view is widely shared among the client-side actors, though some express 
it in a softer tone. On the other hand, several of the vendor-side actors are exclaiming 
that they see themselves as what Markus (2001) labels expertise-seeking novices – as 
someone who are who are in need of knowledge possessed by others to be able to 
perform their work – when asked to reflect on the collaboration with the client 
employees. One vendor-side actor explains: “I do learn from them. So my mistakes 
will be spoken to me so that I also improve” (Interview #19) and furthermore he 
assumes that learning is not bi-directional, as the client-side actors do not seem to learn 
from him or his colleagues. During my interviews and over-the-desk talks with actors 
from both organizational entities this lack of business understanding has been 
mentioned repeatedly, whereas the vendor-side actors’ level of technical knowledge is 
assessed as good. Thus, the knowledge gap is not related to the technical, but rather to 
the business knowledge.  
Interestingly, the notion of lack of business knowledge among the vendor-side actors 
only apply to the one’s who have not been stationed onsite, in Denmark: One of the 
vendor-side actors with significant onsite experience explains: 
“If anyone sends a mail from the client they [the offshore team in India] will 
not be understanding the exact criticality of that issue, how the client is 
facing over there.  […] So the website is down; […] so they [the offshore 
team in India] will consider this is as low criticality.  So we [the onsite 
vendor-side actors] need to tell them that the entire Europe is using this. If 
this website is not working, then it’s the credibility of [the client] and their 
name is going to lose in the market” (Interview #20 – vendor-side actor) 
Furthermore, the vendor-side actors who have been working in close physical 
proximity with the client-side actors are repeatedly acknowledged for the abilities to 
understand the core business of the client company during interviews and informal 
conversations where I was told that “these two guys [onsite vendor-side actors] are 
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among the best […] They are really easy to work with and highly intelligent” (Field 
Notes 20130213); but also during a client visit to India, where the two aforementioned 
as well as other vendor-side actors working onsite were praised in front of their 
colleagues for their business knowledge (Field Notes 20130910). 
Challenge III: Lack of Transparency 
The vendor-side actors who are deployed onsite and thus working in close physical 
proximity with the client-side actors are also repeatedly praised for their commitment 
to adding value by following through on the issues that are raised by the client-side 
actors by “making sure that it actually works” as one client-side actor phrases it. In 
contrast his experience is that when collaborating with the offshore vendor staff 
“things are just hidden or ‘forgotten’ if they [the vendor-side actors] don’t know how 
to solve them” (Interview #16) and sometimes he feels that he cannot be sure if the 
offshore vendor-side actors take responsibility.  
The collaboration between the client-side actors and the onsite vendor-side actors is 
characterized by ongoing interaction, where the vendor-side actors deployed onsite are 
very conscious about ‘proving themselves’ both in terms of the quality of work they 
are doing but also, to a large extent about making sure that all enquiries from the 
client-side actors are responded to as fast as possible – as one of the vendor-side actor 
emphasizes: “your service should be effective and your response time should be very 
quick” (Interview #10).  
On the other hand, the interaction between the client-side employees and the offshore 
vendor-side actors is based on a so-called service management system, Remedy, where 
status and progress on tasks is communicated. In contrast to collaborating in close 
physical proximity, where there is an ongoing dialogue about tasks between employees 
from the two organizational entities, the client-side actors perceive the virtual 
collaboration as difficult, because “it is sometimes hard to understand why things take 
so long time – even simple tasks” (Interview #12). 
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In order to cope with this lack of transparency the client employees have changed the 
way they specify assignments. One of the client-side employees explains that he used 
to assign tasks that were abstract, but as that did not work out he now has to “be more 
specific and split the tasks so they matches the siloes [functional areas]” (Interview #6) 
in order to make sure that they are completed satisfactory, which he has realized after 
he has visited the OMC and “seen how they work […] which makes it easier to 
understand why things are happening the way they are” (Interview #6) 
Thus, one consequence of virtual collaboration mediated by a service management 
system is that the client-side actors perceive that they lack transparency. That is, until 
they have had the chance to visit the OMC and gain understanding of how the vendor-
side actors work, which they can use to change the way they specify tasks. Another 
dimension of lack of transparency has to do with the faceless communication, where 
some of the client-side actors are unsure who are working on the tasks they have 
submitted in the service management system, which is further complicated because 
they – as one puts it – “can’t separate one name from the other” (Interview #17) when 
it comes to working with the offshore vendor-side actors, whose Indian names are 
difficult to remember for the client-side actors of Danish origin. 
Establishing Trustworthiness in Offshore Outsourcing 
In this section I will address the second research question, namely: How is 
trustworthiness established in the collaboration between actors from the two 
organizational entities? As positive assessments of trustworthiness is a prerequisite for 
the development of trust, understanding how the three antecedents to trust; ability, 
integrity and benevolence (see Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’) are perceived by the 
actors from the two organizational entities will provide valuable insights into how trust 
can be established.  
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Assessments of Benevolence 
Actors from both organizational entities find ‘going directly’ challenging, when they 
have not had the opportunity to meet their counterparts face-to-face. However, even 
short face-to-face encounters – such as the client-side actors’ week-long visits to India, 
where the client-side actors’ face-to-face interaction with individual vendor-side actors 
is limited to one or two meeting, not lasting more than 45 minutes each, increases the 
actor’s comfort-level with regards to making direct contact via e.g. phone. This is 
repeatedly attributed to getting to know each other on a more personal level or, as one 
vendor-side actors puts it to “understand their characters well” (Interview #20).  
In each their way, the actors from both organizational entities all emphasize that 
meeting their counterparts cater for a more humanized image. As one vendor-side actor 
recollect about her image of one particular Danish employee – who has a very direct 
approach and usually talks rather hard, as I have observed repeatedly myself – before 
meeting him: “I thought he will be somewhat huge. Tall. Intimidating” (Interview 
#19), whereas he is in fact quite small. Thus, she projects an image of him based on his 
hard, direct and somewhat confrontational virtual communication style, as being huge 
and intimidating. After meeting him she “feel[s] free to dial him and dial him anytime 
if there is an issue.  I don’t have second thought” (Interview #19).  
Even though no one specifically mentions the word ‘benevolence’ when referring to 
the change in perception, that happens when meeting face-to-face with their other-
organizational counterparts, I argue that this word, benevolence, very well describes 
the change in perception that physical proximity leads to.  
While the collaboration among actors who have met in person is characterized by 
positive assessments of benevolence the same is not the case for actors who have not 
met face-to-face. In this scenario the collaboration is characterized primarily by the 
absence of assessments of the counterpart’s benevolence.  
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It is important to stress the distinction between negative assessments of benevolence 
and the absence of such assessments: I have not observed a single incident where an 
actor has expressed that virtual communication has led to negative assessments. 
Rather, it seems that in cases where the actors have not met physically they refrain 
from assessing their counterpart’s benevolence; and as a consequence they refrain from 
engaging in ‘direct’ communication, such as talking on the phone. Thus, is seems that 
when positive assessments of benevolence is missing, the actors act as if they had 
assessed benevolence negatively. 
Assessments of Ability 
With regards to ability, we have seen how vendor-side actors with onsite experience 
are praised for their ability to understand the client’s business and use this to provide 
high quality in their work. Seen from the client-side actors’ perspective the vendor-side 
actors with onsite experience are considered both technically savvy and knowledgeable 
about the client’s business environment.  
Thus, on one hand, the client-side actors assess the abilities of the vendor-side actors 
they have been collaborating with in close physical proximity for period of time on the 
grounds of their perceived business understanding and in a more “holistic” manner. 
That is, their abilities are subjectively assessed as the perceived quality of their 
individual contributions. This stands in contrast to the assessment of the abilities of the 
vendor-side actors with whom the client-side actors have not collaborated with in 
physical proximity: These actors are not individually assessed, but rather assessed as a 
part of the functional group they belong to and based on performance measurements 
derived from the monthly reporting as well as reports from the service management 
system. In some cases, systems have been running smoothly for a long period of time. 
This is reflected in the reporting and during the client’s visit to the OMC such teams 
are praised for doing a good and competent job. Other teams, that cannot display 
equally good results, are questioned in terms of their abilities. These are the teams that 
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are referred to when a client-side actor says that “there is still a lack of overview” 
(Interview #12) despite a huge effort in transferring knowledge throughout the 
transition period. 
On the other hand, the abilities of the client-side actors are assessed quite similar by 
the vendor-side actors who have had a chance to work in Denmark and the ones who 
have solely been working from India: Actors from both sub-groups acknowledge the 
client-side actors’ business knowledge and in a similar vein they position themselves 
as expertise-seeking novices (Markus, 2001), who early in the collaboration are 
dependent on the client-side actors to understand the business. Though, the client-side 
actors’ business knowledge is never challenged by the vendor-side actors it is worth 
noticing that the vendor-side actors with onsite experience express a level of 
reservation when it comes to readily accepting the needs and requirements expressed 
by their client-side counterparts. Whereas the vendor-side actors who have not been 
exposed to collaboration in physical proximity with their client-side counterparts 
seems to accept the business knowledge of the client-side actors without any hesitation, 
the group of vendor-side actors who are – or has been – working in Denmark are more 
reluctant and are deliberately challenging their client-side counterparts. As one vendor-
side actor says: “when you get requirements you have to be sure that he is absolutely 
sure about the requirement” (Interview #05). This suggests that that the vendor-side 
actors with onsite experience are comfortable questioning their client-side 
counterparts, which corresponds very well to the positive assessment of benevolence. 
Assessments of Integrity 
Finally, with regards to integrity, we have seen how client-side actors are counting on 
the vendor-side actors who are deployed onsite to “making sure that it actually works” 
and how the vendor-side actors working from onsite manage to prove themselves and 
as a consequence are given the freedom to plan their work without having to justify 
how they spend their time in detail. On the other hand, the lack of transparency, as seen 
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from the perspective of the client-side actors, lead the client-side actors to question the 
integrity of the offshore vendor-side actors. However, this only applies to offshore 
vendor-side actors who have not had exposure to working onsite – vendor-side actors 
returning to India after an onsite allocation continue to enjoy positive assessments of 
their integrity. From the perspective of the client-side actors they experience that the 
offshore vendor-side actors without onsite experience do not take responsibility. Thus, 
the client-side actors assess the onsite vendor-side actors’ integrity positively and the 
offshore vendor employees negatively.  
On the other side the vendor-side actors draw positive conclusions about the integrity 
of their Danish counterparts, regardless of having onsite experience or not. This 
difference, I speculate, may relate to the nature of the collaboration, where the client-
side actors are dependent on the vendor to provide solutions that are critical to their 
business, i.e. the nature of the client-vendor relationship. 
Co-location Facilitates Trustworthiness – Distance Inhibits it 
As elaborated above the actors perceive co-location as beneficial as it makes ‘being 
available’ and ‘understanding’ easier. However, beyond these immediate values of 
collocation another benefit of co-location – one that is indeed subtler, more long-term 
oriented – surfaces: Co-location and face-to-face interaction are catalysts for building 
trustworthiness.  
When the actors are co-located they engage in what Bjørn & Christensen (2011) have 
labeled relation work. That is, the interaction necessary to establish “technical and 
social connections that are critical for the everyday interaction within organizations” 
(Christensen et al., 2014: 2). Through co-located relation work the actor’s establish 
positive assessments of the other’s abilities, integrity and benevolence – the 
antecedents to trust. Interestingly, this relation work has a positive impact on the 
collaboration that goes beyond the period of time where the actors are co-located; its 
effect lasts when the actors are no longer working in close physical proximity, when 
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they are engaging in distributed collaboration. Thus, vendor employees who return to 
India after onsite deployment still enjoy positive assessments of their ability, integrity 
and benevolence by their client-side counterparts; collocation facilitates positive 
assessments of trustworthiness. 
On the other hand it seems that distance inhibits positive assessments of 
trustworthiness. However, while the conclusion about the exposure to co-location is 
clear cut as it facilitates positive assessments of both ability, integrity and benevolence 
for the actors from both organizational entities and thus paves the way for trust 
between the actors, this is not the case when the actors have not met face-to-face. In 
such cases the client-side employees refrain from assessing the vendor-side actors’ 
abilities on an individual level; they assess integrity negatively when the expected 
performance criteria are not met; and they refrain from assessing the benevolence, 
which leads to negative conclusions insofar they are reluctant to approach the 
employees directly. Thus, the client-side employees do not display any form of 
positive assessment of trustworthiness of the vendor employees they have not met in 
person. 
The vendor-side employees’ also refrain from assessing the client employees’ 
benevolence when they have not met face-to-face, which also result in reluctance to 
approach their face-less counterparts directly. However, even though the actors have 
not met in person, the vendor-side employees assess both the ability and the integrity 
of the client employees positively.  
The second research question reads: How is trustworthiness established in the 
collaboration between actors from the two organizational entities? In this section I 
have answered this question by investigating first the three challenges that the actors’ 
face when collaborating virtually and afterwards by relating these challenges to the 
three antecedents to trust, namely ability, integrity and benevolence. The findings are 
summarized in table 5.1. 
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Noteworthy Differences and Opportunities 
What defines a virtual team? On one hand there are teams that are always working in 
close physical proximity. On the other side there are teams that never meet, where all 
communication is mediated by technology. Thus, we have a continuum where it is 
difficult to clearly define when a team is indeed a virtual team.  
In the specific empirical settings we are dealing with here we have team members that 
hardly ever meet. Over the course of the collaboration that has lasted more than one 
and a half year, they have met once or twice and seldom more than a few hours. It is 
safe to say that the collaboration between these actors can be characterized as a virtual 
team structure.  
On the other hand we have team members who have been working in close physical 
proximity for a longer period of time. During the course of time where they are 
actually co-located, when the vendor-side actors are working at the client-side office in 
Denmark, the team structure cannot be characterized as virtual. However, we have seen 
how co-location has a positive effect on the assessments of ability, integrity and 
benevolence, which lasts even after the actors are not working together in a co-located 
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environment. That is, when the collaboration structure is changed to a virtual one, the 
positive assessments stemming from co-location are preserved. Thus, we can conclude 
that while trustworthiness is created when the actors are co-located it can be 
maintained at a distance.  
Noteworthy Differences in the Perceptions of Trustworthiness 
With regards to laying a foundation for cognition-based trust we see that the vendor-
side employees are assessing the ability and integrity of the client employees positively 
despite not working with them in a co-located manner. This is not the case for the 
client-side actors who only assess the vendor-side actors’ abilities and integrity 
positively when they have been working with them in close physical proximity for a 
period of time. What causes this difference? From the body of literature on trust we 
know that assessments of ability, integrity and benevolence are dependent on the 
trustor’s propensity to trust; that is, a predisposition (Greenberg et al., 2007) that can 
be caused by a number of things such as culture (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006) or macro 
factors, such as national wealth, income equality and education (Ferrin & Gillespie, 
2010). I speculate that two such factors may influence this difference in trust 
development between the client employees and the vendor employees: First, the 
vendor employees are working in an IT-industry in India, where more than ninety 
percent of the employees are delivering outsourcing services to non-Indian companies. 
This means that the vendor employees are highly accustomed to working in virtual 
teams with people from the other side of the globe, which gives them an advantage: 
They are simply used to work with and build rapport and trust with counterparts they 
have not met. 
Secondly, the difference in team sizes may have an influence. That is, on the vendor 
side approximately eighty people are servicing the client, who are represented by less 
that ten people that engage with the vendor-side staff – and in practice the vast 
majority of communication with the vendor-side actors is done by a group of four 
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client employees. As mentioned in Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’ the literature review 
trust is a psychological state where one is prepared to accept vulnerability and in order 
to do so one has to take a ‘leap of faith’, where fuzzy uncertainty, as Bachmann (2011) 
calls it, is transformed into an accepted risk. Given the organizational setup and the 
team sizes I argue that taking such a leap of faith is easier for the vendor-side 
employees as they can make use of referral trust (Jøsang, 2011): By the means of a 
colleague’s trust in a client employee, the vendor employee can more easily establish 
trust in the specific client employee – the basis for trust is so to say transferred from 
one vendor employee to another. As the client-side employees are significantly fewer 
and all vendor-side employees presumably know their names finding a colleague 
among the vendor employees who is able to vouch for the client-side counterpart in 
question is undoubtedly easier than finding a colleague among the client-side 
employees who can vouch for a specific vendor-side employee, knowing that the 
client-side employees are challenged by the Indian names and “can’t separate one 
name from the other” (Interview #17) as one of the client employees told me. This 
furthermore corresponds well with Tsai & Ghoshal’s findings that “individuals who 
enjoy more central positions within a network are likely to be perceived as more 
trustworthy” (Quoted in Sarker et al., 2011: 283). 
Another noteworthy difference is related to the object of the assessments of 
trustworthiness and ultimately the objects of trust. When the actors have not met in 
person these assessments of trustworthiness are aimed at the collective, while 
assessments of actors whom one has met in person are aimed at the individual level. 
That is, physical co-presence seems to impact the object of trustworthiness. The 
dynamics of trustworthiness as being aimed at an interpersonal level versus a collective 
level will be investigated in much further detail in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across 
Cultures’.  
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Opportunities for advancing trustful relations 
In the analysis above I have answered the two research questions. For the remainder of 
this chapter I will discuss an avenue for unexploited opportunities for advancing 
trustful relations between the actors from the two organizational entities. Arguably, 
perceptions of trustworthiness are established simply by the means of co-location 
itself. However, establishing trust in virtual teams is by no means a trivial matter. 
Berry (2013) concludes that “[c]reating trust between coworkers and between 
employees and managers may be the greatest challenge in building successful virtual 
teams” (p. 10) But does this mean that trust cannot be created in such scenarios?  
In the case that constitutes the empirical foundation for this dissertation we see that 
developing rapport and positive assessments of trustworthiness is in fact achievable, 
when the actors are co-located. The question is whether this can be done without 
physical co-presence as well? I argue that there are two barriers to this. One has to do 
with availability of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) and the other 
has to do with technology utilization. 
First, with regards to availability of ICT the challenge is not the quality of the 
technologies, but rather the fact that video conferencing facilities are not instantly 
available (as elaborated in ‘Challenge I: Going directly’) Thus, impromptu video 
meetings are not an option, which is in stark contrast to the interaction with co-located 
actors, where one can easily move to another person’s desk or office to talk. One can, 
of course, claim that there are other means of ‘going directly’ and thus paving the way 
for positive assessments of benevolence, such as instant messengers or phones. 
However, this leads us to the second barrier: technology utilization. 
In quite a few interviews – sixteen to be specific – I have asked what the difference 
between meeting one another in person and communicating via video, phone or chat. 
The actors all agree that there is a difference as “virtual meetings are more straight to 
the point” (Interview #6) as one puts it. The actors report that there is no small talk 
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before or after meetings. Thus, the way the actors interact when using technology is 
substantially different from interacting face-to-face. Additionally, some are reluctant to 
use the technologies available. For instance one of the client employees exclaim that “I 
don’t do stuff like that” (Field Notes 20130226) when I ask him if he is communicating 
via instant messengers. 
In order to advance positive assessments of trustworthiness in the specific context of 
this virtual collaboration the actors cannot depend on what Child & Möllering (2003) 
calls contextual confidence, as this is weak. Contextual confidence is, as elaborated in 
Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’ a state where the trustor is a passive figure who based on 
contextual information can assess whether to trust another or not. Elsbach et al. (2010) 
signify that assessments of personal traits is an unavoidable characteristic of co-
location as there mere co-presence will prompt humans to evaluate each other and that 
such co-presence will for the most lead to assessments that are more positive than if the 
individuals were not co-located. This way contextual information will likely lead to 
positive assessments and create contextual confidence.  
Arguably, contextual information passed on via co-location can lead to mutual trust by 
following a principle of gradualness, where the actors gradually approach each other 
and by continuously gathering contextual information about each other they can 
continuously develop a higher level of trust. That is, the risky business of trusting is 
gradually expanded in a speed that is proportional with the gathering of contextual 
confidence. The same principle of gradualness cannot readily be applied in 
geographically distributed teams as contextual information is only to a very limited 
extend increased between interactions. In such distributed teams contextual 
information is only scarcely available as the actors are not absorbing information about 
each other continuously, but only when they – more or less often – actively interact 
with the virtual counterpart. Thus, in order to develop a foundation for trust actors need 
to actively engage in trust building by – as Child & Möllering (2003) would put it – 
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applying active trust. However, active trust development in virtual teams requires that 
technology is readily available and used; and that they actively seek to compensate for 
the lack of contextual information by imitating the form of dialogue that occurs when 
they are co-located. As Möllering (2006) reminds us such active trust requires that the 
actors continuously engage in intensive communication and furthermore requires 
openness. 
How can this be done? I believe there is ample opportunity. One technique is to raise 
awareness of each other’s presence by imitating how the co-located team members 
greet each other when they arrive at the office, when they break for lunch and when 
they leave again at night. In the co-located environment they walk through the open 
office and with a few words or gestures they signal their presence to their colleagues. 
This can be imitated by actively engaging with remote actors in the same situations, by 
a simple ‘hi’, ‘good morning’ or ‘goodbye’ conveyed through instant messenger. I 
speculate, that this would eventually lead to a situation where a short greeting on the 
way in or out of office would remind the actors of something that needs to be 
discussed, just as it happens between co-located actors when one see’s another on the 
move in or out of the office. In other words, it would improve the ability to be ‘going 
directly’ in virtual teams. Furthermore, such greetings would improve transparency as 
to the availability of remote counterparts. 
There are several other techniques, such as leaving webcams and sound on for a longer 
period of time without necessarily having to speak to each other all the time or booking 
calendar time, where it is agreed that remote colleagues have first priority and can 
make contact at any point in time. Such techniques also aid help the actors to be going 
directly and increases transparency by the means of active trust building. Undoubtedly, 
such techniques will feel odd in the beginning. Some will work and some will not. 
However, in order to advance trustful relations in virtual teams we need to, somehow, 
engage in active trust building that may challenge our habitual way of collaborating 
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and I argue that this can be done by seeking to imitate the way collaboration is done in 
co-located teams as this would help expand and refine the contextual information about 
the other’s.  
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter has been to answer two research questions, namely (a) What 
are the perceived challenges of globally distributed collaboration? and (b) How does 
distance influence the actors’ perceptions of their inter-organizational counterpart’s 
trustworthiness?  
We have seen that the actors perceive difficulties in ‘going directly’ when they are not 
co-located; and how geographical distribution creates knowledge gaps and lack of 
transparency. Furthermore, I have argued how this leads to a situation where mutual 
trust can be created only when the actors are co-located. However, I have also argued 
that the vendor-side employees are assessing their client-side counterparts’ abilities 
and integrity positively, even when not being co-located and I have suggested that this 
may be explained by them being more used to work in virtual teams due to the 
characteristics of the IT industry in India; and furthermore that referral trust (Jøsang, 
2011) may contribute positively to the positive assessments of trustworthiness. 
With regards to the client-side actors’ assessments of vendor-side actors whom they 
are not, and have not been, working with in a co-located manner I have shown how 
they refrain from assessing their counterparts’ ability. The same is the case for 
assessments of benevolence: In this case neither client-side actors nor vendor-side 
actors assess their counterpart. Within the trust literature assessments of the three 
antecedents to trust are habitually treated as either positive or negative and to my 
knowledge the consequence of absence of assessments have not been considered. In 
the empirical context of this dissertation I have shown that absence of assessments of 
benevolence leads to negative conclusions. One can speculate whether this is a result 
of propensity to trust among the actors or a generally applicable conclusion that 
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inability to assess another’s benevolence will cause negative conclusions; this is 
something I believe is worthwhile studying within the community of trust scholars.  
Finally, I have, in the discussion, argued that in order to advance trustful relations in 
virtual collaboration the actors are dependent on technology being readily available but 
also on engaging in active trust building (Child & Möllering, 2003), by actively 
imitating the way they communicate face-to-face, when they are collaborating 
virtually. Consequently, practitioners facing the challenges of working in a 
geographically distributed environment cannot rely on development of trustworthiness 
to happen automatically. Rather, they must cater for establishing a foundation for a 
trusting inter-organizational and inter-locational work environment. The analytical 
findings in the chapter suggests that this can be done by facilitating the possibility for 
the actors to work in a co-located environment for a period of time, as co-location has a 
positive impact that exceeds the period of time where the actors are co-located. 
However, as I have suggested, a foundation for a trusting work environment can also 
be catered for while the actors are not co-located by ongoing use of synchronous 
communication via ICT, which can be used to engage in active trust building. 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter the ambition of this chapter has been to 
answer two fundamental research questions, but also to lay the grounds for the 
following analytical chapters by presenting a wide range of empirical observations. 
Throughout this chapter the focus has been on the “distance issue”; on how co-location 
and face-to-face interaction is perceived valuable; and how the actors are challenged 
by geographical distribution. While focusing on ‘distance’ however, three other themes 
have surfaced: First, I have shown that when the client-side actors are not working with 
vendor-side actors in a co-located manner or with vendor-side actors with whom they 
have had significant face-to-face exposure to they rely significantly on standardized 
information mediated through templates and web-based tools. This topic will be 
explored further in the next chapter ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ where I 
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will put attention to the relationship between assessments of trustworthiness aimed at 
the individual level and formalized assessments of performance by analyzing how 
control mechanisms are used in the collaboration between client and vendor and how 
this influences the possibility to establish trustworthiness. Secondly, this chapter has 
focused on ‘distance’ in itself. In Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I will dive 
deeper into the formations of groups as these are indeed more complex than merely 
being a question of geographical separation. This chapter will, in other words, take a 
closer look at how assessments of trustworthiness unfold at a collective level. This is 
important given the finings in this chapter, which suggests that when the actors are 
distributed and have not met in person, assessments of trustworthiness is not done at an 
interpersonal level, but rather at a collective level. Third, the importance of boundary 
spanners will be the topic of Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness Boundary’ 
as these intermediaries paly an important role when it comes to establishing positive 
assessments across cultural groupings. 
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CHAPTER VI: FLIPPING THE SWITCH ON TRUST AND 
CONTROL 
Introduction 
According to Mellewigt et al. (2007) “trust is often argued to be the glue that keeps the 
partners of IORs [interorganizational relationships] together” (p. 837). Throughout the 
previous chapter we have seen how the actors from the two organizational entities that 
mutually perceive each other as trustworthy are in fact much more glued together than 
the ones that do not exhibit such indications of mutual trustworthiness. By the means 
of positive assessments of trustworthiness the actors are able to interact directly in an 
unproblematic fashion and they perceive their collaboration and the other’s actions as 
transparent.   
From Rousseau et al. (1998) we know that to trust inherently involves taking a risk. 
Without risk, it simply does not make sense to talk about trust.  And we know trusting 
behavior – and the inevitable risk taking that comes along – can facilitate increased 
trust, insofar one’s trust is honored by trustworthy behavior by the trustee. However, as 
Das & Teng (1998) remind us: “Although risk taking breeds trust, firms do not blindly 
take unjustified risk in the hope of developing a trustful relationship. (p. 504). 
Arguably, an IOR, such as the one between the two organizational entities, is 
somewhat paradoxical as each organization are pursuing their own interests, but at the 
same time they are to a certain extent required to refrain from pursuing their interests 
in order to make the IOR work. The balance between pursuing own interests and 
making the partnership work is a risk that both actors incur. Thus, contracts are written 
and signed in order to avoid such unjustified risks.  
DiMaggio (1988) remarks that “the compelling nature of contractual agreements is 
widely acknowledged, even by actors who might be better served by breaking them 
and even in the absence of a credible threat of legal retribution” (p. 6) and thus, just as 
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any other offshore outsourcing engagement, the collaboration between the two 
organizations is, of course, also based on a written contract. In the words of Mellewigt 
et al. (2007) “there are two reasons why partners in IORs draw up formal contracts: 
control and coordination. Control can be conceptualized as a process to bring about 
adherence to a desired outcome through the exercise of authority or power 
mechanisms, the purpose being to minimize idiosyncratic and deviant behavior, as well 
as to hold parties to articulated policy. Coordination can be seen more as an enabling 
process to attain a desired outcome, the purpose being to provide the appropriate 
linkages between two different and interdependent task units” (p. 834). In other words, 
a contractual agreement on one hand provides control as it specifies the obligations of 
the two parties as well as the remedies and financial penalties associated with breach of 
these obligations; and on the other hand the contractual agreement provides an outline 
of how the parties are expected to collaborate.  
In the previous chapter I have investigated how trust is established between the actors 
from the two organizational entities, but I have done so without taking the contractual 
underpinning into account and without paying attention to the role of control. 
Arguably, control exists in all kinds of organizational work and not merely in IOR’s, 
but in IOR’s, such as the one I am engaging with in this dissertation, the contractual 
underpinning is arguably significant as such a contract introduces legal restrictions and 
financial as well as legal consequences, in case the contractual obligations are not met. 
Thus, when analyzing control in an IOR we must always keep in mind that the controls 
do not stand alone. Rather, they are practical instances for monitoring contractual 
agreements.  
However, though the contractual agreement has impact on the way control is 
performed this does not mean that control is merely a pragmatic solution to monitoring 
contractual agreements. Control is much more than this, which I will shed light upon 
throughout this chapter. 
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According to Möllering (2006) “trust and control are not the two mutually exclusive 
sides of a dualism but rather are so directly interrelated that they constitute a duality. 
Trust and control each assume the existence of the other, refer to each other and create 
each other, but remain irreducible to each other” (p. 194). When Möllering refer to the 
relationship between trust and control as a duality rather than a dualism, he signifies 
that they are mutually dependent on each other to establish positive expectation in a 
relationship. The notion of a trust/control duality will be examined further later.  
The focus of this chapter is the interplay between trust and control as it unfolds in the 
empirical setting, which I am investigating, by acknowledging that these two 
constructs – trust and control – are interrelated as they are both potential contributors 
to establishing the level of confidence needed and mitigate risk-perceptions in partner 
cooperation.  
Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to answer these two research questions: 
• How are control mechanisms used in the collaboration between client and 
vendor? 
• How does the use of control mechanisms affect client-side perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of vendor-side actors? 
 
Given the nature of the collaboration, where the vendor is delivering services to the 
client in exchange for money the focus in this chapter will be on how on how the 
client-side controls the vendor side.  
Theoretical Foundation: Understanding the Concept of Control 
Control is by no means a new aspect of scholarly work on organizations. Back the 
1960’s when organizational science was a relatively new discipline Cyert & March 
(1963) took an interest in understanding how managers sought to align employees’ 
capabilities and performance to the goals and aspirations of the organization; and Blau 
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& Scott (1962) acknowledged the importance of managers’ control of subordinates. 
But arguably control theory has an even longer history relating back to Weber’s notion 
of bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century (Dunbar & Statler, 2010). Over the years 
the understanding of the theoretical construct ‘control’ has changed from being a 
coercive efficiency-enhancing tool maybe best represented by the 1980’ notion of 
Total Quality Management (TQM) to a construct that captures both the coercive aspect 
as well as a sensemaking aspect, where control influences and is influenced by culture 
and identity (Sitkin et al., 2010).  Cardinal et al. (2010) explain that:  
“Traditionally, researchers have suggested that control mechanisms are 
either formal or informal based on their position along a single ‘formality’ 
continuum. […] However, control researchers […] have recently suggested 
that formal and informal represent distinct dimensions and that individual 
control mechanisms can exhibit both formal or informal attributes” 
(Cardinal et al., 2010: 57) 
What Cardinal et al. (2010) clarify is that control has a formal side to it as well as an 
informal, where the formal mechanisms include “a range of officially sanctioned (and 
usually codified) institutional mechanisms such as written rules and procedural 
directives” (p. 57) and informal control has do to with values, norms and beliefs that 
guide employees’ actions and behaviors”(ibid.). This perspective is in line with 
Ouchi’s (1977) seminal work on control, where three modes of control are defined: 
behavior, output and clan, where there first two are formal controls and the last, clan 
control, is informal. 
In their well-cited article Piccoli & Ives (2003) define control “as attempts to ensure 
that individuals working on organizational projects act in conformity with predefined 
strategies” (p. 368). That is, control always has the dual objective of checking whether 
something or someone’s actions correspond to what has been planned and to correct 
deviations from this plan. While I believe this definition adequately describes formal 
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control, I argue that it does not cover the full concept of control, as it fails to take the 
informal aspect into account. Rather, I propose that we define control in the lines of 
Leifer & Mills (1996), namely as "a regulatory process by which the elements of a 
system are made more predictable through the establishment of standards in the pursuit 
of some desired objective or state" (p. 117) as this definition to a larger extent caters 
for both formal and social/normative control. 
When researching the constructs of trust and control in conjunction this distinction 
between the two forms of control is especially important. Das & Teng point out that “it 
is necessary to consider formal control and social control for their distinctive 
implications for trust. Whereas formal control employs codified rules, goals, 
procedures, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior, social control 
utilizes organizational values, norms, and cultures to encourage desirable behavior” (p. 
501). Formal control on one hand is a “strict evaluation of performance” (ibid.) 
whereas social control on the other hand according to Das & Teng (1998) “is about 
dealing with people” (p. 501).  
Cardinal et al’s. (2010) definition of informal control, Ouchi’s (1977) notion of clan 
control, as well as Das & Teng’s term social control bears significant resemblance to 
Kunda’s (1992) concept of normative control, defined as “the attempt to elicit and 
direct the required efforts of members by controlling the underlying experiences, 
thoughts, and feelings that guide their actions”(p. 11). In Das & Teng’s (1998) 
vocabulary norms, values and culture are intertwined. Arguably, it is difficult, if not 
impossible to separate these three concepts (Alvesson, 1995), However, for the 
purpose of establishing an analytical framework that can grasp both the formal and 
social aspects of control, I argue that it is reasonable to focus on the unwritten rules 
(norms) and what is perceived as ‘good’ or ‘right’ in the given context (values) 
exclusively, and thus steer clear of the concept of culture, which, according to Hatch & 
Cunliffe (1997) is very ambiguous as it has an infinite number of meanings and 
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definitions attached to it. Consequently, in this chapter I will adhere to the concept of 
normative control as defined by Kunda (1992). The next chapter will however be 
devoted entirely to understanding the interplay between trust and culture as it unfolds 
in the collaboration between the two organizational entities I am researching. 
According to Das & Teng (1998) ‘control’ is referred to as “an organizational setup, a 
process of regulating behaviors and an organizational outcome” simultaneously (p. 
493).  For the purpose of this chapter I adhere to Das & Teng’s (1998) distinction 
between ‘control’, ‘control mechanisms’ and ‘level of control’ (Das & Teng, 1998), 
where control mechanisms refer to the concrete organizational arrangements that are 
utilized to reach predictability (that is, ‘control’) and level of control refers to “the 
degree to which one believes that proper behavior of the other party is ensured” (Das & 
Teng, 1998: 493). Thus, to gain formal control, formal control mechanisms are utilized 
and to gain normative control, normative control mechanisms are utilized. 
Formal Control 
According to Weibel (2007) the mechanisms used to gain formal control can be 
divided into three types: “(a) standard specification; (b) monitoring, evaluation, and 
feedback, which are designed to inform on organizational standards and individual 
goal attainments; and (c) sanction and reward mechanisms, which are applied to tie 
individual incentives to organizational goals” (p. 502). On the other hand Das & Teng 
(1998) – with inspiration from Aulakh et al. (1997) – divide formal control into two 
sub-categories, namely ‘output control’ and ‘process control’. Output control is, as the 
name suggest, has the deliverables from each individual or group – their output – as its 
objective, whereas process control controls peoples actions under the assumption that a 
specific behavior will lead to the desired or desirable outcomes. Process control is also 
referred to as ‘behavior control’ (Piccoli & Ives, 2003). However, I will designate it as 
‘process control’ in order to emphasize the difference between on one side controlling 
how people act in order to do a specific task and on the other side how they act in the 
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workplace in general. That is, how do they interact with colleagues and behave at 
work? This relates to normative control, which will be elaborated below. 
Thus, there are two different approaches to sub-division of formal control. However, 
they can very well co-exist: Weibel’s categorizations are evolving around the question 
on how formal control can be obtained, whereas Das & Teng (1998), Aulakh et al. 
(1997) and Piccoli & Ives (2003) are primarily concerned with what is being 
controlled. Thus, by integrating the two views we can conceive formal control as six 
different types, as depicted in table 6.1 below. 
 
Normative Control 
Where formal control is about setting goals (output control) and making structural 
specifications (process control) and monitoring adherence; as well as rewarding or 
sanctioning adherence to these to types of control, by employing “codified rules, goals, 
procedures, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior” (Das & Teng, 
1998: 501) normative control employs a different, and arguably more subtle, set of 
mechanisms, attempting “to elicit and direct the required efforts of members by 
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controlling the underlying experiences, thoughts, and feelings that guide their 
actions”(Kunda, 1992: 11). Thus, normative control is aimed at controlling workplace 
behavior. 
As normative control makes use of less tangible mechanisms than formal control it is 
arguably also more difficult to analyze. I argue, however, that normative control can be 
scrutinized by Weibel’s (2007) categorization of types of formal control. That is, 
normative control as a ‘what’ can be understood by applying the three categorizations 
of ‘how’ as I did for formal control: standard specification; monitoring, evaluation and 
feedback; and sanctions and rewards.  
First, the organizational values and norms can be regarded as a standard specification 
for workplace behavior (I will argue why it is so later in this chapter, in the section 
‘Analyzing Control of Workplace Behavior’). Secondly, the way actors behave in a 
workplace are indeed monitored, evaluated and given feedback on. Though such 
monitoring, evaluation and feedback may not necessarily be deliberate and conscious, 
the literature on in-group favoritism (Kanter & Corn, 1994; Marrewijk, 2010) and the 
resulting us-versus-them dynamics (Cramton & Hinds, 2005) suggests that deviations 
from what one perceives as a standard specification for workplace behavior (i.e. norms 
and values) are both monitored and evaluated and, thirdly, that this result in rewards 
for actors who are considered as in-group and sanctions for actors who are considered 
out-group. Such rewards and sanctions can be financial and oriented towards career 
progression, but can also be more directly focused at the collaboration (Cramton & 
Hinds, 2005) in the form of information sharing and joint idea generation (for in-group 
members) or lack of the same (for out-group members). Thus, I argue that using 
Weibel’s (2007) categorizations of how control is effectuated can provide a novel and 
nuanced analytical view on normative control.  
Below I shall unfold how the three categories (missing verb) and how they relate to 
formal as well as normative control in more detail. 
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Framework for Analyzing Formal Control and Workplace Behavior 
Analyzing Process Control 
Within the IT-industry there has been a significant focus on process control for years. 
Many organizations adhere to the CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration) 
framework developed by Carnegie Mellon University to define and improve process 
maturity for software development. For instance, all the top-tier IT service providers in 
India pride themselves of being CMMI level 5 (the highest possible level) 
organizations and include this process maturity as a central part of their value 
proposition to customers. Within IT-operations, the ITIL (Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library) framework has become a standard adopted by organizations 
worldwide. Additionally, project management certifications such as Prince2, PMP 
(Project Management Professional) and IPMA (International Project Management 
Association) are typical requirements in job adverts for project managers within the IT-
industry. Thus, there are numerous ways of controlling the process within IT-
development and IT-operations. 
All of these frameworks and certifications can be regarded as standard specification on 
some level as they define what is commonly referred to as “best practice”. Given the 
broad application of such frameworks and certifications they all aim at providing 
guidelines, which to some extent needs to be tailored to the specific organization, team 
or project. The adherence to the (tailored) standard specifications is monitored, 
evaluated and fed back through the use of standardized control mechanisms, such as 
standardized assessments and templates; and in the cases of the frameworks (ITIL and 
CMMI) this is thought of as an iterative process aimed at providing status, “health 
check” and input for iterations on process improvement initiatives as well as the work 
itself.  
None of the frameworks or certifications suggests how to – or whether or not – the 
monitored adherence to standard specifications should be rewarded or sanctioned. 
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Thus, this is entirely up to the organizations employing such framework and/or project 
management methods. However, it is important to note that there is a significant 
difference between on one side feedback and on the other side rewards and sanctions. 
Whereas feedback is (an attempted) neutral reporting of monitoring and evaluation, 
rewards and sanctions are the positive or negative consequences of such feedback 
bestowed upon actors. 
Analyzing Output Control 
As the collaboration between the two organizations that constitute the empirical 
foundation for this dissertation is characterized by exchange of services for money, the 
overall governing mechanism is of course a contract. In complex outsourcing 
arrangement the contract is typically underpinned by a string of amended artifacts such 
as sub-contracts, high-level governance and process agreements and service level 
agreements (SLA). These can all be considered standard specifications, which are 
monitored and evaluated in order to secure that the transactions are performed as 
agreed upon. Furthermore, the feedback – in the form of reporting – can form the basis 
for sanctioning insofar the contractual agreements are not honored, either by changes 
to the financial aspects of the contract as per the contractual agreement itself or – in 
extreme cases – in court. With regards to rewards, initiatives that are not a part of the 
mandatory service delivery, such as supplier-side innovations, can be regarded as a 
reward; insofar the contract has built-in financial incentives for such behavior. 
Obviously, the ultimate sanctioning is early termination of the contract and the ultimate 
reward is extension of the same. 
However, there is another aspect to output control than the contractual agreements. As 
argued in the introduction to this chapter there are two reasons why partners in IOR’s 
make contracts, namely control and coordination (Mellewigt et al., 2007). Thus, in 
addition to specifying obligations a contract also provides an outline of how the 
collaboration is expected to play out on a high level. The key here is the intent of the 
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contractual partners, which signifies that each and every detail cannot be covered by a 
contract. Consequently, over time – as the partnerships progresses and matures – more 
detailed standard specifications of output can be agreed upon and implemented in order 
to meet the overall objectives of the contractual agreement. Such standard 
specifications are arguably still to be considered as instances of output control. 
Moreover, the monitoring, evaluation, feedback as well as rewarding and sanctioning 
are also to be considered as output control in this perspective.  
Analyzing Control of Workplace Behavior 
Regarding organizational values and norms, as standard specifications for workplace 
behavior may at the outset appear to be quite a tall claim, one could raise the point that 
a ‘standard specification’ is characterized by its accessibility in writing to all involved 
actors. This is hardly ever the case when it comes to organizational norms and values. 
However, the concepts of norms and values are characterized by being something that 
a group of people has in common, adhere to and know, so to speak, “by heart”.  
Arguably, norms and values are more robust than written artifacts to the group that 
have these values and norms in common. Norms and values are internalized rules, 
which are not required to be in writing, in order to be effective for those that belong to 
the group. On the other hand, norms and values are very hard to grasp for people not 
belonging to the group that share these. In other words, to the out-group they are to a 
certain extent inaccessible up until the point where members of the in-group convey 
them explicitly to the out-group; or out-group members ‘discover’ the norms and 
values by themselves over time.  
Thus, norms and values can indeed be regarded as standard specification. The 
interesting question is not so much whether such a specification is in writing, but rather 
if it is in some way or another made accessible to those who, given their status as out-
group members, do not know it “by heart”. We can compare this to the notion of 
standard specifications within formal control: Whether a specification exists in writing 
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is less interesting. What is interesting is whether such a standard specification is 
accessible (Thornton et al., 2012). That is, the relevant question to pose is this: Do the 
relevant actors know of the existence of a standard specification or not? If a group of 
actors are not aware of the existence of a standard specification, it might as well not 
exist, as it has no control effect on this group.  
The same arguments holds good for standard specification of workplace behavior: If a 
standard specification of norms and values is not accessible to the relevant actors, it 
has no controlling effect. Thus, when we enquire about standard specification of 
workplace behavior, we enquire about the accessibility, rather than whether or not it 
exists. 
How do we monitor workplace behavior? As elaborated in the last chapter collocation 
facilitates the possibility to monitor each other’s behavior at the workplace – and lack 
of collocation is a hindrance to the same. The term monitoring suggests that it is 
something that is done deliberately, but as I have argued in the last chapter ‘Challenged 
by Distance’, this is not necessarily the case. Rather, passive face time enables actors 
to monitor each other, which is done both consciously and unconsciously. While 
monitoring has a connotation of being something deliberate when we are talking about 
formal control, this is not necessarily the case when it relates to workplace behavior. 
Thus, instead of talking about ‘monitoring’ I will address it as ‘observing’ moving 
forward in this chapter, as this term has a more neutral connotation that can embrace 
both the formal monitoring that happens when formal control mechanisms are applied 
as well as the lesser structured and, in some cases, unconscious observation of other 
actors that characterize social control.  
In the last chapter I have shown how passive face time leads to positive assessments of 
ability, integrity and benevolence respectively. In this chapter I will adhere to Weibel’s 
(2007) categorizations of control and thus label it evaluation. In sum, monitoring and 
evaluating workplace behavior will be a reiteration of some of the main analytical 
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findings from the previous chapter. Consequently, the findings presented here are not 
new. However, in order to bring forth a robust and coherent analysis of how control 
mechanisms affect trust building, some level of repetition is needed.  
While analysis of monitoring and evaluating in this chapter are partly drawing on 
analytical findings on passive face time and assessments from the previous chapter, 
feedback will add a new perspective. Arguably, both monitoring (passive face time) 
and evaluation (assessments) can happen without the other party knowing about it. 
This can facilitate trust, insofar the assessments are positive, but are not control in 
itself. Only if the actors who are being controlled are aware of this will it have a 
controlling effect. This does not in itself require feedback – take for instance 
Bentham’s panopticon – if sanctions are severe enough. But arguably, in most cases in 
the modern work life feedback would – in some form or another – be present when 
controlling.  
There are indeed many ways to reward or sanction adherence respectively lack of 
adherence to expectations on workplace behavior. Financial incentives, promotions and 
praise are some of the most obvious forms of rewards. However, there are more subtle 
rewards and sanctions too, such as group-inclusion and visibility. In the analytical 
sections of this chapter I will take a closer look at how rewards and sanctions are used 
as control mechanisms and subsequently how they affect trust. 
Summing up & Graphical Representation of the Analytical Framework 
I started this chapter arguing that trust and control form a duality in which the two 
constructs are highly interrelated. Below I will unfold this argument in greater detail by 
shedding light on how they are interrelated. Subsequently, I will analyze  how control 
mechanisms are used in the collaboration between the client and the vendor 
organization (research question #1) and how the use of control mechanisms affects the 
perceived trustworthiness of the vendor-side actors, in the eyes of the client-side 
actors(research question #2). 
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However, before moving forward let me briefly sum up how formal control as well as 
normative control can be captured using an integrative framework: On one hand the 
literature on control suggests that there are two distinct forms of control, namely 
formal control and normative control, where the first can be divided into control of 
process and output respectively. The three categories – process, output and workplace 
behavior – are focused on what to control. On the other hand, Weibel (2007) suggests 
that there are three main categories of how to perform formal control, namely a) 
standard specifications, b) monitoring, evaluation and feedback and c) sanctions and 
rewards. I have argued that the same categorizations can be used for understanding 
how normative control is performed. However, for the second category I have argued 
that the term monitoring should be replaced with ‘observation’ as this does not have 
the same connotation of something “surveillance-like”. Thus, the analytical framework 
that will be used in the remainder of this chapter to understand how control 
mechanisms are used in the empirical context can be illustrated as done in table 6.2 
below. 
 
 159 
Perspectives on the Relationship between Control and Trust 
Arguably, trust and control are two sides to the same coin as both constructs are aiming 
at reducing perceived risk in interactions. As we know from Rousseau et al. (1998) 
trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). Control, 
on the other hand, is "a regulatory process by which the elements of a system are made 
more predictable through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of some desired 
objective or state" (Leifer & Mills, 1996, 117). Thus, when we trust we accept a risk 
based on positive expectations of intentions, whereas control is about making risks 
more predictable through the use of control mechanisms, or, as Möllering (2006) calls 
it “structural influences on the embedded other” (p. 195) 
What trust and control furthermore have in common is that both constructs seek to 
reduce complexity. Das & Teng (1998) emphasize how "virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust” (p. 494) and adds that as “it is 
impossible to monitor every detail in most exchanges, firms must always have a 
minimum level of trust” (ibid.). By trusting, one reduces complexity by establishing 
positive expectations, whereas control reduces complexity by focusing on what is 
expected to be the key differentiators.  
According to Das & Teng (1998) “trust and control are the two contributory factors of 
confidence in partner cooperation” (p. 494), where confidence is defined as “the 
perceived level of certainty that the partner will behave in a desirable manner” (ibid.). 
Thus, the aggregated level of trust and control determines an actor’s confidence. 
According to Möllering (2006) the relationship between trust and control forms a 
duality, which “can lead to positive expectations of others” (p. 195).  
However, as Das & Teng also notes, the relationship between trust and control needs 
clarification (Das & Teng, 1998, 493). Specifically, we need to understand whether 
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one or both of them are necessary in order to reach certainty or whether one can be 
sufficient.  
As it is arguably impossible to control every single detail, trust is essential in order to 
build confidence and reduce perceived risk. Following that line of thinking we can say 
that the higher complexity a risky interaction entails, the bigger is the need for trust 
among the involved parties. However, in less complex scenarios it may be possible to 
have high confidence without trust, if adequate control mechanisms are in place. 
However, as Möllering (2006) reminds us, even in such situations one must trust that 
the control mechanisms works as actors “do not need to trust in an impenetrable 
system as a whole but ‘only’ in the functioning of controls” (p. 72). Thus, in order to 
build and maintain confidence trust is necessary. 
On the other hand, the same is not the case when it comes to control: If trust is strong, 
the need for control mechanisms can be rendered obsolete. Consequently, “when it is 
possible to fully trust a partner, there is no need to control its behavior. Control comes 
into play only when adequate trust is not present. For instance, if a manager trusts 
employees to be self-motivated to do the best job possible, no behavior [i.e. process] or 
outcome control will be needed” (Das & Teng, 1998: 495). That is, control is not a 
necessity per se.  
With regards to whether one of the two constructs, trust and control, is sufficient to 
establish confidence and lower perceptions of risk, we can – following the same line of 
thinking – say that in complex scenarios trust may be sufficient, but control cannot be 
sufficient. Only in less complex scenarios can control be sufficient to establish 
confidence, as complex scenarios will always entail that incompleteness with regards 
to control. 
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Control Mechanisms as Substitutes, Catalysts and Inhibitors to Trust 
In addition to understanding the role of trust and control in establishing confidence and 
lowering perceptions of risk, we need to understand how these two constructs affect 
each other. 
Traditionally trust and control have been understood as each other’s substitutes (Das & 
Teng, 1998). That is, the more there is of one the less is needed of the other in order to 
lower risk perceptions. Furthermore, the relationship between trust and control is, in 
this line of thinking, competing against each other as “control mechanisms imply that 
one party does not trust the other. Since trust has the characteristic of reciprocity, one 
tends to think along the lines of ‘I do not trust you because you do not trust me.’ 
Consequently, this may evolve into a vicious cycle” (Das & Teng, 1998: 501) where 
control undermines trust, because ‘to trust’ “implies the exclusion of deliberate control 
over the behavior of others” (Das & Teng, 1998: 495). Trust and control are, so to 
speak, two completely different approaches aimed at solving the same problem of how 
to raise confidence and lower perception of risk. 
However, research suggests (see Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002 for reviews) that the relationship between the two constructs is more complex 
than this, as implementations of control mechanisms can have a positive effect on the 
level of trust. That is, control breads trust. Goold & Campbell (1987) argue that 
because control provides transparency into performance, trust can be strengthened by 
the use of control mechanisms insofar the controls render a positive result visible. In 
the same line of thinking, Sitkin (1995) argues that formal rules and standardized 
procedures are conductive for "the development, diffusion, and constructive 
institutionalization of trust in organizational settings" (p. 187).  
Thus, the implementation of control mechanisms can have three distinctively different 
impacts on the trust level. They can substitute for trust; be a trust catalyst; and an 
inhibitor to trust. On one hand controlling may have a negative effect on trust and on 
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the other hand it may have a positive effect on the same. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will take a closer look at the use of control mechanisms that are used in the 
collaboration between the client and the vendor; and analyze their effect on perceived 
trustworthiness. 
Use of Control in the Offshore-Outsourcing Collaboration 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter the main focus will – given the fact 
that the collaboration is essentially a supplier-client relationship – be on how the client 
controls the vendor.   
I have argued that control can be divided into three major categories, namely process 
control, output control and normative control. However, these are theoretical constructs 
and the actual control mechanisms applied in the context of this offshore outsourcing 
collaboration do indeed cross this theoretical boundary as specific control mechanisms 
can be linked to more than one type of control. One example is the change 
management process that to a large extent is about controlling a process, but also has 
elements of output control, as the result of a change is indeed a specific output. Such 
control mechanisms will be introduced in the theoretical category that is the “best fit” 
and I will argue why it is the best fitting theoretical category in each such instance. 
In the three sub-sections below I will introduce the most significant control 
mechanisms that I have identified through observations, informal conversations and 
interviews and hence provide an overview of control as it appears in the empirical 
settings sorted using the three theoretical categories: output control, process control 
and normative control. Subsequently, the effect of the utilization of these control 
mechanisms on perceptions of trustworthiness will be analyzed.  
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Output Control: Measuring Goal Achievement 
SLA Measurements 
As a natural consequence of having a contract that specifies the relationship between 
what the vendor is expected to deliver and the remuneration the vendor receives for its 
services the contractual relationship specifies a number of measurements designed to 
monitor whether or not the services agreed upon in the contracts are in fact delivered. 
Such specifications are designated as Service Level Agreements (SLA). The SLA 
report consists primarily of two different types of objects of measurement: System3 
availability and incident handling. All the IT-systems that the vendor operates on 
behalf of the client are measured in terms of availability; that is, whether or not the 
system is accessible to those users or other systems that make use of the system and if 
it conforms to a defined response time (the time it takes the system to execute a 
specific set of commands). The availability is reported as a percentage (e.g. 98.5) per 
system, which indicates the uptime of the system in question. Thus, the aggregated 
SLA report consists of a number of percentages that delineate the performance of each 
and every system and these percentages are colored green or red depending on whether 
or not the actual performance of a system meets the minimum performance defined in 
the SLA. This way, meeting the SLA requirements is a simple yes/no question. If the 
color is green the system availability meets or exceeds the availability agreement and if 
it is red it fails to meet the agreement. In case of the latter a complex system of 
penalties and compensations is evoked. 
The other object of measurement in the SLA report is incident handling. Incidents are 
unplanned interruptions to an IT service or a reduction in the quality of an IT service, 
                                         
3 Please note that I use the term ‘system’ rather freely to cover both databases; applications; 
infrastructure, such as network and printers; and hardware operations. While this is an abstraction that 
IT-professionals may find unreasonable, I have done so as I do not believe that a more precise 
technical terminology is necessary to the purpose of this chapter. In fact, it would probably confuse 
rather than enlighten the reader. 
164 
which can be reported automatically, by the means of surveillance systems, or by users 
who experience that a service is not working as expected. After incidents are submitted 
to the helpdesk they are categorized as priority 1 to 4 depending on their criticality, 
their impact on the business or impact on number of users. This is done according to a 
set of agreed definitions based on the ITIL framework (see sub-section on process 
control for an elaboration of ITIL). All types of incidents are measured on ‘response 
time’ (i.e. the time between an incident is submitted and the vendor starts to work on 
resolving it) and ‘resolve time’ (i.e. the time between an incident is “picked up” – that 
is, when the vendor starts to work on resolving it – and resolved). Both the expected 
response time and resolve time as defined in the SLA depend significantly on the 
priority of the incident, varying from minutes to days in response time and hours to 
weeks in resolve time. Just like system availability, incidents are marked green or red 
respectively, depending on whether or not the incidents in a given category in a given 
month meet the agreed service levels. 
The reporting on SLA fulfillment is done on a monthly basis. The data on system 
availability is generated on the basis of various surveillance systems provided by the 
vendor, whereas the data on incident handling is generated based on a system called 
Remedy, which is also provided by the vendor. But unlike the surveillance systems 
used for measuring system performance Remedy provides full transparency to the 
relevant client-side actors, as they can track the development of each single incident 
reported. On the basis of these tools an elaborate power point presentation is prepared 
by the vendor and sent to the relevant client-side managers – the CIO, the two service 
managers and the director of IT operations. A few days after the report has been 
conveyed to the client-side staff a service delivery meeting is held. This meeting is 
attended by the two service managers and the director of IT operations from the client; 
and from the vendor the head of the OMC (also designated as Service Delivery 
Manager, Operations), the Service Delivery Manager for Applications, and the Change 
Manager participate from India alongside two vendor-side actors based in Denmark: 
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the native Danish Service Manager and usually one onsite-allocated Indian consultant 
who acts as single point of contact for the SAP team (which is one of the larger teams 
with a lot of interaction with the business part of the client’s organization).  
During these service delivery meetings the participants walk through the report. In 
most cases all metrics that are green are not scrutinized individually. Rather the focus 
is on metrics that are red. The only exception to this are metrics that the client-side 
actors believe should be marked red for some reason, which is a rare case that in all 
instances I have observed are resolved amicably after the vendor-side actors have 
provided a more elaborate verbal explanation. Metrics that are marked red are 
discussed in these meetings, where the vendor-side representatives are expected to 
explain what measures they are taking to improve the outcome. In some cases red 
measures are ‘accepted’ by the client-side actors, meaning that they assume 
responsibility for the low score because of negligence, such as lack of investment in 
hardware or software upgrades that has been brought to their attention earlier. 
Furthermore, the SLA report is the basis for the quarterly steering group meeting, 
which is attended by the same group of client-side staff members as the service 
delivery meeting. In addition, the CIO and the head of the project management office, 
who are the actors overall responsibility of the contract, participates. From the vendor-
side the two service delivery managers, the native Danish service manager and the 
overall account responsible, who is also the direct supervisor to the head of the OMC, 
attend these steering group meetings. The steering group meetings are predominantly 
aimed at the more strategic aspects of the collaboration. However, the SLA report is 
always on the agenda for these meetings, and issues that have not been resolved 
satisfactorily via the service delivery meetings will be discussed and resolved among 
the members of the steering group. Altogether, the SLA measurements are the central 
output control. This is not to say that it is the only form of output control that is being 
utilized in the collaboration, but rather that such other control mechanisms are only to a 
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limited extend about controlling output, and to a larger extent about controlling process 
or workplace behavior. They will therefore be dealt with in these respective sections. 
To sum up in accordance with my analytical framework: SLA measurements are the 
epicenter of output measurements in the collaboration. The expected work output is 
specified according to a standard specification, namely the service level agreement. 
The output is monitored by the means of various surveillance systems and the incident 
handling tool, Remedy. At the monthly service delivery meeting the client-side 
participants evaluate the output and both parties provide feedback on the performance. 
In some cases, when the metrics are ‘red’ and the client-side do not accept 
responsibility there is a potential sanction in the form of compensation. 
Process Control: Discipline in ‘the way we work’ 
Client-side actors have repeatedly mentioned that they perceive themselves as more 
mature in terms of outsourcing now, than when they started to outsource in 2007. The 
vendor-side actors support this perception, and one manager assesses the client as a 
“very mature customer and very constructive” (Interview #21). When asked about 
what characterizes maturity client-side actors explain that it is about learning to let the 
vendor provide services without having to know every detail yourself. It is in other 
words about focusing on the output, rather than the process. In this perspective one 
could be lead to the conclusion that the extent to which process control is exercised is 
limited. However, this is not the case. In fact, the process control is significantly more 
elaborate than the output control. In this section I will illustrate the most prevailing 
forms of process control that are utilized. 
The ITIL Framework 
ITIL is an abbreviation of ‘Information Technology Infrastructure Library’ and this 
somewhat odd name is the title of a framework for IT-operations. It is a ‘best practice’ 
within IT used worldwide in a magnitude of different industries and types of 
organizations to ensure a common practice and understanding of concepts. ITIL is also 
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the process framework used in this. Throughout my fieldwork I have been met with the 
answer “it’s standard ITIL” (Field Notes 20130226) when I have enquired about the 
processes used in the collaboration between the two organizations. On my very first 
day of fieldwork a Danish vendor-side actor told me that “using uniform processes are 
a key to the savings in outsourcing”. (Field Notes 20130214) He furthermore explained 
that the processes implemented in this particular collaboration are based on the 
vendor’s standard interpretation of ITIL with a few alterations to cater for the current 
organizational setup in the client organization.  
ITIL is thus a standard of how to do IT operations on a high level, which requires local 
tailoring since ITIL does not come with e.g. specific templates to use in daily work and 
does not prescribe which tools to use to. For instance, any IT organization (of a 
reasonable size) would arguably require a tool supported process on how to release 
new functionality into the production environment; ITIL provides high-level guidelines 
and terminology, but does not suggest which tools to use or how to practically submit, 
approve and implement changes. Thus, the ITIL framework does not in itself provide 
standard specifications on how to do the work; it does not offer a method on how to 
observe, evaluate and give feedback on process adherence, but only states that in order 
to obtain process maturity this should be done; and it does not suggest any rewards or 
sanctions for process adherence or lack of the same. Thus, in order to understand how 
ITIL is used as a control mechanism, we must turn to concrete instances of 
implementations of ITIL processes. One such instance is the change management 
process. 
The Change Management Process 
The change management process is by no means the only concrete instance of an 
implemented ITIL process. However, together with the processes for handling 
incidents (which I will discuss later) it is the process that the client-side actors are most 
frequently exposed to. The reason for this is that the change management process 
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requires extensive knowledge of the business: As the change process is about 
introducing technical changes to the current environment it requires knowledge about 
how the system is used, when downtime is acceptable, and how the system under 
change is interfacing with other systems. This stands in contrast to most other ITIL 
processes, which are focused on keeping a technical environment running. Examples of 
such processes are capacity management IT Continuity. 
The overall responsible for coordinating planned changes to the environment is the 
vendor-side change manager, who tells what he does: 
“I organize things and ensure every track raises a proper change request, 
which is submitted on time and I ensure all the change requests are coming 
through a proper channel and have been planned. […] I ensure that […] 
we'll have time for rollback in case there is any mistake or any slip […] I 
ensure that we have a rollback plan in case something goes wrong so we 
don’t panic, but can set environment back to normal. So I ensure that 
everything is being planned well in advance. […] I'll be able to check 
whether the process is being followed but I'll not be able to judge or be 
strong in the implementation steps. So I get in touch with the track leads to 
ensure the work submitted is correct. Once they give a sign-off I take it 
forward: […] once it's been approved by the management, the client side 
and from our side we approve and I check with the durations [schedule] 
being followed strictly.   
There are chances for us to have failures. So in that case we intimate the 
stakeholders and the business that this change is not being performed and it 
was rolled back. Once the change activity has been rolled back […] I sit 
with the team and ask them to provide a post implementation review: Why 
did the change go wrong? […] We analyze and get the document filled and 
we analyze from scratch, to make sure that when we perform the change 
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there are no failures. For major changes it will be discussed and justified to 
the customers that this is the reason why this went wrong and we ensure that 
it’s not happening again” (Interview # 19 – vendor-side actor)   
As the quote shows, a significant part of the change manager’s job is making sure that 
the processes are being followed, but he is also relying on track leads for technical 
expertise. During the week he collaborates with vendor-side colleagues to make sure 
that upcoming changes are prepared according to the process descriptions and every 
Tuesday he presents these to the client-side employees at the weekly standing change 
board meeting. Arguably, the change management process introduces two sets of 
controls. One is the control that the change manager performs which is directed 
towards to the technical staff and track leads within the vendor organization. Another 
is the control that client-side actors perform of the change management process at the 
weekly change board meetings. The sole focus here (given by the scope of this chapter) 
will be the latter.  
At the weekly change board meetings, the change manager conducts a detailed walk-
through of all the elements in the change template for every single pending change. 
This template, which can indeed be characterized as a standard specification, forms the 
basis of the client-side evaluation of the change. Based on this the client-side actors 
give feedback accordingly on whether they accept the proposed change or reject it 
based on either lack of process adherence or for business-related reasons that do not 
relate directly to the change management process itself, but rather to embedded 
knowledge they may have. With regards to rewards and sanctions based on adherence 
to the change management process, this instance of process control differs significantly 
from the types of rewards and sanctions that are effectuated based on output control: 
Where output control results in rewards and sanctions aimed at an organizational level 
the rewarding and sanctioning based on the control of changes are aimed at a person, 
namely the change manager.  
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Over the course of my fieldwork I have participated in twelve change board meetings 
and my observations in these meetings all suggest that the client-side actors perceive 
the change management processes as being embodied by the vendor-side change 
manager. Thus, in instances where the client-side actors are dissatisfied with the 
thoroughness of the process-based preparation of a change they always express the 
dissatisfaction as something related to the change manager’s person and never to the 
role or the process. Such dissatisfaction is exhibited repeatedly and the client-side 
actors assess the change manager as “a secretary who fills in templates and sends them 
up here [to Denmark] for approval” (Interview #6), rather than as someone who adds 
value to the collaboration.  
To sum up: The change management process is a form of process control that can 
indeed be regarded as a standard specification, which is observed and evaluated by 
client-side actors at the weekly change board meetings. These client-side employees 
furthermore provide feedback on the process, by their acceptance, rejection and 
comments on the individual changes. In terms of the reward-sanction duality the 
perception of the change manager’s poor performance can ultimately, and very likely, 
lead to a sanction in the form of discontinuation of the specific change manager.  
Handling Critical Incidents 
The process for handling critical incidents is another process that the client-side actors 
are heavily exposed to:. In ITIL terms an incident is – as explained earlier in this 
chapter – an unplanned disruption or degradation of an IT-service. Such disruptions 
can be reported by users of IT-systems or automatically, by the means of surveillance 
systems. Incidents can be more or less critical; depending on a number of factors such 
as financial or commercial impacts, data security violations, and number of users 
affected. In this particular collaboration there are four categorizations of incidents – 
priority 1 to 4, based on a set of predefined parameters – where priority 1 and priority 2 
incidents are considered as critical incidents. When such critical incidents occur the 
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process dictates that the vendor must inform the client, whereas priority 3 and priority 
4 incidents are handled without client-side involvement. One of the two incident 
managers at the OMC explains the initial part of the process for handling critical 
incidents like this: 
“I collect all the information from service desk to find out what exactly is 
wrong: what the impact is on the business; and whether we have any 
workarounds. So, I analyze all those things and I coordinate with the teams 
to find out what is technically wrong and how long is it going to take to fix it. 
[…] Then I have to communicate with the client stating what is wrong and 
how long are we going to take to fix it. So I get an approval from them [the 
client] and then I talk with the teams [at the OMC] and I’ll make sure things 
are done”. (Interview #22 – vendor-side actor) 
As soon as a critical incident is reported the incident manager follows a standard script 
as described above. On one side the incident manager is coordinating with the 
technical staff at the OMC and on the other side he is coordinating with the client-side, 
making sure they are informed on the progress. The latter is done via a so-called 
management bridge, which is a phone conference attended by the incident manager, a 
representative of the overall OMC management as well as one or more client-side 
representatives, where the incident manager “updates the customer on what is 
happening every 15 minutes” (Interview #22). 
This process is the standard specification of how critical incidents are handled, which, 
by the means of the management bridge, enable the client-side employees to observe 
and evaluate whether the process is being followed and, in case it is not, to give 
feedback on the same. Through my interview with the incident manager I enquired if 
they always follow this process to which she answers:  
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“We basically try to stick to the process even if the customer says okay to 
deviate. But later, if something goes wrong [and I have been] deviating the 
process then I’m going to take the responsibility. So it’s my own profile and 
my own job that I’m looking at now. I am really very hesitant and I don’t 
take the chance. […] That is how I am”. (Interview #22 – vendor-side actor) 
The incident manager furthermore tells that critical incidents quite often occur during 
out-of-office hours and even in the middle of the night. However, this does not change 
the fact that she adheres closely to the process, even if it means waking up a client-side 
actor for something that may later turn out to be easily solved.  
That happens many times. I look at what’s the time there and so he must be 
sleeping so should I call him? But most of the times I am forced to call him 
because I don’t want to take a chance when somebody goes and asks me why 
haven’t you informed us […]I do so, even if it’s late night. […] The client 
also feels that if something is happening in their environment [...] they want 
them to be the first people to know. (Interview #22 – vendor-side actor) 
In her own words, her key responsibilities are to make sure that the service level 
agreements; with regards to response time and resolve time (see section on Output 
Control) are met. That “things are done within time. That is my primary responsibility” 
(Interview #22) and to make sure that the handling of the critical incident is 
coordinated internally and that the client is continuously informed: “So if we are giving 
them the frequent updates, they are happy about it. They don’t think that we’re not 
working and we’re just delaying their work”. (Interview #22) 
This strict adherence to process that the Incident Manager displays is recognized by 
client-side counterparts. During the client visit at the OMC the two incident managers 
are repeatedly acknowledged for their work (Field Notes 20130911). Additionally, 
during informal conversations one of their client-side counterparts told me that despite 
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the inconvenience he appreciates being woken up in the night, when critical incidents 
happen, as he wants to be informed and involved. He furthermore refers affectionately 
to the incident managers as “my good friends” (Field Notes 20140129) 
The Mother of All Critical Incidents 
All IT-organizations experience critical incidents from time to time. Inevitably. Any IT 
professional would know that and this collaboration is not an exception. In the vast 
majority of cases such incidents are handled according to the standard specification. 
Likewise, most IT operational matters are handled according to processes, but even so 
– sometimes errors occur. The incident manager explains that the client-side actors 
“are technically strong” (Interview #22) people who understand that complex issues 
arise sometimes, which take time to handle. In most cases, there is not even the 
slightest hint of doubt that they believe that the vendor acts according to defined 
processes, standard specifications, and thus do the best they can to prevent that critical 
incidents arise. However, there is one notable exception: A DNS-error4 that occurred 
Friday afternoon on the 18th of January 2013. This incident was different than other 
incidents for two reasons. First of all because it had a huge impact on the business, as 
all –– the client’s commercial websites, in total more than forty, were completely 
inaccessible for almost two hours in the middle of the day. Second, because the 
incident was a human error, where a specific vendor-side actor had disregarded the 
process for updating DNS entries. The fact that this particular vendor-side actor had 
disregarded the same process earlier, however only with relatively minor 
consequences, made the situation even worse.  
                                         
4 DNS, Domain Name System, is the service that translates domain names (such as www.cbs.dk) into 
IP-addresses (such as 130.226.47.28). The Internet is based on IP-addresses and to understand which 
IP-address belongs to a certain domain name DNS is used. If the DNS entries are overwritten, no IP-
address is associated with the domain name. Consequently the user sees a blank page in the web 
browser. 
174 
At my second day of field studies I observed a meeting where this specific incident 
was discussed internally in the client organization. Several client-side actors did not 
want that particular vendor-side actor associated with them anymore (Field Notes 
20130213). This eventually led the Editor in Chief and CEO to demand that the 
vendor-side actor in question, a technician, should be removed from this account. This 
particular incident, arguably the mother of all critical incidents as one called it (Field 
Notes 20130215), serves as a good example of how important processes and process 
adherence are perceived among the client-side actors. In most cases adherence to the 
standard specifications are not monitored by the client. The vendor is assumed to 
follow these standard specifications and evaluate them, themselves. Thus, it is indeed 
possible that vendor-side actors circumvent processes, without such circumvention 
ever being noticed by the client. But in cases where circumvention leads to operational 
failures the circumventor can potentially face severe consequences. Such consequences 
are what the incident manager refers to when she says that she is hesitant to diverge 
from the processes as it can have consequences for “my own profile and my own job” 
(Interview #22). 
Normative Control: Gaining Transparency  
The two forms of control introduced above – output control and process control – are 
instances of formal control: Output control is formalized by contractual agreements, 
such as SLAs, agreed upon at the very outset of the collaboration; and process control, 
which at an abstract level is also formalized by the means of contractual agreement and 
at a concrete level is agreed upon and refined over the course of the collaboration. Both 
types of control are formalized – they are mutually agreed upon and put in writing.  
Normative control is distinctively different from formal control as this form of control 
is typically characterized by not being cemented by written agreement. Rather, 
normative control is, in most cases, characterized by the absence of written standard 
specifications. That is not to say that workplace behavior is not, or cannot, be 
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specified. Indeed, codes of conduct or other written descriptions of what is expected in 
terms of workplace behavior can exist. However, normative control is about 
“controlling the underlying experiences, thoughts, and feelings that guide their actions” 
(Kunda, 1992: 11). That is, it is not merely about controlling actions (which can be 
sought by the means of written codes of conduct), but about controlling what guide 
these actions. Arguably, codes of conduct are not instances of normative control, but 
rather process control. Thus, the focus in this section is not on written descriptions of 
workplace behavior, but rather on the informal control.  
The collaboration is on one side characterized by being physically close when client-
side actors are collaborating with the onsite-deployed Indian and Danish vendor-side 
actors. On the other side the collaboration is also characterized by being physically 
distant, in cases where client-side actors collaborate with OMC staff. This dual mode 
of collaboration is also characterized by utilizations of distinctively different 
mechanisms for performing normative control. Thus, ‘normative control of those close 
to and far-away from the clients will be analyzed in separate subsections below. 
Normative control of ‘the near one’s’ 
“If a stranger tells you: “I need you to do this”, you’ll say: “okay, if I have 
time I’ll do it”. But, if your friend tells you then you’ll make extra effort. 
That’s the difference, I think.” (Interview #21 – vendor-side actor) 
The stranger/friend dichotomy that the vendor-side actor elaborates on in the quote 
above frames the difference between the relationship that the client-side actors form 
with onsite and offshore vendor-side actors respectively. Vendor-side actors that are 
deployed onsite are seated close to the client-side actors. Over time, a cordial 
relationship is formed, and the vendor-side actors’ merits are recognized by the client-
side actors (as reported in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’). The ease of access – 
or as I call it in the aforementioned chapter ‘being available’ – has a clearly positive 
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effect on the two parties’ ability to collaborate, but it arguably has another connotation 
than the mere fact that communication is perceived as easier in a co-located work 
environment, as co-location seems to minimize – if not completely remove – conflict.  
In chapter V I have argued that distance leads to lack of transparency. In line with 
Hinds & Bailey (2003) I find that the distributed collaboration is, to some extent, a 
case of “Out of Sight, Out of Sync”, manifested by task conflict, motivational conflict 
and process conflict. That is, the client-side actors voice concern that tasks handled at 
the OMC in India are sometimes of sub-optimal quality due to lack of understanding of 
the business domain; that the OMC staff’s motivation is below par and “things are just 
hidden or ‘forgotten’ if they [the OMC staff] don’t know how to solve them” 
(Interview #6); and that processes are not followed rigidly (i.e. the case with the DNS 
error and the dissatisfaction with the Change Manager, both reported earlier). Claiming 
that such conflicts characterize the collaboration when the actors are distributed is a 
coarse exaggeration. In fact, in most cases the distributed collaboration is quite smooth 
and without conflict. What is interesting, however, is that throughout my field studies I 
have not witnessed any instance where the collaboration between co-located actors 
from the two organizational entities has been conflictual. This does, of course, not 
mean that there are no conflicts in the collaboration between employees from the two 
organizational entities when they are co-located, but it does signify that such conflicts 
are minor and not considered worth mentioning by the client-side actors.  
However, with regards to the co-located work environment at the client’s premises one 
recent development is worth noticing: When I embarked on my field studies in early 
2013 the onsite deployed vendor-side actors were placed at another floor in the 
building. While all of client’s own IT-employees were placed at the third floor, right 
next to the Danish vendor-side actors, the Indian onsite-workers were placed on the 
second floor. The fact that there were no Indian faces visible in the office I was located 
in, despite the fact that I was told that a handful of Indian vendor-side actors were 
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deployed onsite, made me enquire on their whereabouts. When I asked where they 
were I was told that they we’re on the second floor. Then I started to dig into the 
reasons for this physical displacement. It turned out that I got several different 
explanations. Some client-side actors told me that it was because of lack of space 
(despite the fact that there were free seating at that point in time and that it was 
generally accepted that on days where everybody was in, some had to sit in the coffee 
kitchen, in the lounge area or in another part of the building). Others told me that it was 
because the vendor-side actors themselves preferred being close to each other, rather 
than being close to their client-side counterparts. And one told me that during the 
transition the Indian vendor-side actors had been seated this way and that they just 
never got around to change it, while another explained that due to mold in the building 
parts of the staff had to be relocated and “as the Indians were simply the lowest in the 
hierarchy and thus the easiest ones to move” (Field Notes 20130221), they were now 
placed away from the rest of the IT-department. On the other hand, the onsite-deployed 
vendor-side actors told me that they did not know why it was so. Some guessed that 
they were too loud when speaking to each other and on the phone; some guessed that it 
was just a random thing that nobody had considered. Unlike the client-side actors, who 
seemed perfectly all right with this arrangement, all the vendor-side actors found it 
strange and counterproductive, though none had ever voiced their opinion to the client-
side actors.  
A few months later the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors were moved to the IT-
department at the third floor in connection with a bigger organizational change. The 
fact that the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors were moved in to the IT-department 
seemed to foster a closer and more frequent collaboration: Before the move, I had 
spent some of my days of observation studies sitting next to the client-side actors, 
some sitting next to the native Danish vendor-side actors and some at the second floor, 
sitting right next to the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors. This shifting allowed me to 
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observe the number of face-to-face interactions between them, which was essentially 
limited to the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors going to the third floor when called 
upon – something that only happened once or twice per day in total for the whole 
group. The client-side actors only went to the second floor on a very few occasions. 
After the shift this changed. I saw how the collaboration was now characterized by 
frequent interaction, where they frequently came by each other’s desks to discuss 
matters in which they collaborated. 
I also noted that the change in seating seemed to have an impact on the way the client-
side actors spoke of the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors: Before the move they were 
by and large spoken of as ‘The Indians’, whereas this changed to being personalized 
after the move. Communication shifted from “you should go and talk to the Indians” to 
“you should go and talk to Srinivas”; from “can you ask the Indians to have a look at 
this” to “can you ask Pradeep to have a look at this”. Thus, the cordial and friendly 
tone I described in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ was in fact not predominant 
before the move, though still relatively more cordial than the relationship with the 
vendor-side actors working at the OMC in Chennai. But it definitely came to be 
predominant over the course of the following months and throughout the remainder of 
time I spent doing observation studies in the field.  
How can we characterize the normative control that is imposed on the vendor-side 
actors when the actors from the two organizational entities are co-located? During 
interviews with client-side actors I have asked them to describe the relationship 
between themselves and their closest colleagues at the client organization (Interviews 
#8, #12, #13, #14, #15, #16, # 17). First, I asked them to note three words describing 
the relationship and subsequently to elaborate on these words. I argue, that the 
elaboration of themes that are common among the client-side actors I have interviewed 
can be regarded as norms and values in the client organization. While they most 
certainly do not constitute a complete description of the set of values and norms, they 
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are indeed an important subset. Thus, they can be regarded as standard specifications 
of workplace behavior. During the interviews three common themes surfaced: 
Informality, collaboration and responsibility.   
After enquiring about the characteristics of collaboration with their client-side 
colleagues I asked them to describe the relationship with their vendor-side counterparts 
the same way, that is, by noting down three words and elaborating them. While some 
interviewees chose the same words, some noted other words. But all interviewees 
started elaborating on how they perceived their vendor-side counterparts by relating – 
positively as well as negatively – to the words they had used to describe their closest 
client-side colleagues. 
Informality as a standard specification of workplace behavior was elaborated as a 
‘flexible’ and ‘relaxed’ mode of collaboration, where communication is characterized 
by being ‘non-submissive’ even across hierarchical positions and where people are 
joining in on informal gatherings, such as celebrations and after-hours arrangements. In 
terms of evaluation of the vendor-side actors’ adherence to these standard 
specifications the interviewees indicated that the vendor-side actors working onsite 
over time learned to adapt to this informal way of collaboration. However, one noted, 
in line with my own observations, that even though they did in fact participate in the 
informal gatherings, they tended to keep to themselves: “We all stand there, joking, 
talking. But the Indian keep to their separate group. They are not really a part of the 
community” (Interview #16).  
Collaboration as a standard specification of workplace behavior was elaborated as 
something where the actors ‘shared knowledge’, had a ‘mutual respect for each other’s 
contributions’, where people treat each other as ‘working with, not against’ each other 
and were ‘honest’ and ‘spoke one’s opinion freely’. Again, the client-side actors 
evaluated that they believed that the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors were in line 
with this value of collaboration and thus possessed the same values as themselves.  
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The last common theme, responsibility, was elaborated as something that had to do 
with showing ‘commitment’, ‘being thorough’ and ‘following through on promises’ as 
well as ‘working towards common goals’. As with the two other values the perception 
among client-side actors was clearly that the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors 
showed a large degree of responsibility. Thus, again, they were evaluated as following 
the same standard specification of workplace behavior.  
Thus, the three values are, from the client-side actors’ point of view adhered to by the 
vendor-side actors located onsite in Copenhagen. Earlier in this chapter I have argued 
that if control is to have an effect, some level of feedback is needed. If the one that is 
subject to normative control does not know that he is being evaluated, he is arguably 
not being controlled at all, but merely subjected to control mechanisms. The difference 
is important. Consequently, it only makes sense to talk about a normatively controlling 
effect insofar the vendor-side actors are in some way or another made aware of the 
result of their client-side counterparts’ evaluation. This can be done via feedback, 
which, as defined earlier, differs from sanctions and rewards by being free of 
consequences; or via sanctions and rewards. Arguably, sanctions and rewards can be 
instigated without any feedback, but in most cases sanctions and rewards are 
accompanied by some feedback, implicitly or explicitly.  Therefore, the question is: 
Are they made aware of these evaluations? And if so, how? 
As elaborated in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ the vendor-side actors with 
onsite experience are repeatedly being praised for their effort and their business 
understanding in front of their colleagues during the client-side visit at the OMC. This 
is certainly a very direct and public form of feedback. Additionally, I have witnessed 
several instances where the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors are thanked and praised 
for doing a good job in meetings at the client headquarters in Copenhagen. On other 
occasions, I have seen how client-side actors approach them for their input or help on 
specific matters. In such situations they are approached with sentences such as “I need 
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your help on this matter” or “Do you know how…” which clearly signals that their 
professional abilities are valued. But the way the client-side actors approach them also 
shows that they are treated as equals – that they are a part of the in-group (Kanter & 
Corn, 1994), which is also recognized by the vendor-side actors working onsite, 
themselves (Interview #5, #9, #10).  
This sort of appreciation is of course not concrete feedback on their adherence to 
client-side values and norms, but rather related to their professional abilities. However, 
I argue that such direct feedback on value and norm adherence is seldom found, unless 
a previous and specifically noticed lack of adherence to such norms and values has 
warranted appreciation due to changed workplace behavior. Because norms and values 
are essentially invisible and taken-for-granted by the actors as long as these are not 
faced with alternate and disruptive norms and values, adherence will often not be 
consciously noticed and thus, adherence will not be explicitly recognized. Rather, 
group inclusion, can be interpreted as a sign of adherence to norms and values.    
With regards to rewards and sanctions an offshore outsourcing engagement is 
characterized by organizational boundaries that by the virtue of the form of 
collaboration itself cannot be trespassed. Consequently, rewards and sanctions related 
to career development and monetary incentives are alone decided by the employee’s 
employer. Thus, the client cannot affect career progression or salary levels of the 
vendor-side actors – at least not directly. However, it is very likely that client-side 
praise of specific vendor-side actors has a positive effect on their career progression 
and remuneration. Thus, such praise can be regarded as an indirect reward.  
Additionally, I argue that the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors are also directly 
rewarded as the in-group inclusion is a recognition of their ability to work 
independently and thus with more freedom, higher independent responsibility and less 
formal control as the quote below suggests. 
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“[A]t first when I came here it was all specifications and stuff. The reason is 
they [the Danish employees] did not know if I can do it or not, at the start, so 
it was all specifications and they asked me how many hours you need to do 
it, I need this, I need that, you need to do it fast, and stuffs like that.  So as 
soon as I got it, I mean I came here and I started to interact with them and 
they saw how much we can do. Then it was like you can take how many 
hours you want.” (Interview #5 – vendor-side actor) 
So far in this section I have been occupied with depicting how client-side actors 
perform normative control over the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors. Before moving 
on to look at ‘normative control of the far-away one’s’, I believe it is worthwhile to 
turn the question around and ask how the client-side employees do not perform 
normative control over the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors: As I have pointed out 
earlier in this section the vendor-side actors tend to keep to themselves during informal 
gatherings in the office. They take part without really taking a part so to speak. There 
is definitely a friendly tone between the actors, but they never have lunch together; the 
vendor-side actors never participate in out-of-office gatherings and they are not invited 
to the bi-weekly department meetings, even though the Danish vendor-side actors are 
taking a part in this. 
With one notable exception – a project manager who, in his own words “work a lot on 
establishing personal relations [and have] invited them [the vendor-side actors] home” 
(Interview #1), everybody seems to be contempt to keep a certain distance – and 
thereby not take the next step into normative control.  
Normative control of the ‘distant ones’ 
The collaboration between client-side and vendor-side actors stationed onsite is 
characterized by being informal and the vendor-side actors are perceived by the client-
side actors as having a highly collaborative approach and by being responsible. The 
vendor-side actors stationed onsite are subjected to normative control, which is 
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evaluated by the means of the co-location itself, what Elsbach et al. (2010) would label 
passive face time. This corresponds well with the findings from Chapter V: 
‘Challenged by Distance’, where I conclude that distributed collaboration is 
characterized by perceived difficulties in going directly, knowledge gaps and lack of 
transparency, as the actors engage in what Clark & Brannen (1991) would call the least 
collaborative effort. In other words, they keep communication across geographical 
boundaries at an absolute minimum and most of the time they do not engage in social 
interaction beyond common courtesies and they do not engage in each other’s work-
life, but stick to agreed upon touch points of formal control. As a consequence of this 
mode of least collaborative effort the level of normative control that the actors are able 
to exercise upon each other is limited to standing phone meetings and client-side visits 
to the OMC. Below I will address these groupings of instances of normative control. 
With regards to the standing phone meetings one could argue that these are in fact not 
an instance of normative control, but rather process control as the meetings follow a 
standard script with regards to who say what and when and as the meetings are 
instigated to evaluate and give feedback on process adherence (related to incident 
handling and change management, respectively). However, there is a certain element 
of normative control at play too. In the section on normative control of ‘the near ones’, 
I have elaborated how informality, collaboration and responsibility arguably are 
standard specifications of workplace behavior. During my observation studies I have 
noted how responsibility seems to play a central role in the standing phone meetings, 
while collaboration and informality only play a minor role. That is, the vendor-side 
actors who are perceived as ‘taking responsibility’ at the standing phone meetings are 
positively evaluated by the client-side actors, who also give feedback on the same by 
acknowledging these vendor-side actors’ contribution in public. An example of a 
positive assessment and the following public praise are the incident managers (Field 
Notes 20130911 – see also section on ‘Handling Critical Incidents’). In contrast is the 
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change manager who is perceived as lacking a sense of responsibility (see section on 
‘The Change Management Process’). But beside these examples the standing phone 
meetings are by and large characterized by process focus, where each actor has a well-
described role to fill.  
Apart from the standing phone meetings the only form of normative control that the 
client-side actors engage in towards the vendor-side actors are during the client-side 
visits to the OMC. These visits typically happen twice a year, where a group of actors 
from the client-side spend approximately a week at the OMC. The main encounter 
between the client-side visitors and the non-management vendor-side actors are the 
meetings between the client-side actors involved in IT operations and representatives 
for the different functional areas (commonly referred to as ‘tracks’). In some cases 
these meetings are attended by the track lead and a few more members of the track, and 
in some cases all track members are joining – that latter only in cases where the team is 
quite small in terms of headcounts. During these meetings the vendor-side track lead 
and other meeting participants are invited to present successes, challenges and 
suggestions for improvements.  
These meetings has a clear notion of normative control, where the client-side actors to 
a large extent impose their understanding on what “good” work is on the vendor-side 
actors, who are expected to show tokens of both collaboration and responsibility by the 
means of coming up with suggestions for improvements. A detailed analysis of these 
meetings will be given in the next chapter, ‘Trusting Across Cultures’, where I will 
show how these meetings, as instances of presentational rituals (Kunda, 1992) seek to 
impose the client-side workplace behavior on the vendor-side actors.  
Adherence to the standard specifications as laid out by the client-side management is 
evaluated positively, whereas lack of adherence to this standard specification is 
evaluated quite negatively to an extent where the client-side actors in one instance “get 
furious” (Field Notes 20130502). It seems that the normative control performed during 
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these sessions is not withstanding as the client-side actor’s experience that after 
returning home “it is the same old story as before we visited” (Interview #12). I 
speculate that this may be because the vendor-side actors are indeed receiving positive 
feedback on adherence to the standard specification, after their presentation, but there 
is no reward attached what so ever. That is, the client-side employees fail at showing 
that collaboration and taking responsibility, understood as adherence to standard 
specification, actually matter to them. 
Control Mechanisms’ Influence on Trust 
So far in this chapter I have shown the client-side actors make use of control 
mechanisms. In this section I will discuss how the use of control mechanisms affects 
trust building and trust maintenance in the outsourcing collaboration. I will do so by 
applying a notion of control mechanisms as substitutes, catalysts and inhibitors to trust 
as described in the theoretical section of this chapter. 
Control as a Trust Substitute 
Throughout this chapter we have seen examples of formal control that suggest that 
control is indeed a substitute for trust. With regards to output control the SLA 
measurements, the monthly follow up on the same and the financial sanctions that are 
contractually put in place to ensure adherence to contractual agreements suggest that 
output control is a trust substitute. Actors from both organizations acknowledge the 
need for output control. One of the client-side actors with management responsibility 
considers the contractual underpinning of the outsourcing collaboration as “very 
important”, while a vendor-side actor says that it is “extremely important” and adds 
that without contractual underpinning “any supplier would cut corners” (Field Notes 
20140129) 
The underlying assumption seems to be that while both parties agree that the 
partnership must be mutually beneficial, they are, at the same time inherently 
opportunistic. One example of this is the recent change in the number of onsite field 
186 
operators deployed by the vendor-side organization. As one of the vendor-side actors 
told me, the vendor has decided to cut down on these field-operators, whose purpose is 
to make sure that physical equipment, such as printers and network devices, are 
replaced or fixed in cases of failure. The consequence is, in the vendor-side actor’s 
own words that “we may not be able to meet the SLA requirements” (Field Notes 
20140129). However, due to the relatively high costs of having field operators 
stationed across Denmark ready to service the client’s remote offices, the vendor 
assesses that it is a financially more sound decision to accept penalties for non-
compliance with SLA requirements than to endure the running costs of having field 
operators. Thus, with regards to SLA measurements the assumption that the other party 
will act in an opportunistic manner, and thus is not to be trusted, requires adequate 
controls in place; control becomes a substitute for trust.  
With regards to process control, the ITIL-based standard specifications are arguably 
also an instance of control as a trust substitute. The logic seems to be that an elaborate 
process framework warrants the dutiful performance of vendor-side actors. Thus, 
process control is a substitute for trust as standard specifications, evaluation, feedback 
and rewards and sanctions render trust in the vendor-side actors unnecessary. However, 
there is another aspect to this too: While rewards and sanctions related to output 
controls are aimed the organizational level, the rewards and sanctions related to 
process control are aimed at a personal level. In the analysis above I have shown how 
on one side the incident managers are personally rewarded with recognition based on a 
positive evaluation of the incident handling process, whereas the change manager as 
well the technician attributed the responsibility for ‘the mother of all incidents’ are 
personally sanctioned based on a negative evaluation of the their compliance with 
processes. That is, control can be a catalyst to trust insofar adherence to standard 
specifications is evaluated positively, and an inhibitor to trust insofar adherence to 
standard specification is evaluated negatively. In the following two sections I will take 
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a closer look at control as a trust catalyst and control as an inhibitor to trust, 
respectively. 
Control as a Trust Catalyst 
As argued above it seems that positive evaluations of adherence to standard 
specifications of process control are a catalyst for trust in the person that is perceived 
to embody the process. If we look towards prior theoretical findings, this is indeed 
interesting. Das & Teng (1998) argue that “the nature of formal controls is at odds with 
a trusting environment, which suggests a negative relationship between formal control 
and trust level” (p. 501), which leads them to propose that “deployment of formal 
control mechanisms will undermine the level of trust among partners” (ibid.). The 
analytical findings of this chapter, suggest that this it not so. Rather, control can, 
insofar adherence to standard specifications is evaluated positively, in fact be a catalyst 
to trust. By the means of the analysis of this chapter I have shown that process control 
can indeed be conducive to trust.  
I argue that the same is the case with regards to output control, however with a 
different focus. In this particular collaboration the control mechanisms that are 
available to the client-side actors are never aimed at controlling the individual vendor-
side actor, but rather aimed at controlling the vendor as a collective. Thus, whether 
output control of individual has a positive catalyzing effect on trust cannot be 
determined in this case. If we consider the effect of collective output control on trust in 
the collective it seems clear from observing the practices at the service delivery 
meetings, that output control at a collective level can also be a trust catalyst. Indeed, 
the output control mechanisms are maintained irrespective of the level of trust, but they 
do so, because they are contractually agreed upon and because they serve as the input 
to settle payments. However, from the meeting I have observed during the client visit 
to the OMC, where the client-side actors praise teams that are constantly “in green” 
(Field Notes 20130910, the client-side actors acknowledge ability and integrity. I argue 
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that this has a positive effect on trust, as lack of trust is more probable for teams that 
have a history of being “in red” rather than for teams that have a history of being “in 
green”. Thus, I do not find support for Aulakh et al’s. (1997) argument that output 
control is negatively related to trust level – on the contrary, output control can also be a 
trust catalyst, insofar the measurements reveal a positive result. 
In a similar vein I have shown how normative control can also be a catalyst to trust. 
This finding is in line with Das & Teng’s (1998) proposition that “deployment of 
social control mechanisms will enhance the level of trust among partners”(p. 501).  
“In the beginning, as soon as they give us a specification, they say that it has 
to be done in like two-three days […] otherwise there will be a breach, a fine 
[…] As soon as we gain some trust, I was able to say: “No, we need some 
more time”. And they say yes, they believe that [it is] reasonable and they 
agree to it.” (Interview #5 – vendor-side actor) 
Thus, the normative control that is being performed on vendor-side actors stationed 
onsite is conducive for trust development. In the last chapter ‘Challenged by Distance’ 
I have argued that co-location is conducive to trust development; and in this chapter I 
have shown how co-location goes hand in hand with normative control. Thus, the 
client-side actors evaluate the onsite vendor-side actors on adherence to the client-side 
actors’ standard specifications of workplace behavior – that is, the expressed values of 
informality, collaboration and responsibility. Arguably, this normative control is an 
unavoidable companion to co-location. I propose that there are two different ways in 
which the normative control that accompanies co-location is a catalyst to trust 
development: First, co-location is conducive to an increased propensity to trust when 
the client-side actors acknowledge that the vendor-side actors “are like us”. Second, 
co-location is conducive to cognition-based trust when the client-side actors 
acknowledge that the vendor-side actors “work like us”.  
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‘You Are Like Us’ 
As soon as the vendor-side actors who are stationed onsite were moved into the client-
side IT department to sit close by the client-side actors I experienced a change: From 
being ‘The Indians’ the onsite vendor-side actors were all of a sudden not anonymous 
resources anymore, but people with names. I argue that what is at stake here is a shift 
from perceiving them as resources to perceiving them as fellow human beings; 
someone one cannot overlook, as they are immediately present; someone who for the 
most part “are like us”: They come to work every day, they have lunch every day, they 
interact, they are approachable – in short “they are like us”.  
In the next chapter I will unfold this argument in much greater detail and I will show 
how stereotyping (i.e. ‘The Indians) is counterproductive to trust development. For 
now, I will merely claim that as the values to which the client-side actors advocate for 
are repeatedly evaluated as standard specifications to which the onsite vendor-side 
actors adhere to, by the means of co-location only, the client-side actors’ propensity to 
trust the onsite vendor-side actors will increase. Thus, co-location is conducive to an 
increased propensity to trust as the client-side actors, by the means of normative 
control acknowledge that “you are like us”. 
‘You Work Like Us’ 
My second proposition is that co-location is conducive for cognition-based trust when 
the client-side actors acknowledge that the vendor-side actors “work like us”. It 
follows the same line of argument as above, however with a focus on how the co-
located actors not only are closer together, but also work closer together. In ‘Chapter 
X: Passive Face Time and Active Trust’ I have shown how cross-locational 
collaboration is impeded by perceived difficulties of ‘going directly’, perceived lack of 
knowledge among the offshore vendor-side actors and perceived lack of transparency.  
Furthermore, I have shown that these challenges are rendered obsolete when the actors 
are co-located. I have highlighted numerous examples on how the onsite vendor-side 
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actors are evaluated as adhering to the three standard specifications of workplace 
behavior, namely informality, collaboration and responsibility. These evaluations are 
the results of normative control only. That is, the onsite vendor-side actors are not 
evaluated differently when it comes to adherence to standard specifications of process 
control. In fact, they are not evaluated on adherence to the ITIL-based processes at all, 
but solely on their behavior at work. And finally, given the output control mechanisms’ 
sole focus on organizational performance and not individual ditto they are no evaluated 
on output control either. Thus, co-location is conducive to cognition-based trust as the 
client-side actors by the means of normative control acknowledge that “you work like 
us”. 
Control as an Inhibitor to Trust  
Finally, control can be an inhibitor to trust, which for instance is the case with the 
change management process where the negative evaluation of adherence to the 
standard specification has a negative impact on the change manager, who is perceived 
as not taking adequate responsibility. I have highlighted earlier how the incident 
managers are rewarded based on positive evaluation of process adherence – in this case 
it is the opposite: Negative evaluations leads to sanctions. 
But there is another and more subtle way in which control is an inhibitor to trust: I 
argue that the standard specification of output, i.e. output control, even though mostly 
evaluated positively by the client-side actors are an inhibitor to trust. While the output 
controls do on one hand act as a trust substitute (as argued above) they are at the same 
time inhibiting trust as the very focus of the output control is on contract adherence. 
Such adherence stands in contrast to the values that the client-side actors perceive as 
central as ‘responsibility’ and ‘collaboration’ suggest something that exceeds mere 
adherence to SLA’s. That is, output control effectively hinders the offshore vendor-
side actors to show responsibility and collaborative efforts as the output control rigidly 
summarizes their effort into measurements that render the individual contribution of 
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offshore vendor-side actors invisible. These offshore vendor-side actors are faceless 
resources – a point I will address more thoroughly in the next chapter. Piccoli & Ives 
(2003) rightly claim that “by their very nature, behavior control mechanisms reward 
compliance with the given rules and procedures. As a consequence, teams are likely to 
pay significant attention to the requirements” (p. 368). I argue that this it not only the 
case for behavior control (that is, in my terminology: process control, ref. the 
theoretical section in this chapter), but also output control, which is in line with Gopal 
& Gosain (2013) who finds that “outcome-based controls are effective in addressing 
the outcomes of choice positively but have possible negative implications” (p. 344) In 
the same line of thinking Weibel (2007) states that “formal control seems to be a 
double-edged sword. It may complement trustworthiness and trust but can also have a 
harmful effect on employees’ trustworthiness and thus negatively affect trust” (p. 511), 
which indeed is the case here. 
A Strategy of Intelligently Applied Control  
“The best device for creating trust may be to establish and support 
trustworthiness […] by applying the right form of managerial control in the 
right way, which is in a nutshell a managerial control based on participation 
and two-way communication” (Weibel, 2007: 513) 
Conventional wisdom regards trust and control as two means to lower risk perception 
and increase confidence (Das & Teng, 1998). Control is seen as a token of lack of trust 
following a logic where confidence is seen as a constant, which can be met by a certain 
level or trust, or a certain level of control, or a certain mix of trust and control. 
Predominantly, trust and control are seen as each other’s substitute and if we, for some 
reason or another, do not trust, then we mitigate and gain confidence by controlling. 
Following this logic, control becomes a negative manifestation, which suggests that we 
do not, or cannot, trust. Indeed, we can probably all think of scenarios where we have 
been subjected to some form of control, which has evoked thoughts like “doesn’t she 
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trust me?” – indeed control is often perceived as something bad as “control 
mechanisms imply that one party does not trust the other” (Das & Teng, 1998: 501). 
My analysis, however, shows that all forms of control – formal as well as informal – 
can indeed be a catalyst for developing trust. Therefore, I argue that abandoning the 
belief that control is bad and signals lack of trust is productive. Rather than seeing 
control as a display of lack of trust, we should consider control as a wish to establish 
trust. In line with Goold & Campbell (1987) I argue that control provides 
transparency, which in this case of offshore outsourcing, is one of the central problems 
in distributed collaboration; transparency with regards to work processes and with 
regards to commitment and proactivity. On one hand process control provides 
transparency into the work done by the vendor-side actors, which renders assessments 
of trustworthiness possible. In a similar fashion control of workplace behavior, when 
actors are co-located also provides transparency into work processes and thus renders 
assessments of trustworthiness possible. Furthermore control of workplace behavior 
transforms the vendor-side actors from being unknown to being known. They are 
acknowledged as individuals, they are made human. Throughout this chapter as well as 
the last chapter I have highlighted how important face-to-face meetings are to the 
actors. I argue that this is by and large because it makes the individual more 
transparent by the means of normative control, where the actors are able to show what 
“good behavior” is and observe that their counterpart actually conform to this and 
adheres to similar understandings of good behavior.  
In line with Weibel (quoted above) I argue that the right form of control can support 
the possibility to assess trustworthiness. With regards to output control, I have shown 
how this is primarily done at a collective level, which is conducive for developing trust 
in the vendor-side collective’s ability to perform in a way that meets what is 
contractually agreed upon. However, at the same time – given the well known fact that 
what you measure is what you get, or put in more academic terms, paraphrasing Piccoli 
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& Ives (2003), control mechanisms reward compliance; and actors are therefore likely 
to pay significant attention to the requirements that the control mechanisms pose. That 
is, these output control mechanisms will inevitably make the vendor-side actors 
prioritize what is being measured, which – as I will show in the next chapter – can be a 
significant barrier to rendering positive assessments of trustworthiness possible. 
Concluding Remarks 
I sat out to answer two questions in this chapter, namely 1) how control mechanisms 
are used in the collaboration between client and vendor; and 2) how the use of control 
mechanisms affect client-side perceptions of the trustworthiness of vendor-side actors? 
My ambition was to capture a rich and nuanced picture of the use of control 
mechanisms. To accommodate this ambition I have established a framework in which 
both formal control – output control and process control – as well as normative control 
can be captured. Furthermore, with inspiration from Weibel (2007) I have 
operationalized the theoretical framework on control by a matrix structure in which the 
three forms of control (output, process and normative) depict ‘what’ is being 
controlled, while standard specifications; observation, evaluation and feedback; and 
sanctions & rewards capture ‘how’ control is being carried out.  
By the means of this framework I have analyzed the use of control mechanisms in the 
collaboration between client and vendor. Subsequently, I have discussed the effect of 
these control mechanisms on trust and argued that in the empirical case control is in 
some instances a substitute for trust, in other instances a catalyst for trust and finally in 
some instances an inhibitor to trust. While it is well known that trust and control can be 
each others’ substitutes and also that control can inhibit the development of trust, the 
catalyzing effect that control mechanisms can have on establishisment of trust is by 
and large overlooked. Thus, this chapter contributes with an implication to theory, as it 
shows that control can in fact be very productive in our quest to establish trust. 
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In the next chapter I will turn focus to the relationship between trust and culture. 
Arguably, there is a relationship between normative control and culture – and it is, 
among other things, this relationship I will shed light on in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII: TRUSTING ACROSS CULTURES 
Introduction 
Culture. The word bears many meanings and associations. Within research culture has 
come to mean everything from something that separate one nation from another on a 
predefined set of dimensions – a view where Hofstede (1984) is arguably the most 
prominent exponent as “his concept of culture equates very strongly with the 
boundaries of nation-states” (Søderberg & Holden, 2002: 108) – to an interpretive 
understanding, where culture is understood as “shared or partly shared patterns of 
meaning and interpretation” (Søderberg & Holden, 2002: 112). 
Within research on cross-cultural collaboration in virtual teams the interpretive 
approach that I adhere to stands in contrast to the majority of research efforts, where 
the primary focus is on generalized comparisons of national cultural differences. This 
functionalists approach is especially dominant within information systems research 
(Leidner & Kayworth, 2006) where national cultures are assumed to be homogeneous 
and relatively stable; and measurable according to a set of universally applicable value 
dimensions. Leidner & Kayworth (2006) have reviewed 82 articles on IT and culture 
within the information systems field and identify two streams of research, where the 
largest stream studies the impact of national cultures and predominantly relies on 
Hofstede’s five values dimensions (power distance, individualism/collectivism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and femininity vs. masculinity, short or long term time 
orientation) or other types of value dimensions, such as Hall’s (1976) notion of high-
context cultures versus low-context cultures. The other stream examines organizational 
cultures; and does so by relying on generalized values too. Leidner & Kayworth (2006) 
conclude that only a few studies go beyond the study of values. 
However, the heavy reliance on value dimensions does not stand uncontradicted. 
Leung et al. (2005) advocate the need to study how various levels of culture interact 
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dynamically to form and change a working culture and Brannen & Salk (2002) suggest 
that social interaction and the negotiation of meaning in global teams should be studied 
in order to understand the perceptions of culture and cross-cultural collaboration of the 
actors involved in global team work. 
Jackson & Aycan (2006) suggest that cross-cultural researchers should depart with the 
functionalist research agenda and its heavy reliance on cultural values and rather adopt 
an interpretivists perspective. In line with Brannen & Salk (2002), Søderberg & 
Holden (2002), Jackson & Aycan (2006) and Marrewijk (2010) I adhere to such an 
interpretive understanding of culture. By adhering to this perspective I reject that we 
can look at dichotomies such as India/Denmark, client/vendor or IT-development/IT-
operations as a priori constructs. This does not mean that I reject the possibility that 
for instance nationality may have a significant impact on the collaboration but rather 
that in order to understand if and how culture plays a role in the collaboration we must 
follow how culture unfolds in practice. That is, we need to construct an a posteriori 
understanding of culture and cultural differences by following how the actors make 
sense of each other, how they establish boundaries and construct in-groups and out-
groups (Tajfel, 1981; Kanter & Corn, 1994). That is, we must make sense of culture as 
being embedded in practice and thus understand culture by the means of investigating 
how it is enacted in the concrete empirical setting. In the specific context of this thesis 
the term cross-cultural collaboration can thus be attributed many different meanings: It 
could be about the collaboration between Danish and Indian actors; it could be about 
collaboration between actors from two different entities; it could be about collaboration 
across professional cultures. It is potentially none of the above and at the same time 
potentially all of the above or something completely different! 
The research question I aim to answer in this chapter reads: How is vendor-side actors’ 
trustworthiness affected by enactments of cultural boundaries? 
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Before commencing one thing is important to note: In line with the interpretivists 
perspective I adhere to it is not the intention of this chapter to explain culture by 
establishing causal relations between culture and action. Rather, it is the ambition to 
identify the cultures and the associated values and interpretations in the empirical 
settings in order to achieve an understanding on how the cultural groupings specific to 
the empirical setting affect perceived trustworthiness.  
In order to answer the question I will first attend to understanding how culture as a 
construct is enacted and subsequently relate this to trustworthiness. However, before 
attending to the research question an elaboration of the theoretical positioning I adhere 
to with regards to the term culture is needed. 
Theoretical Underpinning 
Culture: Essence or interpretation? 
Scholars within organization studies have even been involved in so called 
‘culture wars’ (Martin and Frost, 1997) between different paradigmatic 
approaches to the study of organizational cultures. Wars between 
‘functionalists’ referring to cultural systems as ‘essential’ (Schein, 1985) 
and looking for ‘basic assumptions and believes … that operate 
unconsciously’ (Schein, 1985) and ‘interpretivists’ understanding cultures as 
ongoing social constructions (Smircich, 1983) that can be studies using 
qualitative methods like interviews and participant observation (Kunda, 
1992). (Søderberg & Holden, 2002: 107 
As highlighted by Søderberg & Holden (2002) scholars within studies of culture have 
been engaged in a ‘culture war’ with functionalists on one side and interpretivists on 
the other. For instance McSweeney (2002), as a representative of the interpretivists 
view, has provided a substantial critique to Hofstede’s dimensional view of culture. I 
shall refrain from going into detail on all of the five central points of critique that this 
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paper offers and merely agree to Søderberg & Holden’s (2002) conclusion that 
“management academia and business consultants must break out of the dependence on 
Hofstede’s survey and his cultural categorizations and rethink the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of international management in an increasingly 
interdependent, yet culturally diverse, business world” (p. 109). However, I would like 
to emphasize two central points for parting with Hofstede and “his evangelized 
entourage” (McSweeney, 2002: 27) view on culture. First, the presupposition that a 
nation-state is a homogeneous culture, which can be captured by the means of a 
handful of value dimensions, fails to grasp the complexities of culture.  In the case of 
India a large body of literature (Anisya & Annamma, 1994; Chatterjee & Pearson, 
2001; Singh, 1990) has stressed that India has many different cultures and is indeed “a 
complex mosaic of many languages, cultures and religions” (Marrewijk, 2010: 370) 
that is further complicated as the “traditional Indian values are changing in interaction 
with Western values” (ibid.). Second, the presupposition that culture is stable, which 
neglects human agency and thus reduce us all to “cultural dopes” as Garfinkel (1967) 
would say.  
Søderberg & Holden (2002) take the contrary view: We are not cultural dopes, but 
rather humans with agency; and culture is to be understood as shared meaning and 
interpretation that are “produced, reproduced and continually changed by the people 
identifying with them and negotiating them in the course of social interaction. People’s 
identification with and affiliation to a multiplicity of different cultures – for example 
national, ethnic, organizational, professional, gender and generation cultures – are thus 
subject to change, and boundaries between cultural communities become fluid and 
contingent” (Søderberg & Holden, 2002: 112).  
By adhering to the notion from Søderberg & Holden (2002) that culture is inherently 
unstable I do not suggest that culture cannot have a stabilizing effect. Rather, I argue, 
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in line with Swidler (1986) that actors and culture must be understood as embedded 
into each other.  
“Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward 
which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, 
skills and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’. (Swidler, 
1986: 273) 
Swidler (1986) elaborates that such “strategies of action” are not strategies in a 
conventional sense, namely as a “plan consciously devised to attain a goal” (Swidler, 
1986: 277), but rather “a general way of organizing action” (ibid.), which affect 
people’s actions and thus “people do not build lines of action from scratch, choosing 
actions one at a time as efficient means to given ends” (ibid.). Neither do they conform 
to a pre-defined set of values as a “culture is not a unified system that pushes action in 
a consistent direction. Rather, it is more like a ‘tool kit’ or repertoire from which actors 
select differing pieces for constructing lines of action” (ibid.). That is, culture affects 
people, and people affect cultures – we are not cultural dopes, nor are we hyper-
muscular actors, whose actions, convictions, values and norms stand unaffected by the 
cultures we belong to.  
How to Analyze Culture? 
By adhering to an interpretivists’ understanding of culture one is faced with the 
challenge of ‘how to analyze culture’. Given the absence of predefined and readily 
available dimensions that can be quantified we must find other ways of understanding 
culture as it unfolds in practice – we must develop a terminology for understanding 
culture. In this chapter I will be analyzing culture by first identifying the social 
constructions of groups among the actors and subsequently by analyzing how 
boundary objects and presentational rituals influence cultural boundaries. Below I will 
outline the three theoretical constructs. 
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Actor-level Construction of Groups 
If we are to take serious the break with the functionalist tradition in cross-cultural 
research we must – as mentioned in the introduction – also break with the notion that 
identify cultural dichotomies a priory. Consequently, we cannot for instance 
investigate cultural differences between an Indian and a Danish team or between a 
management and an engineering team without first qualifying that such dichotomous 
grouping is in fact present in the concrete empirical setting. Put differently, the mere 
fact that one group of actors has a different religion, a different socio-economic 
background and has been enrolled in a different educational system than another group 
of actors does not necessarily entail perceptions and enactment of cultural boundaries 
in the actual collaboration between these two groups. Thus, we cannot assume that 
cultural differences necessarily play a role in collaboration between for instance Danes 
and Indians. Therefore, any interpretivists’ investigation of cross-cultural collaboration 
must depart from the actors’ perceptions of cultural boundaries and not from 
presupposed categories. Even though a significant body of literature suggests that thee 
are cultural differences between Europeans and Indians working together in knowledge 
intensive global teams (see for instance Krishna et al., 2004; Marrewijk, 2010) an 
interpretivists approach must take departure in the actor’s own perceptions and only a 
posteriori construct cultural dichotomies based on identified cultural difference. 
Arguably, there are two ways in which such an investigation can be conducted. One 
approach is to investigate the meanings and interpretations of what constitute good 
behavior, quality, a contribution, power, and so forth among the empirical actors; and 
based on this theoretically a posteriori construct cultural groupings. Another approach 
– and the one I am pursuing – is to investigate how the empirical actors construct us-
and-them dichotomies (Kanter & Corn, 1994; Cramton & Hinds, 2005) – that is, 
groups – and subsequently make efforts to understand the actors’ reasoning behind 
constructing these groupings.  
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In a recent article Jensen & Nardi (2014) follows how the actors make uses of the word 
culture themselves, when describing their daily collaboration. Their aim is to 
understand “how informal patterns of closure [are] enacted in cross-national 
collaboration” (Jensen & Nardi, 2014: 2) in an empirical setting that bears resemblance 
to mine as they also deal with offshoring of IT services, however to the Philippines and 
in a captive environment.  
The method of analysis used by Jensen & Nardi (2014) arguably catches the rhetorical 
use of the term culture. However, if the research ambition is to understand how culture 
in a broader sense than the rhetorical use of the word culture, this analytical approach 
cannot stand alone as it does not recognize (and does not claim to recognize) that 
something that can reasonably be argued as being related to culture, can in fact by 
spoken of as something quite different by the actors. In their study, Jensen & Nardi 
(2014) conclude: “only Danish employees construct a cultural ‘other’, while Filipino 
employees spoke of problems of coordination, communication, and professionalism in 
their efforts to manage collaboration” (Jensen & Nardi, 2014: 12). In their rhetorical 
analysis culture is only culture if spoken of as culture. However, bearing the definition 
of culture that I subscribe to in mind – namely as “shared or partly shared patterns of 
meaning and interpretation” (Søderberg & Holden, 2002: 112) – we must conceive of 
culture as something more than a rhetorical construct. Specifically, as groups. Thus, in 
this chapter I will analyze culture as actor-level social constructions of groups by 
drawing on Kanter & Corn’s (1994) notions of in-groups and out-groups. Following 
this line of thinking one could potentially come to the conclusion that despite the fact 
that Jensen & Nardi’s (2014) Filipino interviewees do not speak of culture directly, 
they may in fact construct cultural dichotomies insofar they rhetorically present the 
coordination, communication and professionalism challenges as related to such 
groupings.  
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Therefore, to understand how cultural boundaries are enacted I will draw on inspiration 
from Jensen & Nardi (2014), but extend the scope of the analysis. My analysis is not a 
rhetorical analysis of the use of the word culture, but rather an analysis of how 
groupings are socially constructed and enacted among the empirical actors. 
Furthermore, after identifying such groups I will analyze how the actors’ give meaning 
to these groups by focusing on the perceived differences between them.  
Boundary Objects 
In the literature review in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ I have highlighted how 
collaboration across physical distance has been – and still is – considered a challenge 
to practitioners. Elsbach and her colleagues (2010) have shown how personal traits 
such as reliability, dedication, and accountability are assessed more positive when 
actors are co-located and in his cross-disciplinary review on trust in virtual teams and 
Berry (2013) concludes that the technological advancements over the last almost 
fifteen years since Olson & Olson (2000) published their widely cited article ‘Distance 
Matter’ has failed to eliminate the challenges that geographical distribution poses. 
In Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ I have analyzed how distance affects trust 
building in an environment characterized by geographical distribution of actors, but I 
have done so with only limited focus on the artifacts used in the collaboration between 
the actors from the two organizational entities. Researchers within the fields of 
Computer Supported Collaboration Work (CSCW) and Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI) have put studies of artifacts such as documents and web-based collaboration 
tools at the center stage; and according to Christensen & Bjørn (2014) it “is evident 
from this research that documents are woven into cooperative work activities as part 
and parcel of those activities, rather than as secondary tools where information is 
passively stored and retrieved” (p. 2452). Christensen & Bjørn (2014) continue by 
stressing that “[r]ecent studies have pointed out that documents are not to be regarded 
as isolated artifacts, but rather as intertwined in heterogeneous networks of actors, 
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activities, and other artifacts inherent to cooperative work practice” (ibid.). In a similar 
vein Barrett & Oborn state in their 2010 article on the use of boundary objects in cross-
cultural software that the “practice of software development incorporates numerous 
objects including requirements specifications (specs) and project management 
methodologies” (Barrett & Oborn, 2010: 1200) aimed at bridging knowledge 
boundaries. The same can be claimed about IT-operations, where boundary objects are 
used in a similar way to convey knowledge, provide transparency and enable 
coordination. 
Barrett & Oborn (2010) define boundary objects – a term originally coined by Star & 
Griesemer (1989) – as “mediating artifacts that have interpretive flexibility and can be 
an important means of achieving collaboration, promoting the sharing of knowledge 
between diverse groups” (Barrett & Oborn, 1200). Their aim is to “understand how and 
why their role and use may facilitate collaboration at one time and contribute to 
conflict at other times within cross-cultural software teams” (ibid.) by shedding light 
on how boundary objects “are brought to life through social interaction as diverse 
actors negotiate collective meaning through and around these objects” (p. 1204). That 
is, Barrett & Oborn (2010) perceive boundary objects as negotiated construct, rather 
than “ascribing the boundary object with essentialist properties” (p. 1204) and 
regarding them as “monolithic autonomous edifices” (p. 1200).  
In line with Barrett & Oborn (2010) I argue, that by focusing on the actors perceptions 
of boundary objects and “the negotiations around the boundary objects as they are used 
in practice” (p. 1215) we can gain a more fine-grained analytical understanding of 
group formation and thus of cultural boundaries in the studied empirical practice as 
“[t]he creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersecting communities” (Bowker & Star, 2000: 297). 
Derived from their analysis of the use of boundary objects Barrett & Oborn (2010) 
corner the term culturizing, which signifies that boundary objects can reify cultural 
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differences which at the outset were identified by the actors but considered as 
unproblematic, but over time becomes challenging. That is, the boundary objects lead 
to cross-cultural conflict. Barrett & Oborn (2010) acknowledge the empirical limitation 
to their findings and urge researchers to draw on their theoretical approach to explore 
the meaning of boundary objects in other empirical settings (Barrett & Oborn, 2010: 
1218). The ambition of this chapter is to do exactly that and by doing so gain a more 
elaborate understanding of the role of culture, than what can be done by the means of 
establishing an understanding of how groups are socially constructed by the involved 
actors. 
Presentational Rituals 
The third analytical construct I will use to understand culture as it unfolds in the 
empirical setting is presentational rituals. Kunda (1992) explained rituals as “a rule-
governed activity of symbolic character which draws the attention of participants to 
objects of thought and feeling which they hold to be of special significance” (Kunda, 
1992: 92) and elaborate that presentational rituals is thus gatherings “where the 
organizational ideology […] is dramatized and brought to life” (p. 93). Such 
presentational rituals are “mechanisms through which certain organizational members 
influence how other members are to think and feel – what they want, what they fear, 
what they should regard as proper and possible, and, ultimately, perhaps, who they are” 
(p. 93).  
By the means of my empirical observation studies it has become clear that Kunda’s 
construct of ‘presentational rituals’ has a significant explanatory power as the 
encounters between the client-side actors and offshore vendor-side actors, when these 
meet in person during the client-side actors visit at the OMC in India, is indeed 
characterized by an agenda of ritualized presentations. 
However, in Kunda’s (1992) perspective ‘certain organizational members’ refer 
primarily to managers and his focal point is inter-organizational rituals. In my 
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empirical setting, where two organizational entities are interacting I will broaden the 
scope of Kunda’s concept to understand how presentational rituals influences the 
actors in the other organization. I will do this by adhering to Kunda’s (1992) three 
types of presentational rituals, namely ‘talking down’, ‘talking across’ and ‘talking 
around’. In Kunda’s intra-organizational perspective ‘talking down’ represent rituals 
where a manager is engaging with subordinates; ‘talking across’ are rituals where 
members of one part of the organization engages with members of another part of the 
organization; and ‘talking around’ represent rituals where peers interact with each 
other, such as work group meetings. 
From the outset inter-organizational rituals are best understood as ‘talking across’. 
However, I argue that even though for instance the CIO from the client organization 
has no formal power over operational staff from the OMC, he is considered to be ‘the 
boss’ by them. Thus, when the client-side actors address the vendor-side OMC staff I 
see it as a ‘talking down’. This argument of power will be unfolded later in this 
chapter. 
Researching Trust in a Cross-Cultural Perspective 
“Is there a universally applicable model of trust and trust development [etic], or do 
people from varying cultures understand and enact trust differently [emic]?” ask Dietz 
et al. (2010; 7) in the introductory chapter to Saunders et al. (2010) book on 
‘Organizational Trust – a cultural perspective’. Despite the title of the book there is to 
a large degree a focus on national culture, where organizations from different countries 
– Germany and Ukraine, France and Lebanon, Nigeria and Ghana, Germany and USA, 
and finally Turkey and China – are compared with regards to various aspects of trust. 
Out of eleven empirical studies in the book, five has a significant focus on the 
differences in national cultures. Despite this the authors claim that they “do not see 
cross-cultural engagement as being limited to national boundaries. Mergers, strategic 
alliances, joint ventures and outsourcing arrangements bring people together from 
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different organizational cultures” (Dietz et al., 2010: 6). While some authors adhere to 
a universalist understanding of culture other see culture as a social construction and the 
conclusion from the final chapter, that some research find that, for instance, the 
trustworthiness characteristics “are universally applicable, there are also culturally 
specific unique manifestations and interpretations of these characteristics in at least 
some countries” (Saunders et al., 2010: 409). 
By taking into account the epistemic stance of social construction I adhere to in this 
thesis, where culture is defined as patterns of meaning and interpretation that is, to 
some extend, shared among its members I argue that the potential to develop an 
universally applicable model of trust and trustworthiness cannot be rule out, but that it 
is however highly unlikely. If meaning and interpretation as such is socially 
constructed among members of a culture, it seems improbable that meanings on what 
constitute trustworthy behavior are universally applicable. Thus, when researching 
trust and trustworthiness across cultures we must keep an eye on the possibility of 
diverse understandings of these constructs. Therefore I argue in the lines of Wright and 
Ehnert who propose that “because trust is dynamic rather than fixed or stable, it should 
be framed as a social construction” (Saunders et al. 2010: 410).  
Regarding trust as a dynamic, negotiated and pluralistic construct introduces a number 
of complexities: First, if meaning is socially constructed and words are 
recontextualized (Brannen, 2004) the word trust itself is bound to have different 
meanings in different contexts. The multitude of definitions introduced over the years 
bear witness to this. As stated in the theoretical framework (Chapter II) I adhere to the 
widely adopted definition from Rousseau et al. (1998) where trust is understood as “a 
psychological state compromising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions and behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 
395). As elaborated in the methodological chapter (Chapter III), I have attended to this 
by consequently refraining from asking about ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ during 
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interviews and informal conversations with the actors. Rather, I have focused on their 
expressed accept of vulnerability to other parties and their assessments of other’s 
intentions and behavior.  
Second, if meaning and interpretation is socially constructed, it is also highly probable 
that the characteristics of trustworthiness vary across cultures. While ability, integrity 
and benevolence after Mayer et al. (1995) has been widely recognized as antecedents 
of trust and characteristics of trustworthiness, there are indeed research that suggests 
that these characteristics can vary across cultures. For instance, Tan & Chee (2005) 
reported that in Confucian settings filial piety, diligence, effort, harmonious 
relationship in office, humility and magnanimous behavior are significant 
characteristics of trustworthiness.  
However, I argue that while there may be more trustworthiness characteristics at play 
in given cultural settings, the three “base characteristics” will always be present given 
the definition of trust I adhere to (which I have argued for in Chapter II). Put 
differently, the relationship between ‘behavior’ and ‘intention’ on one side (ref. the 
definition of trust) and ‘ability’, ‘integrity’ and ‘benevolence’ on the other side is quite 
close. ‘Behavior’ can be understood as someone’s ability in conjunction with 
consistent adherence to principles that guide action (integrity); and on the other hand 
‘intention’ can be understood as a trustor’s positive orientation towards a trustee, 
which is benevolence (Dietz et al., 2010: 10). However, this does not rule out that there 
may be more characteristics of trustworthiness than these three that have significant 
impact in various cultures. Thus, the ABI-characteristics are arguably universally 
present as they are tied to the definition itself, but may be supplemented with other 
culture-specific characteristics.  
Third, trust is arguably always context dependent and actor’s propensity to trust does – 
as argued in Chapter II – also influence trust building. Thus, when analyzing how 
culture influences perceived trustworthiness we must look for what they take for 
208 
granted, what is undisputed, what is regarded as bizarre without further argument – in 
other words: we must look for the actors’ propensity to trust, as something shaped by 
their cultural belongings; their meanings and interpretations. 
Understanding Actor-Enactments of Culture 
In the previous chapter I have analyzed how control, formal as well as normative, 
affects trustworthiness in the empirical context of the offshore outsourcing between the 
client and the vendor. In that chapter I stated that I would be looking at control 
primarily as something that the client-side perform on the vendor-side, given the nature 
of the collaboration, where the vendor are delivering services to the client in exchange 
for money. This perspective naturally suggests two distinct groups, namely on one side 
the client-side employees and on the other the vendor-staff employees. However, such 
a perspective only accounts for group formations that are related to legal and 
organizational boundaries, insofar the vendor and the client are indeed two separate 
legal and organizational entities that are formally connected by the means of 
contractual obligation.  
In this chapter I will take a closer analytical look at groups as the actors socially 
construct them. Such groups are not confined to being of a legal or an organizational 
character. In fact, the social constructions of groups offer additional perspectives than 
the underlying understanding of groups that were presupposed in the last chapter. 
However, this does not mean that the grouping related to organizational boundaries is 
artificial. On the contrary, the actor’s repeatedly construct this grouping verbally – it is 
just not the only grouping that is being talked about. 
After analyzing the patchwork of social constructions of groups I will take a closer 
look at how presentational rituals and boundary objects influences cultural groupings. 
Finally, I will connect the analytical findings on culture to the overall research agenda 
trust in globally distributed IT teams.   
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Social Constructions of Groups 
National Stereotyping 
I started this chapter by arguing in the line of Søderberg & Holden (2002) that culture 
should be understood as shared meaning and interpretation and as something that 
dynamically changes over time as it is affected by human agency. This view of culture 
stands in stark contract to the functionalist understanding, where culture to a large 
extent is seen as synonymous with national states. 
Arguably, Hofstede (1984) has made a significant impact on how culture is defined 
and understood – and this both within academia and (perhaps to an even greater 
extend) within practice. In the empirical context I am researching I have repeatedly 
experienced such national stereotyping among the Danish actors, but interestingly, 
only to a very limited extent among the Indian actors. Throughout my interviews and 
informal conversations the Danish actors have repeatedly brought up the notion of 
cultural without me prompting the subject; and when they start talking about culture, it 
is always as something that has to do with national or regional differences. Not 
organizational differences, not professional differences, but differences referring to 
“the other’s” as Indians or, in a few cases, Asians.  
When I started my empirical field work at the client’s head office in Copenhagen, the 
actors were told that I was researching ‘global collaboration’, which prompted several 
of them to talk about national culture. Below are a few excerpts from my field notes 
from the first three weeks: 
- He explained that the Indian work culture is more hierarchical. I asked how this 
manifested itself and he explained that Indian managers micro-manage in the 
sense that for example a technician does not have “the full picture”, but rather 
works on specific instructions from his manager. He noted that this is very 
different than how Danes work, where people are not micro-managed. (Field 
Notes 20130212) 
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- She told me that he was a really good guy, with a very western approach, and 
that he had been working in the UK for years. She added that he was the sort of 
guy they feared to loose, because he is very talented. (Field Notes 20130212) 
- He told me that the manager of the OMC is about to change to a new job. This 
piece of news is circulating in Denmark now, but for some reason, he told me, 
HCL won’t let this out before last minute. He speculated that it is a significant 
difference between the way Danish and Indian organizations function. He said 
that in Danish organizations one would typically make such things public as early 
as possible, while in India it is done last minute. (Field Notes 20130214) 
- She is on the phone and is explaining someone that the problem with Indians is 
that they are not approaching the problems head on. “They always deflect”, she 
says. (Field Notes 20130221) 
Throughout my observation studies I have encountered several such situations, where 
something the Danish actors have observed about the vendor-side organization and 
employees, which stands in contrast to their own way of working, is generalized as “a 
national cultural feature”. Interestingly, only one of them has previous experience in 
working with Indians, for all other’s the collaboration with the vendor is the first time 
they are experiencing working with Indians. Despite this, the cultural stereotyping is 
commonly used among the Danes and the themes are reoccurring. First, Indians are 
perceived as more hierarchical, where employees are micro-managed and receive 
specific instructions from their manager that are not questioned. As a consequence of 
this Indians are perceived as being re-active and not pro-active, as the Danish actors 
perceive themselves to be. Second, Indians are perceived as collectivists, who, 
according to a Danish actor, do not possess “the same kind of feeling of personal 
responsibility, as we do in the west” (Interview #04). Third, Indians are perceived as 
very concerned with maintaining a harmonious relationship and will avoid conflict at 
almost any cost. In the words of one of the Danish actors Indians will always “say yes, 
but if you listen carefully, you know that it is an ‘evasive yes’ […] it is more important 
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to keep the good relation [than to say no], I have experienced that many times” 
(Interview #3). Consequently, it is perceived as necessary to escalate issues 
immediately as lack of progress can be a sign of such an ‘evasive yes’. The quote from 
the client-side CIO sums up the national stereotyping very well: 
Clearly, it is a strength that the employee on the floor in Denmark will not 
accept: “this is not your responsibility, do not think about it, just do your 
work”. It is built in to our society that each and every employee has a high 
capability of abstraction and insists on being involved in decisions. […] 
They have an opinion, and they are not afraid to voice it. And I encourage 
them to do so. This is not the way it is in India, because in Denmark the 
individual is important, which it is not in India […] The individual cannot be 
important there [in India], there are simply too many of them [Indians]. 
(Interview #04 – client-side actor) 
From the outset of the outsourcing collaboration the client organization have had a 
focus on cultural challenges related to working with an Indian vendor. The client-side 
CIO, who bears the overall responsibility for the outsourcing contract, explains that: 
“What we did, before we started in both the Netherlands and Denmark, was 
to hire a consultant, a Danish girl living in India, to do workshops with the 
employees with most contact with HCL and a few from the business side too. 
In the first workshop, attended by approximately twenty people, she [the 
consultant] explained the [cultural] mechanisms. […] At that workshop 
many learned to ‘sit on the other side of the table’ and learn a bit about how 
these people thing and what their frame of reference is. […] We had a lot of 
benefit from that workshop” (Interview #4 – client-side actor) 
The workshop was repeated again after I started doing my observation studies and I 
had a chance to participate as an observer in the session, where fourteen people from 
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the client organization and two native Danish vendor-side actors participated. From the 
outset the consultant conducting the workshop asked what the participants expected to 
gain from participating in the workshop and most answers were in the line of 
“understanding Indian hierarchies”, “understanding the world they live in, their 
religion and family structure and relations”; when does yes mean yes and when does it 
mean no” (Field Notes 20130301). That is, from the outset the expectations were about 
gaining generalized knowledge about India and Indians.  
The consultant presented trivia about India: size, population, religions and languages 
first and then moved on to talk about what she herself called “tendencies in Indian 
work culture” and using the likes of Hofstede (1984) and Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner (1997) to support the claims. While she did make an effort to stress that she was 
painting a generalized picture and that this did not mean that all Indians conform to 
these categories; and furthermore elaborated that cultures are not stable, but can be 
affected by human agency, the participants agenda seemed to be to get exactly that 
generalized picture of how Indians are and how they work. It seemed to me that the 
participants used the workshop to air frustration and to get one-size-fits-all tools to use 
in their daily collaboration with Indians, which was partly (and I expect, 
unintentionally!) catered for by the consultant who repeatedly invited for dichotomous 
views on the collaboration, by asking questions such as “how is the hierarchy different 
in Denmark and in India” (Field Notes 20130301). That is, even though I suspect that 
the purpose of the workshop was not to convey cultural stereotyping as an appropriate 
way of intellectually dealing with cross-national collaboration, this was exactly what 
happened: The client-side actors were confirmed in their stereotypical view of cross-
cultural collaboration. 
In contrast to the Danish client-side actors, the Indian vendor-side actors do not engage 
in national stereotyping of culture. Those who have gained international experiences 
working with client organizations from other countries than Denmark reflect on how 
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working with this client is different, but they do so without stereotyping. This does not 
mean that they do not reflect on the differences they experience, but rather that such 
experiences are conveyed as exactly that – experiences. For instance, a vendor-side 
actor with significant onsite experience tells me that: 
“I have been working with multiple clients and I find the people from 
Copenhagen or Denmark quite calm.  […] Compared to earlier [where] I 
have been working with a German client and the US.  There the work 
pressure is more, but now here you should not feel that you are pressurized 
and I feel very comfortable working here” (Interview #09 – vendor-side 
actor)  
During interviews I have repeatedly asked if the vendor-side actors had experienced 
challenges in their collaboration with the client-side actors. Some of the Indian vendor-
side actors express, in line with the quote above, that they are pleased with working 
with the client-side actors as it is characterized by a relaxed work atmosphere and 
freedom to work independently, while other’s express that they initially were surprised 
by the very direct and sometimes almost rude mode of communication. But unlike the 
client-side actors, the vendor-side actors never seem to generalize. It is never “Danes 
are very direct”, but rather “he is very direct”. Furthermore, such claims are never 
attributed to culture, but rather to communication. In fact, when I have tried to bring 
the topic of culture to the table by specifically asking about cultural challenges, the 
vendor-side actors without onsite experience generally reject that there are any cultural 
challenges, while the vendor-side actors working onsite relate to the question as a 
personal matter, as something not attached to their work. They talk about how the food 
is different in Denmark, how public transportation works, how expensive commodities 
and food is, and how it is difficult to adapt to the cold climate in Denmark. Thus, 
national stereotyping seems to be something that only the client-side actors and the 
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native Danish vendor-side actors engage in. Thus, the social construction of a group 
based on national stereotyping can be illustrated as in figure 7.1 below. 
 
Group by Organization: Vendor vs. Client 
In the case of national belonging only the native Danish client-side actors engage in 
group-constructions based on national stereotyping, but how about organizational 
groupings? As mentioned earlier, the last chapter ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and 
Control’ presupposed two distinct groups separated by organizational boundaries. Are 
such groups merely a priori constructed or are they enacted as social constructions of 
groups too? Unlike the case with national grouping, actors from both organizations 
construct us-and-them dichotomies of ‘client’ and ‘vendor’. However, there is one 
notable exception, namely the vendor-side actors of Danish origin. I will return to this 
particular group later. For now the focus is on the Indian vendor-side actors on one 
side and the client-side actors on the other. 
When interacting with the vendor-side actors, it becomes clear that the notion of ‘the 
client’ bears significance to them. During interviews I have repeatedly found that this 
“significant other”, the client, is at the same time a dichotomous construction of us-
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and-them and at the same time somewhat symbiotic, as the vendor-side actors are 
acutely aware that the, as a service provider, is dependent on ‘them’ as a client. One of 
the vendor-side actors explain his job like this: 
As a service provider it is also a part of your job getting to know them [the 
client] and their mindset and their culture and then you have to modify 
yourself a bit and then you need to do your service.  So, if he [the client] will 
be happy, I will be happy”. (Interview #10 – vendor-side actor) 
The vendor-side actors define themselves as ‘the vendor’, but focusing on the other 
side, the client side. Another vendor-side actor explains “you are not representing 
yourself here” (Interview #09) and elaborates further on the symbiotic client-vendor 
relationship: 
I should give respect to the client who is giving work to me and I should 
respect [the vendor organization] who is paying me for working there. So 
when you start talking or when you are working with the people, you should 
always keep in mind that your parent company and the client both should be 
happy with your things. […]We always try to compensate or balance the 
things. (Interview #09 – vendor-side actor)  
During my interviews with vendor-side actors, there are four words that are repeatedly 
mentioned in connection with the client-vendor relationship: Service, respect, 
understanding and adaptation. That is, they perceive that in order to provide a high-
quality service to the client, they need to respect the client and the client’s needs; and 
they need to understand the way the client-side actors communicate, how they work 
and what their values are and they need to adapt themselves to the client-side’s way of 
working. You need to “modify yourself a bit” (interview #10), or as another one puts 
it: “they [the client] are the ones who is sponsoring this, so I have to adapt” (Interview 
#05) and another explains how she changed the way she works, after arriving in 
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Denmark: “I saw the way the people are working, so I similarly started molding myself 
to work like that” (Interview #09) 
The client-side actors construct the client-vendor dichotomy in a similar way. Among 
the client-side actors there is a clear construction of ‘a them’, the vendor and ‘an us’ 
the client, where the vendor is expected to deliver services according to contractual 
specifications and agreed-upon processes. Thus, the notion of ‘service’, which has 
been brought up repeatedly by the vendor-side actors (as explained above) is similar in 
the eyes of the client-side actors. With regards to understanding and adaptation, several 
client-side actors have expresses that they “don’t understand the hierarchy and who to 
talk to” and that they “do not know the [vendor’s] organization” (Field Notes 
20130301). Many of the client-side actors express that they “don’t have a team” (Field 
Notes 20130301), signifying that they perceive a lack of unity between the vendor-side 
and the client-side, which arguably enhances to us-and-them distance. Also, as one of 
the client-side manager tell me there is a clear feeling of us-and-them with regards to 
task distribution and helpfulness: The client-side actors rigidly adhere to 
understandings of ‘what is your job and what is mine’. The manager explains that he 
had urged some of the client-side actors to help the vendor-side actors to which the 
other client-side actors answered “why should we do their job” (Interview #03), to 
which the manager argued that against the silo approach and stressed that “your job is 
really to make sure that the overall collaboration runs smoothly” (Interview #03). 
However, the client-side manager assesses that the silo thinking is very predominant. 
At the aforementioned culture workshop one of the native Danish vendor-side actors 
explained that the vendor organization is deeply engaged in Corporate Social 
Responsibility activities and gave a few examples. A client-side employee assessed 
that  “It’s good to hear that [the vendor] has such a good profile. I am happy to know 
that, but I would have appreciated to know that before”, which all the other workshop 
participants agreed to. Thus, the group construction of ‘the vendor’ is not as strong 
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from the client-side, as the group construction of ‘the client’ is from the vendor-side 
actors’ perspective. Rather, the client-side actors tend to talk in more generalized terms 
about ‘the Indians’.  
With regards to adaptation to the vendor’s way of working, there are different opinions 
on the client-side. Some are critically stating that adaptation to for instance another 
work culture that “it is not us who are supposed to work on this. They are the supplier” 
(Field Notes 20130301), while others have a more accommodating approach, where it 
is acknowledged that “we need to support [the vendor] to add value” as one of the 
managers explained it at one of the steering group meetings (Field Notes 20130501). 
Another client-side actor elaborates: 
“We have a situation where we have this vendor and we cannot change that. 
So, we must get the best out of it and we don’t do that by being stubborn. We 
do that by trying to meet people where they are. It would surely be great if 
they just understood everything, but that cannot be expected. There are two 
sides to collaborating and we have an equally big obligation to understand 
how they work as they have to understand how we work” (Interview #06 – 
client-side actor) 
As stated earlier the Danish vendor-side employees are a notable exception to the 
otherwise clear-cut us-and-them dichotomy with ‘the client’ on one side and ‘the 
vendor’ on the other. On one side these native Danish vendor-side actors acknowledge 
that they are a part of the vendor organization, on the other they have historically been 
employees of the client organization, before the first outsourcing wave in 2007, where 
they were transferred to the first outsourcing partner. When the current vendor took 
over, these employees were transferred and at the same time they moved back in to the 
client’s headquarters. During the first outsourcing contract they were situated at the at-
that-time vendors premises, physically detached from their old colleagues from the 
client company – now they are back. Their historical relations to the client-side actors; 
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their long-lasting affiliation with the IT-department in the client organization; their 
knowledge of the business and the IT-platform; their network; and their shared mother 
tongue and personal friendships with the client-side actors brings about a close 
affiliation with the client organization and its employees.  
During one of my first interviews, I asked one of these native Danish vendor-side 
actors how he would characterize his relationship to the client organization – whether it 
was that of an employee of that of a vendor. He reciprocated like this: 
“Hehe, I ask myself that too from time to time. Some [of the client-side 
actors] would say that it is a very collegial relationship – and in many ways 
it is. But there is no doubt that it is a client-vendor relationship, however 
with a deeper insight into the other organization and more openness that if I 
was an external hire – if I didn’t have relations within the organization. […] 
Uh, it’s a difficult question. What is a client-vendor relationship at all? I 
believe I have some prerequisites for being much more collegial, but when 
we moved back here [the Director of IT-operation in the client organization] 
said that they would like that we [the Danish vendor-side actors] become a 
part of the department and colleagues on same terms as the rest. I told him, 
well I didn’t, but I do not believe that this will ever happen because at the 
end of the day we are external hires. Okay, we are participating in the 
department meetings and from time to time we go out for a beer with them 
[the client-side actors] and we are invited to all such things; and we do get 
all sorts of information that a supplier normally wouldn’t. I mean, I can hear 
them when they are negotiating with [the vendor]. I can also hear them when 
they negotiate with third parties. They are standing right next to my table, 
right – and they are speaking openly about how negotiations progresses and 
how they plan on handling it […] it is a question of how I act on it. If I were 
to interfere every time I heard something or give input from a [vendor-side] 
 219 
perspective on for instance department meetings – well, I can do that some 
times, but it is really important to know the ‘visiting hours’. One thing is to 
hear something, but if it is not appropriate I should not interfere […] It is 
also important that I don’t pass on everything I hear [to the vendor-side 
colleagues]” (Interview #02 – vendor-side actor) 
According to this native Danish vendor-side actor there is a collegial feeling between 
him and the client-side actors, but that the same time they are not, given his 
organizational affiliation, real colleagues; and to balance this requires 
fingerspitzengefühl – that is, great situational awareness, and the ability to respond 
most appropriately and tactfully in situations where he gains privileged information, 
that is normally not available to vendor-side actors. At the same time the Danish 
vendor-side actors have an organizational affiliation with the vendor. However, this 
affiliation is repeatedly described as very superficial. The native Danish vendor-side 
actors feel that they are forgotten:  
“They are clearly forgetting us […] sometimes I call the bosses and tell them 
to remember us. Then they reply that they agree they should involve us more; 
remember to communicate and set up weekly information meetings. Then I 
say, ‘listen, why don’t you just invite me for the internal meeting we have in 
[the vendor organization]’, because there are such internal meetings. I 
doubt that people never communicate, right! […] I am involved in some 
monthly meetings, some internal meeting, but not nearly enough. And I try to 
fight my way in” (Interview #02 – vendor-side actor) 
Another native Danish vendor-side actor explains that he is challenged by lack of 
insights into how the organization works and that he does not know “how the Indian 
way of working is and that’s a bit of a downside for me because they seemingly is a 
hierarchy, but nobody is really willing to tell exactly how the hierarchy works and 
who’s above, who in it because initially when it started off they all seemingly were on 
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the same level, but I am slowly working out that that person is slightly more senior to 
that person.  So now I’d like to know! […] When I’m on the phone, there’s usually one 
guy who takes control.  So I’m assuming that he is the leader figure of these boards” 
(Interview #07). Thus, the organizational hierarchies are unfamiliar to the native 
Danish vendor-side actors, who further more adds, with a spark of sarcasm that the 
lack of such knowledge “does present unique challenges” (Interview #07) and the fact 
that one of the Danish vendor-side actors have visited India combined with the vendor 
organization’s lack of presence in terms of a administrative functions in Denmark, at 
the time when they were transferred to the vendor, meant that “getting into the 
company was a strange experience” (Interview #7). From informal conversations it has 
become clear to me that the Danish vendor-side employees do feel a responsibility 
towards the vendor organization as an employer, but do not feel as a part of the 
organization. This was made even clearer when I attended a birthday celebration in the 
IT-department a little before summer vacation: While eating a slice of cake I talked 
with another native Danish vendor-side actor about holiday plans. He told me that he 
would be working most of the summer and that he would be “the only [vendor-side] 
employee at work” for a two-week period as the rest were on holiday. I asked him if all 
four of the Indian vendor-side actors would go on holiday too, to which he replied: 
“Oh, I forgot about them. I don’t know. They will probably be in [office]” (Field Notes 
20130613). That is, he forgot about the four vendor-side colleagues sitting less than ten 
meters away from his desk.  
Thus, the construction of groups based on organizational affinity can be as done in 
figure 7.2 below. The red circles illustrate the stable groupings of client and vendor 
respectively and the dotted circles depict the weaker groupings constructed by the 
Danish vendor-side employees.  
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Group by Location: Onsite versus Offshore 
In addition to construction of groups based on national stereotyping and organizational 
affiliation respectively, the client-side actors together with the vendor-side actors who 
are working onsite engage in group construction on another dichotomy based on 
geographical distribution, namely that of onsite versus offshore actors. As I have 
argued in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’, the cross-locational collaboration is 
characterized by three challenges. First, the actors find ‘going directly’ difficult: That 
is, the actors find approaching their counterparts from the other organizational entity 
difficult, when they have not met face-to-face, as encounters in physical proximity 
facilitates communication and social interaction, which helps the actors to get to know 
each other. Consequently, physical distance becomes mental distance.  
Second, the collaboration is challenges by lack of knowledge among the offshore 
actors, who, according to the client-side actors, require much help in performing tasks 
they should be able to solve by themselves. The offshore vendor-side actors are 
constructed as a group of expertise-seeking novices, by themselves as well as by the 
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client-side actors. In contract, the onsite vendor-side actors are repeatedly 
acknowledged for their abilities to understand the core business of the client company.  
Third, among the client-side actors there is a perception that “things are just hidden or 
‘forgotten’ if they [the vendor staff] don’t know how to solve them” (Interview #06) 
and thus they feel that there is a lack of transparency of what the offshore team is 
doing, whereas the collaboration between client-side actors and onsite vendor-side 
actors is characterized by ongoing interaction and consequently by significantly more 
transparency. 
These three challenges of cross-locational collaboration has a significant impact on the 
collaboration, as the onsite vendor-side employees are used boundary spanners and 
gate keepers (which will be the topic Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness 
Boundary’) and arguably the differences in social interaction and levels of business 
knowledge can be seen as a social construction of groups: On one side, the 
knowledable onsite staff and on the other side the offshore expertise-seeking novices – 
a perspective which is shared among both the client-side actors, the onside vendor-side 
actors, the offshore vendor-side actors and furthermore stressed by the vendor-side 
management, who point out that onsite vendor-side staff should not attend to lower 
priority and trivial tasks (Field Notes 20130910).  
Consequently, the onsite vendor-side staff become included in the group of the 
‘knowledable few’ as they “gain understanding of our systems and our business” 
(Interview #04). The social construction of the onsite group can be illustrated as in 
figure 7.3 below. 
 223 
 
Establishing Unity: We are in it Together 
So far I have looked at three different instances of social constructions of groups. All 
three have one common denominator, namely that the constructions both include and 
exclude actors in the groups. The last social construction of groups I will elaborate on 
differs from this, as it only seeks to include, not exclude. 
“I am much more cold and calculative” (Interview #4), the client-side CIO told me. “I 
need them [the vendor] to deliver and if I need a favor, I need them to be flexible and 
not just adhere to the contract. That’s about relations. When it comes down to it, it is 
all about relations” (Interview #4). From my previous encounters with the CIO, I know 
that he has a dry sense of humor and that the staging of himself as cold and calculative 
is more of a humorous remark. Nevertheless, the agenda of the client-side visits to 
India is indeed to establish relations. Several of the client-side actors told me about 
their expectations and reasons for visiting the OMC in India. One said that his 
“expectation is, obviously, to get a better relations to the people I work with” 
(Interview #15), while another elaborates that “just to come down and meet people, to 
put faces on those you don’t know and meet those you know again strengthens the 
relations and thereby also the collaboration that follows. That, to me, is one of the most 
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important reasons to go out there and visit” (Interview #12). This perspective on the 
fruitfulness of client-side visits to the OMC in India is shared among the offshore 
vendor-side actors. One assesses the value of client visits like this: “That’ll reveal 
transparency between both of us and build trust. Their visits here, meeting in person, 
it’s nothing but building trust” (Interview #23). Another assesses that “very good 
rapport we can create with them” (Interview #20).  
According to the actors from both the client-side and the vendor-side such client visits 
to the OMC in India help establish relations, build trust and create rapport, which 
according to several of the client-side actors as well as vendor-side actors has helped 
established a collaborative environment, where it is less “yes, sir” (Field Notes 
20130911) and more equal; where the Indian vendor-side actors are comfortable 
talking to the client-side actors and voice their opinion. I characterize this grouping as 
establishing unity. That is, establishing a feeling of being in it together, which can be 
depicted as in figure 7.4 below. After summing up the findings on social constructions 
of groups I will re-attend to this notion of establishing unity and look deeper into how 
it is done by focusing on how presentational rituals are enacted during these visits, as 
well as in situations characterized by ‘being business as usual’.  
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Summing up on Social Constructions of Groups 
In this section I have elaborated how groups are socially constructed in the 
collaboration between the client and the vendor. Together they form a complex picture 
of groupings. One may argue that the four ‘boxes of actors’ too are groupings, which I 
have not accounted for. This is true. Within both the client-side actors and the offshore 
vendor-side actors there are indeed subgroups, for instance on the client-side 
‘development people’ and ‘operations people’. Similarly, within the group of offshore 
vendor-side actors, there are several constructions of groups linked to professional 
occupation and work domain areas. There are constructions of groups that spans two or 
more of the ‘boxes of actors’. For instance, there is a construction of a SAP group that 
spans across the client-side actors, the onsite vendor-side actors and the offshore-
vendor side actors. And there is arguably a social construction of a management group, 
which spans across all four ‘boxes of actors’.  
Thus, the picture of social constructions of groups is indeed even more complex than 
what I have presented so far. However, I have chosen not to include the 
abovementioned social constructions of groups as well as others for one simple reason: 
They do not appear as strong social constructions as the ones I have described – they 
have proved to be less relevant. Thus, the ‘boxes of actors’ that I have chosen are the 
results of how the actor’s themselves are constructing their reality. 
The significant groupings I have identified are illustrated in figure 7.5 below: A 
complex pattern of several social constructions of groups, which together paint a 
picture of an interwoven patchwork. In the following section I will, first, re-iterate on 
how such groupings can indeed be regarded as enactments of culture. Subsequently, I 
will shed light on how presentational rituals on one side are used to break down 
cultural walls in order to build an all-encompassing culture of characterized by ‘we are 
in it together’. Then I will turn focus to boundary objects and how such boundary 
objects build walls around cultures.  
226 
 
Enacting Cultures 
Social Constructions of Groups as Enactments of Cultures 
Arguably, the social construction of a group is a double-edged sword which on one 
side establishes, confirms and re-confirms particularity within the group. Bearing in 
mind the definition of culture as shared meaning and interpretation; the construction of 
groups signifies unity and particularity within the group. However, this social 
construction of particularity is also at risk of alienating “the others” as we have seen in 
the construction of national stereotypes: When the client-side actors construct ‘the 
Indians’, they distance themselves from this group – but they do so without explicitly 
creating a “counter group”. That is, they never construct themselves as for instance 
‘Danes’ or ‘Europeans’ or ‘Westerners’, but only construct the “counter group” as 
something they themselves do not belong to. This “counter group” is perceived as 
hierarchical, micromanaged, evasive and without a sense of personal responsibility. 
When the client-side actors and the vendor-side actors construct groups of ‘client’ and 
‘vendor’, they construct differences that relate to the contractual obligations but also to 
how information should be shared and to how one group (the client-side) has the 
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privilege of conducting business as usual, while the other (the vendor-side) is obligated 
to service the client, to understand and to adapt. In a similar vein, the construction of 
onsite and offshore groups respectively, imposes shared meaning and interpretation, 
where the onsite actors are the experts and the offshore actors are the expertise-seeking 
novices. Finally, the fourth grouping – the “we are in it together” group: This is 
different as this construction aims at only including, not excluding. Below I will attend 
in more detail to how this is done. 
Presentational Rituals: Breaking Down the Cultural Walls 
As we know from Kunda (1992) presentational rituals exist in three forms, namely 
‘talking down’, ‘talking across’ and ‘talking around’. In the theoretical section of this 
chapter I have argued that while Kunda’s concept of presentational rituals has an inter-
organizational perspective and thus intra-organizational rituals can be argued as 
instances of talking across I claim that in the instances where the client-side actors 
engage in presentational rituals with the offshore vendor-side actors it is rather a case 
of talking down. I have argued earlier how the social constructions of organizational 
groups – that is: ‘the client’ and ‘the vendor’ – bring about certain patterns of meaning, 
where the vendor-side actors are constructed as those who service the client, those who 
are expected to understand the client and adapt to the client’s way of working. Thus, 
the client-vendor relationship is infused with power, in the sense that the client-side 
actors have the right to define what good work is and how it is done. 
Such instances of presentational rituals in the form of ‘talking down’, is a part of every 
single client visit to the OMC. At least once during such a visit the highest-ranking 
client-side actor who has joined in on the visit at the OMC will address the full body of 
vendor-side actors at a so-called town hall meeting. During such town hall meetings 
the client-side manager will typically present the last periods financial results for the 
client company; he will present strategic initiatives; he will talk about the performance 
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of the IT platform; and he will thank the vendor-side actors for bringing value to the 
client organization (Field Notes 20130502).  
During the client-side visit to the OMC in Chennai in September 2013, where I 
accompanied the client-side delegation I witnessed one such session where the CIO 
was the presenter. The night before the session I was talking to him over dinner and he 
told me that he was a bit reluctant to do the presentation, as he could not present much 
new. However, he assessed that it is important to do such presentations even though 
there is not much new to say, as “it gives them [the offshore vendor-side actors] a 
feeling of being valued and being an integral part of [the client organization]” (Field 
Notes 20130910). On another occasion the client-side Director of IT-operations had 
explained that these town hall presentations were “somewhat a courtesy to the Indians” 
(Field Notes 20130502) to make sure that they also had an understanding of the 
challenges ahead; and a strategic perspective on their work. 
The following day, the CIO did his town hall presentation: Presenting strategies, 
performance results and thanking the vendor-side actors for their contribution. At the 
meeting all of the client-side actors who were visiting the OMC also participated and 
the new head of client-side IT-development and the equally new client-side chief 
architect were presented. The presentation seemed carefully crafted to stress exactly 
that the vendor-side actors are an integral and values part of the client’s IT setup – 
what the CIO told me the night before. During the presentation he consequently used 
“we”, “us” and “our” to describe unity of the vendor and the client. Only when he 
specifically addressed achievements where he wished to acknowledge the vendor-
side’s significant contribution he talked about “you”, as for instance when he thanked 
for the high operational stability, where they had not encountered any ‘priority 1 
incidents’ (incidents with significant impact on operational stability). 
In terms of content, the town hall meeting I observed resembled the bi-weekly 
department meeting in the Copenhagen office a lot. The major difference lied in the 
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inclusive rhetoric, where the CIO carefully communicated how they ‘are in it together’. 
This stands in contrast to the bi-weekly meetings in Copenhagen, where he would 
usually use us-and-them dichotomies where “we” signifies the client-organization and 
where the vendor-side actors are constructed as a “they”. 
In addition to these instances of ‘talking down’ there are another type of presentational 
ritual in the empirical settings of outsourcing collaboration between the two 
organizations. This is an equally formalized ritual, but one that cannot be categorized 
neither ‘talking down’, nor ‘talking across’ or ‘talking around’. Rather it can be 
understood as a fourth typification of presentational rituals labeled as ‘talking up’.  
During these client-side visits to the OMC in India there are several instances – one for 
each ‘track’, which is the term they use for a functional area, such as storage, network, 
active directory et cetera – of ‘talking up’ presentational rituals, where the vendor-side 
actors are expected to present their successes, their challenges and suggestions for 
future initiatives. During all of these meetings – nine in total – I sat with the 
participants and took notes. Below is excerpts of my write-up of the impressions I got 
from these meetings, compiled in approximately 11.000 meters altitude on my way 
back to Copenhagen after the OMC visit. 
It has been a good week. It has been an interesting week. I have learned a lot 
about Berlingske Media’s team and their perceptions of the collaboration with 
HCL – especially during the informal conversations over numerous drinks at the 
hotel in the evening. I have always perceived them to be honest and direct when I 
have spoken to them. Nevertheless, the unfiltered stories that surface around 
midnight enrich the picture. []  
The problematic thing about doing field work like this – in a context of a visit, 
where everybody is eager to get as much out of the ‘confrontation time’ as 
possible is that it is impossible to be present at all the meetings, when they are 
run in parallel sessions. Before departing I decided that I would follow the IT-
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operations people from Berlingske Media in everything they attended to. I am 
glad I did, but I would indeed have liked to attend the other meetings too. [] 
I attended a total of nine track meetings over the course of three days. Present at 
all meeting were the two IT-operations people from Berlingske Media and the 
service delivery manager from HCL, and myself. From each of the tracks the 
track lead and a few other track team members were present. In a few cases, 
where the teams are very small, the full team participated.  
I remember that the Director of IT-operations told, back in May after his last visit 
to the OMC, that his main objective with these sessions were to get the offshore 
staff to stop “hiding”. He said that he had succeeded and that they were now 
asking critical questions and that they no longer seemed to be “afraid” of the 
client. He appreciated that. He took it as a sign of engagement. 
So, how can I sum up my impressions of these nine meeting? A few words come 
to mind: ‘unity’, ‘distance’, ‘initiative’ and ‘status reporting’ – contrasting words 
indeed. The most remarkable thing I have noticed is ‘distance’. Whenever a team 
enters the room, nothing happens. No small talk, no attempts to create rapport, 
nothing. The teams enter the room; in some instances they formally greet the 
client-side people with handshakes, while in other instances they just take a seat. 
And the room is quiet up until the Service Delivery Manager or one of the client-
side IT-operations people signal that they are ready to start the meeting. Only if 
the client-side people have prior knowledge about the OMC staff – typically 
because they have been stationed onsite – there is some interaction. In those 
rare cases pleasantries are exchanged “how are you doing”, “how is it being back 
in India”, so on and so forth. The most remarkable meeting was the one with the 
security team. My notes read like this: “A little after noon the security team comes 
in. No one says hi. 15 minutes later the team lead starts talking and present the 
other people in the room“. Remarkable, odd! 
The most confusing thing about the mental distance is that it is clearly opposed 
by what the IT-operations people say during the meetings. Their rhetoric, once 
the meetings have started, are all about ‘unity’: "We depend on you"; “I think that 
the Kiev team think that they have everything figured out and that you guys have 
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nothing figured out - and that is not our impression at all"; “"We expect that the 
role we have in Copenhagen, you have in the OMC"; “We are very open to your 
suggestions. You are our experts on this". The client-side people repeatedly 
expressed unity in the way they talk – but rarely in the way they act.  
And the OMC staff: They seem genuinely thankful, when they are acknowledged 
for doing a good job. But very few of them make an effort to engage with the 
client-side people. They come in to the room; they wait for the Danes to start the 
meeting and remain quiet until then. Then they do their presentation. It has the 
feeling of ‘status reporting’. Even when they propose initiatives I get the feeling 
that it is something they do because they are required to. Only on a very few 
occasions do they engage in dialogues with the client-side people. They present 
their initiatives – as they are expected to do – they listen to the feedback; and 
then move on to the next topic. To me, they seem to be intimidated by the client-
side people.  
Before the meetings I asked the client-side IT-operations people what they 
expected from these sessions. They told me that their aim was to empower the 
OMC staff and that they wanted them to bring about new ‘initiatives’; to give them 
a role in improving the IT-operations and not just run it. Clearly, this is what 
counts to them. Did they achieve this? I doubt it. Indeed, they did get a lot of 
suggestions and maybe this trip is a stepping-stone towards a more integrated 
collaboration – but they are not there yet. 
During a break I spoke to the client-side Service Delivery Manager about how he 
perceived his own role. I had noticed that during most of the presentations he had 
remained quiet. My notes read: “During this meeting and actually also most of the 
others [the vendor-side service delivery manager] is very quiet. He is observing. 
Much the way I do” (Field Notes 20130910). He explained that he believes “it is 
very important for him to empower the people. To have them talk themselves and 
meet with the Danes”. (Field Notes 20130913) 
The most striking observation was that while the notion of ‘unity’ was repeatedly 
brought to the table by the client-side actors these meeting was to a great extent 
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characterized by a mental distance: The meetings followed a specific agenda and in the 
vast majority of meetings there was no personal engagement. By and large the actors 
performed their professional role giving a sense of status reporting, with no attempt to 
get to know one another.  
When I returned to visit the OMC in Chennai in late January 2014 I had a chance to 
talk to the vendor-side service delivery manager about his perspective on empowering 
his staff. One evening we were on our way out to have dinner, just the two of us, and in 
the car we came to talk more about this subject. He told me: “I am different than most 
Indian managers that way” (Field Notes 20140123) when I asked him about his 
philosophy on empowering the staff; and he explained that as he was not the expert on 
the various subjects and because the client-side actors were very keen on having a 
more integrated collaboration – which he agreed on to be the best way forward – he 
felt it was important to give his subordinates the chance to engage directly with the 
client as much as possible. And he assessed it as “work-in-progress, but we are slowly 
moving forward” (Field Notes 20140123). 
Thus, ‘talking up’ is a very central presentational ritual in the collaboration between 
Berlingske Media and HCL. It is a ritual driven by the client-side actors, but with 
support from the vendor-side management. After the September visit to the OMC I 
conducted follow-up interviews with the client-side delegation, where I enquired 
specifically about how they perceived these sessions and what they gained from them. 
One explained that he would characterize them as “relatively constructive meetings” 
(Interview #12), which had been beneficial insofar he has more dialogues with some of 
the teams now. He gives an example of one team that he has earlier perceived as very 
apprehensive, that now are calling him more and another example relating to one of the 
incident managers, with whom he had a good relation even before the client-side visit. 
This relationship is now even better and “he [the incident manager] happily calls me 
day and night now” (Interview #12). He appreciates their input and explains that when 
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he “is out there [at the OMC] they seems to be talented people that know what they do 
and have everything under control and then one gets happy and excited, thinking that 
everything will work out – and then when one get’s home it’s the same old story as 
before one visited [the OMC] […] When you are out there and can see things for your 
self you get a different perception of things. But when you are back here [in Denmark] 
things are progressing very slowly again – it takes a lot of time for them to solve 
things” (Interview #12) 
In a similar vein, the other client-side actor who had participated in the meetings I 
observed assessed that he was “surprised how open [the vendor] were this time 
compared to last time. That is really good” (Interview #15) and continues: “I think a lot 
of the track leads have found out how we work and how we react – that they do not get 
scolded for making a mistake or suggesting a change […] they lean how the customer 
want things done. I think they have learned a lot about that” (Interview #15) 
Thus, to sum up the findings related to presentational rituals. In the collaboration 
between the two organizations two types of presentational rituals aimed at creating a 
feeling of ‘being in it together’ are employed. The first can be characterized using 
Kunda’s (1992) term ‘talking down’, while the other can be characterized by ‘talking 
up’, adding a fourth type of talking to Kunda’s (1992) notion of presentational rituals. 
Common to both ‘talking down’ and ‘talking up’ are that the client-side actors stage 
the presentational rituals. That is, the common collaborative culture is as such non-
negotiated as it is by and large defined by the client-side actors and adhered to by the 
vendor-side actors, who adapt to the client-side way or working. Presentational rituals 
are used as the means to break down “cultural walls” inside the collaboration. In 
opposition to this are ‘boundary objects’ which are reinforcing the exact same walls as 
presentational rituals – as they are used in this outsourcing collaboration – aims at 
breaking down. In the next section I will take a closer look at these boundary objects. 
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Boundary Objects: Building Walls Around a Culture 
Boundary objects, defined as “mediating artifacts that have interpretive flexibility and 
can be an important means of achieving collaboration, promoting the sharing of 
knowledge between diverse groups” (Barrett & Oborn, 2010: 1200), are arguably an 
essential part of most distributed work, just as collaborative technology is. In Chapter 
VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I have shown how the necessity to use 
such technology has a significant impact on the collaboration as well as the trust 
between geographically distributed actors. One could reasonably argue that 
collaboration technology such as emails, chats, video-conferencing equipment and 
phones are themselves boundary objects – nothing in Barrett & Oborn’s (2010) 
definition argues against this. However, the examples on boundary objects that Barrett 
& Oborn (2010) are bringing to the table suggest that what they are thinking about is 
documents, systems that captures and displays data as well as processes and 
methodologies. In line with this understanding of boundary objects I have identified 
two such boundary objects with significant impact on the collaboration between the 
client-side actors and the offshore vendor-side actors. These are: the change 
management process and the Remedy tool. 
These two boundary objects (where the first has been discussed in Chapter VI: 
‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ too) have two common denominators. First, 
they are instigated as coordination mechanisms. Second, due to the control that is 
enabled by the instigation of these boundary objects, they are culturizing the 
collaboration. That is, they demarcate us-and-them dichotomies and reinforce them. In 
the remainder of this section I will follow “the negotiations around the boundary 
objects as they are used in practice” (Barrett & Oborn, 2010: 1215) and show how they 
reinforce some of the social constructions of groups I have described earlier in this 
chapter. 
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Both boundary objects are instigated in order to comply with the ITIL framework. ITIL 
is – as described in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ a 
framework which has become a standard adopted by organizations worldwide to 
manage IT operations. Therefore, they can be characterized as standardized forms (Star 
& Griesemer, 1989). As mentioned in Chapter VI ITIL was implemented in order to 
have a common set of processes and a common vocabulary that both the client-side 
and the vendor-side understands and adheres to. While there is no reason to question 
the value the ITIL framework has on coordination among the actors it also has a 
flipside. The two boundary objects that I will elaborate on below are examples of this 
flipside.  
In Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I have argued how the 
change management process is embodied by the vendor-side change manager in the 
eyes of the client-side employees; and I have shown how dissatisfaction among the 
client-side actors with the thoroughness of the process-based preparation of a change is 
repeatedly expressed as something related to the change manager’s personal abilities 
and never to the role or the process. In other words, the boundary object, in this case 
the change management process, is perceived as something faultless and as a 
consequence a failure must, in the eyes of the client-side actors, be attributed to the 
vendor-side change managers’ lack of abilities. The change manager is labeled as “a 
secretary who fills in templates and sends them up here [to Denmark] for approval” 
(Interview #6), which is, more or less directly, attributed to his Indian heritage. The 
reasoning seems to be that he needs to be micro-managed; that he doe not possess “the 
same kind of feeling of personal responsibility, as we do in the west” (Interview #04) 
and that he is evasive and tries to keep a harmonious atmosphere instead challenging 
the developers who are submitting the change.  
Is this a reasonable picture? I do not know – I can only guess. My observations during 
my second visit to the OMC in Chennai suggest that he is definitely not evasive: 
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During my visit I was given a desk just two seats away from him and I heard him 
talking to the vendor-side developers, questioning whether they had performed all 
steps adequately several times. He did not strike me as someone who is preoccupied 
with maintaining a harmonious relationship at all (Field Notes 20140121).  
Furthermore, during one of the change board meeting I observed in Copenhagen after 
returning from my second visit at the OMC one of the client-side actors instructed the 
change manager to “filter it out so we don’t need to bring it up in the meeting” (Field 
Notes 20140129) with reference to a change that should not have been approved by the 
vendor-side change manager according to the client-side actor. One of the vendor-side 
actors deployed onsite tried to defend the change manager exclaiming: “I think getting 
approval from [the change manager] is not so easy” (Field Notes 20140129). As said, I 
do not know if he is evasive, has to be micro-managed and do not possess a sense of 
personal responsibility – but the interesting point is that the client-side actors do not 
know either. There could be an endless number of other explanations: Maybe he is 
over-worked; or maybe there are some power relations that force him to approve 
dubious changes. But in the eyes of the client-side employees, the change management 
process is infallible – it is “a standard ITIL” (Field Notes 20130226) as one of them 
told me – and they stick fast to an explanation drawing on cultural stereotypes of 
Indians and thus the change management process becomes a culturized boundary 
object. 
Another example of the flipside of boundary objects is the repository (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989) called ‘Remedy’. Remedy is a web-based tool in which both client-
side actors and vendor-side actors monitor the status of reported incidents. From the 
vendor-side perspective this tool is an integrated part of handling the incidents, as they 
are the one’s updating progress on incidents in the system and changing the status of an 
incident accordingly. The client-side actors do not actively change status or update 
information in Remedy. Rather, they use it for monitoring progress – or lack of the 
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same – on incidents. On a monthly basis the data in Remedy is compiled in to an 
elaborate report on SLA fulfillment (as described in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch 
on Trust and Control’).  
One of the client-side actors elaborate on Remedy as a boundary object: “Everything 
evolves around this task handling system that we use – Remedy. The task [an incident 
or a problem] is reported here, followed up on and solved” (Interview #6). While the 
example I gave on the change management process has quite severe culturizing 
consequences, this is not to the same extent the situation with the Remedy tool. 
However, it is important to note how Remedy establishes a boundary between those 
who handle the incidents (the vendor-side actors) and those who monitor the handling 
(the client-side actors). This way, Remedy is culturizing in the sense that it creates us-
and-them dichotomies.  
I have repeatedly experienced how the client-side actors are frustrated by the long 
response time of Remedy, which is a subject that has also been addressed at the 
steering group meeting (Field Notes 20130501). Why is it so? Apparently because 
Remedy has been instigated as a coordination tool, that aims at minimizing intra-
organizational dialogue and pave the way for smooth, efficient and standardized 
collaboration; and when the client-side actors experience unsatisfactory response times 
they are frustrated because it inhibits them from having a sense of control over the 
work that is done at the OMC. Consequently, the client-side actors are keen on seeing 
an improved performance of Remedy. As the client-side Director of IT-operations 
explained: “I got really mad when I realized that they [the vendor-side track 
responsible for Remedy] had practically nothing planned for improving Remedy. I had 
to show them what the problem was and in the end [the vendor-side service delivery 
manager] had to bring them in to another room to explain how important this is. […] I 
was furious!” (Field Notes 20130502).  
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Remedy is just one example of a culturizing boundary object that glorifies this 
“efficient” standardized way of working. Other examples are SLA reports (where the 
data is derived partly from the Remedy tool) and the aforementioned change 
management process including the templates and reports attached to this. In line with 
the findings of Barrett & Oborn (2010) I argue that these boundary objects are 
facilitating collaboration but also contributing to – if not conflict – then at least to 
reinforcing cultural boundaries; in other words: they are culturizing the collaboration. 
When I turn to discuss how trustworthiness is affected by cultural boundaries later in 
this chapter I will argue why such standard processes aimed at minimizing interaction 
is in a sense counterproductive to trust development. 
Culture and Trustworthiness 
In the beginning of this chapter I introduced this research question: How is vendor-side 
actors’ trustworthiness affected by enactments of cultural boundaries? I have 
presented my view on culture, understood as shared meaning and interpretation. I have 
laid out my strategy on how to analytically understand culture by looking into social 
constructions of groups, presentational ritual and boundary object. Subsequently, I 
have analyzed accordingly. The question remains: How is culture and trust related to 
each other and how can we improve our understanding of how the vendor-side actor’s 
trustworthiness is perceived in this outsourcing collaboration by looking into how 
culture is negotiated? The remained of this chapter will be dedicated to answering 
exactly this question. 
Antecedents to Trust: ABI … and ‘Proactiveness’ 
In the section on ‘Researching Trust in a Cross-Cultural Perspective’ earlier in this 
chapter, I argued how the widely recognized antecedents of trust and characteristics of 
trustworthiness, commonly referred to as ABI – Ability, Benevolence and Integrity – 
proposed by Mayer et al. (1995) can indeed be regarded as “base characteristics” of 
trustworthiness that do no vary across cultures. I did so, by arguing that that they are 
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built into the definition of trust I adhere to. Furthermore, in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by 
Distance’ I have shown how these three antecedents are central to trust development in 
the outsourcing collaboration between the client and the vendor. I did so by focusing 
on how physical distance inhibits trust development as a) client-side actors refrain 
from assessing vendor-side actor’s abilities on an individual level; b) client-side actors 
assess the integrity of the vendor-side actors negatively when expected performance 
criteria are not met; and c) client-side actors refrain from assessing the vendor-side 
actor’s benevolence, which leads to negative conclusions and thus keep the actor’s 
from approaching their other-organizational counterparts directly.  
However, the question remains: Can these perceptions of ability, integrity and 
benevolence solely be attributed to physical distance or does enactments of culture also 
play a role – can a culture analysis of the geographically dispersed collaboration 
further refine our insights into how and why trust development is inhibited? I will 
attend to this question below in the section ‘Keeping the Iron Cage Locked’. However, 
before advancing to this it is necessary to re-iterate on the perceptions of ability 
benevolence and integrity across the identified socially constructed groups and 
secondly to introduce an additional antecedent to trust: As argued above ability, 
benevolence and integrity are not necessarily the only antecedents to trust. In line with 
Tan & Chee (2005) who identified several additional antecedents to trust in their study 
of a Confucian-influenced society I argue that in the settings that constitute the 
empirical foundation for this dissertation, there is also an additional antecedent to trust, 
namely ‘proactiveness’. 
Ability, Benevolence and Integrity Across Cultures 
Are the three base characteristics of trustworthiness – ability, benevolence and 
integrity – dominant in the client-vendor collaboration and if so, can this be explained 
by cultural enactments? As I have argued in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ and 
recapped above the client-side actors perceive the offshore vendor-side actors as less 
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knowledable. Thus, the abilities of the offshore vendor-side actors are evaluated as less 
than the onsite vendor-side actors as well as the client-side actors. The client-side 
actors never attribute the perception of lesser ability to differences across national or 
organizational culture. Rather, the lesser ability is attributed to distance and I have on 
several occasions heard client-side actors assess how they believe that obtaining a high 
level of knowledge about the client’s business would be difficult for anyone sitting 
more than 7000 kilometers away. Thus, we must make a distinction between the 
perception of ability related to actors and related to circumstances. That is, actors are 
perceived to have lesser ability under given circumstances, namely physical distance.  
On this note it is interesting to observe just how quickly vendor-side actors are 
included in the group of the knowledable few when they travel to work at the client’s 
headquarters: They are almost immediately charged with complex tasks and I have 
observed how a vendor-side actor within a few weeks after arriving onsite is praised 
for his abilities. In a similar way client-side actors quickly turn from not assessing the 
benevolence of the vendor-side actors when they are working at the OMC in India to a 
positive assessment when they are relocated to work at the client’s headquarters in 
Denmark. The inclusion into the group of the knowledable few also includes positive 
assessments of benevolence. Finally, working onsite means that the vendor-side 
employees are less exposed to negative assessments of integrity when collective 
performance criteria are not met.  
As argued in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ assessments of trustworthiness 
shifts from being aimed at the collective to being aimed at the individual when vendor-
side actors move from working offshore to working onsite. My empirical 
investigations suggest that the construction of groups based geographical placement 
has a significant impact on perceived trustworthiness: When vendor-side actors are 
working at the same geographical premises as the client-side actors they are assessed 
as individuals rather than as a part of a larger collective. Arguably, the shift from 
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working offsite to working onsite they become individuals in the eyes of the client-side 
actors. Interestingly, the physical proximity changes the focus of these assessments of 
trustworthiness at an individual level, but without changing the client-side actors 
propensity to trust the vendor-side employees on a higher level. While the client-side 
actors clearly acknowledge that vendor-side actors can be both able, benevolent and 
have integrity when they are onsite, this does not result in more favorable assessments 
of the vendor-side actors in general. Below I will attend to the consequence of this 
enactment of culture, but first I will have a closer look at the fourth antecedent to trust, 
namely proactiveness. 
Proactiveness Across Cultures 
In the section on national stereotyping I have shown how the client-side actors perceive 
‘The Indian Work Culture’ as hierarchical and that ‘The Indians’ need to be micro-
managed. Furthermore, the client-side employees perceive ‘The Indians’ as lacking 
personal responsibility and preoccupied with maintaining harmony. These three factors 
together are perceived to impede proactive behavior and the client-side actors 
repeatedly voice their concern about this lack of proactive behavior. Because the 
client-side actors have clear reservations with regards to working with the offshore 
vendor-side actors and because the exact same notion of proactiveness repeatedly 
emphasized and acknowledge with regards to the onsite vendor-side actors, who are 
praised for their work, I consider proactiveness as an antecedent to trust, seen from the 
perspective of the client-side actors. 
One could argue that proactiveness should not be regarded as an antecedent to trust in 
its own right, but rather be understood as a subset or specification of benevolence or 
integrity, or both. Indeed, if we regard benevolence as a “perception of a positive 
orientation of the trustee toward the trustor, including expressions of genuine concern 
and care” (Dietz et al., 2010: 10) one can claim that proactiveness is nothing more than 
a way of accommodating the expectation of such genuine concern and care. The 
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argument would read: By proactively engaging in finding new solutions that exceed the 
contractual obligation the vendor-side actors display genuine care and concern for the 
IT-environment of the client. However, as I have discussed extensively, the vendor-side 
actors are keenly focused on adapting to the client-side expectations in terms of how to 
perform work. At the same time, as argued in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on 
Trust and Control’, the vendor-side actors are subjected to a rather strict output control, 
where there are financial consequences for the vendor organization insofar the SLA 
objectives are not met. Thus, it is highly probably that the vendor-side actors who, 
when they are not stationed onsite, are practically exclusively measured on adherence 
to the SLA requirements and adhering to an argument that could read: By meeting 
contractual obligations such as SLA targets we, the vendor-side actors, display 
genuine care and concern for the IT-environment of the client. Thus, on one side 
genuine care and concern can be manifested through proactive engagement and on the 
other side through meeting contractual obligations – and both can potentially be tokens 
of benevolence.  
According to Mayer et al. (1995) benevolence “is the extent to which a trustee is 
believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (p. 
718). As I have elaborated in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ the client-side 
actors refrain from assessing their counterparts’ benevolence when they have not met 
in person; and earlier in this chapter I have shown how lack of proactiveness is 
attributed to national culture. Thus, it seems that there is no direct link between the 
client-side actor’s assessments of whether or not the vendor-side actors are genuinely 
concerned and their perceived lack of proactiveness. Consequently, proactiveness 
should not be regarded as a subset of benevolence, but rather an antecedent in its own 
right; insofar it can be justified that is not a sub-set of integrity either. 
According to Mayer et al. (1995) the “relationship between integrity and trust involves 
the trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor 
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finds acceptable” (p. 719). Let us consider proactiveness in this perspective: On one 
side integrity is about adhering to a set of principles. Arguably, such a set of principles 
could both include and not include ‘proactiveness’. But Mayer et al. (1995) goes 
further as they point out that the set of principles must also be acceptable to the trustor. 
In this perspective, one can argue that because the offshore vendor-side actors, in the 
eyes of the client-side actors, do not include ‘proactiveness’ then the set of principles is 
not acceptable, in the eyes of the client-side actors. Thus, in this perspective 
‘proactiveness’ is not an antecedent to trust in itself, but rather a subset of integrity. 
However, while ‘proactiveness’ may indeed be a ‘principle’ it is hardly the type of 
principle that Mayer et al. (1995) have in mind: In support for their claim that integrity 
can be regarded as an antecedent to trust they refer to a range of other scholar’s 
constructs (Mayer et al., 1995: 718 – see table). These constructs are, among other’s 
value congruence, consistency, fairness and promise fulfillment. Thus, I argue that the 
set of principles that Mayer et al. (1995) have in mind are moral principles and indeed 
a layman understanding of both the term integrity and the term principle would suggest 
that moral plays a significant role.5 I argue, that proactiveness can hardly been seen as 
something that relates closely to moral and thus I argue that ‘proactiveness’ should not 
be considered as a subset of integrity, but rather as an antecedent to trust in its own 
right. 
To sum up: In addition to the three “base characteristics” of trustworthiness – ability, 
benevolence and integrity – there is an additional antecedent to trust, namely 
‘proactiveness’ at play in the settings that constitute the empirical foundation for this 
dissertation. In the following section I will discuss how enactments of culture sustains 
this perception of ‘Indians’ as re-active actors and how trust building is impeded by the 
very same mechanisms that sustain the image of ‘the Indians’ as re-active. 
                                         
5 Webster’s Dictionary defines integrity as: ”the quality of being honest and fair” and Principle as: “a 
moral rule or belief that helps you know what is right and wrong and that influences your actions”. 
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Keeping the Iron Cage Locked 
Why do the client-side actors perceive the offshore vendor-side actors as re-active? If 
we turn to an Hofstedian view on culture it could probably be answered quite simple: 
Because of the relative high power distance; because India is a collective where the “I” 
is replaced by “we” and thus individual agency is given less value; and because of 
relatively high uncertainty avoidance Indian prefer to follow orders blindly instead of 
engaging in more risky encounters such as proactive thinking and acting where one is 
more exposed to the risk of failure. That’s it! The Hofstedian explanation could even 
be accompanied by a nice illustration showing how Denmark and India compares, like 
in figure 7.6 below. 
 
This sort of explanation resembles the way the client-side actors make sense of their 
Indian counterparts to a great deal. However appealing one may find this sort of 
analysis, I argue, in line with Søderberg & Holden (2002) that we must break out of the 
iron cage that Hofstede puts around culture and understand culture a dynamic 
construct where human agency plays a vital role. In the remainder of this section I will 
take a closer look at why the client-side actors perceive the offshore vendor-side actors 
 245 
as re-active by bringing the analytical findings related to social constructions of 
groups, presentational rituals and boundary objects into play. 
First step is to realize the significance of the geographical distribution. In Chapter V: 
‘Challenged by Distance’ I have shown how cross-locational collaboration is 
challenged by three different factors, namely ‘going directly’, lack of knowledge and 
lack of transparency. I have also re-iterated on these challenges earlier in this chapter, 
where I have pin-pointed how the enactment of an us-and-them dichotomy based on 
physical placement impacts assessments of trustworthiness: Those vendor-side actors 
that are working in close physical proximity with the client-side actors are assessed as 
individuals, whereas the vendor-side actors working at the OMC in India are assessed 
as a collective. This leads to a situation, where the actors – from both organizational 
entities – who are working onsite constitute a group of the ‘knowledable few’ with 
both overview and a deep understanding of the IT-systems as well as the client’s 
business; and they are perceived as benevolent and as having integrity. This is 
interesting because it shows that when the vendor-side actors of Indian heritage are 
sent onsite to work closely with the client-side actors they can break free of the 
stereotyping: They are no longer perceived as a collective, as ‘The Indians’, but as 
individuals – and these individuals are repeatedly praised for their abilities and their 
good work: They become a part of the “onsite culture” of ‘the knowledable few’.  
Second step is to understand the significance of how the roles of ‘the client’ and ‘the 
vendor’ respectively are negotiated. I have shown how the client-vendor relationship is 
constructed as a relationship where the vendor-side actors are expected to service the 
client, to understand and to adapt to the client’s way of working. That is, the 
interpretation of what a client-vendor relationship is (on both the client-side and on the 
actor-side): ‘the client is always right’. One of the vendor-side actors said it best: “they 
[the client] are the ones who is sponsoring this, so I have to adapt” (Interview #05). 
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One could argue that if the client has the power to define how to work and what good 
work is at all – and the vendor-side agrees to this – then the vendor-side actors could 
en bloc very well adapt to the client’s demand for proactiveness. However, there are 
amble reasons why this cannot easily be done, which leads me to the third point: The 
use of presentational rituals. 
I have argued that two types of presentational rituals aimed at uniting and established a 
feeling of being ‘in it together’ are at play in the collaboration between the client and 
the vendor: one is about talking down and the other is about talking up. These two 
types of presentational rituals have one thing in common, namely that they are only 
performed when the client-side actors visit the OMC in India. The client-side CIO 
explains the reasoning for engaging in the talking down presentational rituals like this:  
“It is to show that the relation to them is important and that they are 
important. I started by presenting our strategy and their role in this. They 
were very happy about this and appreciated that I shared it with them and 
that I made clear that they are a central part of this and that they are 
important to us. […] Then I took a round and shook everybody’s hands to 
state that they are on the team. When that is done I might as well leave, 
because I cannot engage in operations. It created a foundation: They are 
much more hierarchical than we are in Denmark and therefore it is 
important that one with stars on the shoulder of the jacket comes and gives 
his blessing to the relationship and says “we really like you and you are 
important to us and we will be in the for a long time together (Interview #04 
– client-side actor) 
Do these kinds of presentational rituals have an effect? I believe they do. However, 
when these rituals are exactly that, rituals, and detached from everyday office life they 
loose their impact. In average the client-side actors visit the OMC twice per year. Thus, 
the talking down presentational rituals take up approximately two hours per calendar 
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year and the talking up presentational rituals take up on average one hour per vendor-
side employees at the OMC (as the meetings with each team lasts about half an hour). 
Arguably, for such presentational rituals to have an effect they need to be reinforced 
significantly more often, which is not the case. Rather than reinforcing the message of 
unity, what in fact happens as soon as the client-side actors have returned to Denmark 
and the positive attitude towards ‘The Indians’ have declined, the client-side actors are 
again succumbing to the national stereotyping of Indians I have elaborated extensively 
on throughout this chapter; and the assessments of trustworthiness is again focused on 
collectives rather than individuals.  
This brings me to the fourth, and final, point, which relates to boundary objects. In 
Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I have shown how the 
necessity to use such technology has a significant impact on the collaboration as well 
as the trust between geographically distributed actors and in the current chapter I have 
expanded this view by looking into the use of boundary objects and how these 
boundary objects, in line with communication technology, impacts collaboration. 
These boundary objects are instigated as coordination mechanisms aimed at easing 
coordination across distance. While there is no reason to doubt that they do exactly 
that, I have also shown that there is a significant flipside as the boundary objects 
reinforces socially constructed groups and hereby strengthens us-and-them 
dichotomies and works against the exact same ‘unity’ as the client-side actors via 
presentational rituals tries to enact. Furthermore, I have shown how the notion of a 
certain process as being infallible, as a “standard ITIL thing” (Field Notes 20130226) 
as one client-side actor said, suggesting an objective meaning of processes, can fortify 
national stereotypes.  
By accepting ‘proactiveness’ as an antecedent to trust it is easy to see that such 
boundary objects are in fact counterproductive to staging the vendor-side actors as 
trustworthy, as they – by their very nature – fail at facilitating proactiveness. Rather, 
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boundary objects glorifies adherence to standard operating procedures and collective 
assessments of trustworthiness; and impedes the proactiveness that the client-side 
actors request from the vendor-side actors.   
Concluding Remarks 
In the beginning out this chapter I sat out to answer this question: How is vendor-side 
actors’ trustworthiness affected by enactments of cultural boundaries? Throughout the 
chapter I have shed light on enactments of culture by focusing on social construction of 
groups, presentational rituals and boundary object and I have shown how the empirical 
enactment of these three constructs impacts perceived trustworthiness. 
More specifically, I have argued that there is a fourth antecedent to trust at play, 
namely proactiveness and I have argued that the enactment of onsite versus offshore 
groups has an important impact on how trustworthiness is assessed, as only co-located 
actors are assessed as individuals. I have subsequently shown how propensity to trust is 
kept status quo by the means of strong enactments of groups among the client-side 
actors and because the client-side management fails to continuously engage actors on 
both sides in presentational rituals when they are not collocated. Finally, the heavy use 
of boundary objects creates a scenario where the offshore vendor-side actors have no 
bandwidth to communicate with the client-side actors outside these boundary objects in 
any way but through the boundary objects. This limits the very possibility to act in a 
proactive manner, as boundary objects foster adherence to standard operating 
procedures and hereby impedes proactiveness. 
This particular finding also constitute a significant implication for practitioners, 
namely that while standardized forms (Star & Griesemer, 1989) of collaboration may 
prove beneficial when it comes to simplifying coordinative efforts they are also 
culturizing the collaboration as they are in effect building walls around socially 
constructed groups and hereby reinforcing these groups. Thus, the use of boundary 
objects come at a price, namely group integration and the possibility to render the 
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assessments of individual actors’ trustworthiness possible, as the individual becomes 
invisible by the means of boundary objects implemented to coordinate work at a 
collective level.  
The most important practical contribution, however, is related to national stereotyping. 
Throughout this chapter I have shown how the client-side actors rely on national 
stereotyping, when they are making sense of the Indian vendor-side actors. Indeed, the 
Hofstedian view on culture provides an easy-to-grasp generalization of members of 
other cultural groups. In this specific empirical context such a functionalist view can 
offer an explanation to why Indians, due to larger power distance and a collective 
mentality, are not proactive. However, I have also offered another explanation as to 
why the Indian vendor-side employees by and large are not perceived as proactive. 
This explanation draws on the challenges of distributed collaboration, where the actors 
are experiencing lack of knowledge and transparency and find interacting directly with 
actors unknown to them difficult; it draws on the power distribution between the client-
side actors and the vendor-side actors, characterized by a “the client is always right” 
thinking; it draws on the scarce use of presentational rituals in which the client-side 
management are establishing unity and empowering the vendor-side actors; and it 
draws on an analysis of the use of boundary objects and the “management by numbers” 
that such boundary objects promote at the cost of visibility of proactive behavior. I 
firmly believe that the second explanation on why the client-side actors perceive the 
vendor-side actors as reactive has a significantly stronger explanatory power than what 
a functionalist analysis can provide. And this is an important implication for practice 
because if practitioners are satisfied with the functionalist explanation, they will also 
silently accept that lack of perceived proactivity as the way it is. By adhering to 
functionalist explanation practitioners accept that this cannot be changed. However, if 
adhering to a different  - and, I argue, better – explanation the perception of lacking 
proactivity becomes manageable. It becomes something we can actually do something 
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about. And thus, it opens up for a possibility to improve such cross-cultural 
collaborations. 
The theoretical contribution of this chapter lies in the identification of a fourth type of 
presentational rituals, namely talking up. In Kunda’s (1992) original work there are 
three types of presentational rituals, but non of them can account for presentational 
rituals, where subordinates are put in the driver’s seat as they are talking up. Arguably, 
this notion of talking up is a significant construct in organizations, such as the client-
side organization in my empirical context, where proactive subordinate behavior is 
considered valuable. As this notion of proactive behavior has become quite common in 
today’s organizations I argue that the talking up presentational ritual is a significant 
addition to Kunda’s three types as this allows for a more elaborate understanding of 
how proactivity and employee agency is manifested in modern organizations.  
In the analytical section on social construction of groups I have introduced how the 
native Danish vendor-side actors have a unique position in the outsourcing 
collaboration between the client-organization and the vendor-organization as they in a 
sense are a part of both the client-side group and the vendor-side group and at the same 
time not fully a part of any of the groups. In the next chapter I will take a closer look at 
their role as boundary spanners alongside other clusters of boundary spanners 
identified in the empirical context. Thus, the next chapter will take a closer look at how 
boundary spanners influence perceived trustworthiness.  
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CHAPTER VIII: SPANNING THE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
BOUNDARY 
Introduction 
The importance of boundary spanning in intra- as well as inter-organizational work is 
by no means a new revelation and “[p]eople who span boundaries of various fields 
have long been identified in the organization literature as boundary-spanners” (Levina 
& Vaast, 2013, 294). Authors such as Merleau-Ponty (1964), Tajfel (1978), and 
Tushman & Scanlan (1981) have earlier articulated interest in boundary spanning. 
However, the “increased globalization of organizations and markets has created a need 
for simultaneously spanning multiple cultural, institutional, temporal, and spatial 
boundaries” (Levina & Vaast, 2013: 285) and thus it is safe to say that boundary 
spanning has become an increasingly complex matter over the latter twenty years. The 
increased globalization of IT-work serves as a good example of this complexity, as 
Levina & Vaast (2008) point out: 
“Increasingly, firms source more complex and strategic as well as harder to 
codify information technology projects to low-cost offshore locations. 
Completing such projects successfully requires close collaboration among 
all participants. Yet, achieving such collaboration is extremely difficult 
because of the complexity of the context: multiple and overlapping 
boundaries associated with diverse organizational and national contexts 
separate the participants.” (Levina & Vaast, 2008: 307) 
In the last chapter I have identified a number of groupings in the empirical context I 
am investigating and I have argued how discursive constructions of groups create ‘us 
versus them’ dichotomies; and how boundary objects play an important role in 
fortifying the boundaries associated with such dichotomies. In line with other 
researchers I have found that the offshoring collaboration is characterized by multiple 
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boundaries, which arguably must be bridged simultaneously in order to achieve an 
effective and well-functioning collaboration (Espinosa et al. 2003; Hinds and Bailey 
2003). Also in line with previous research, I have found that cultural (Cramton & 
Hinds 2005; Krishna et al. 2004), organizational (Espinosa et al. 2003), and functional 
(Espinosa et al. 2003) boundaries pose challenges to collaboration in distributed team 
environments. 
In order to succeed in such distributed teamwork one must, according to Palus et al. 
(2013) “lead and also participate in shared leadership, across groups, at the junctures 
where wide-ranging experience, diverse expertise, and varied identities intersect” (p. 
206) as work is increasingly characterized by lack of shared identity and culture. That 
is, in order to succeed actors must engage in boundary spanning, which according to 
Palus et al. (2013) is required for building trust between heterogeneous groups. (Palus 
et al., 2013: 219). Within the trust literature the relationship between boundary 
spanning and trust is also recognized: “Clearly, trust across boundaries deserves further 
attention, conceptually as well as empirically” (Kroeger & Bachmann, 2013: 280) as 
“the role of boundary-spanners in building and maintaining trust between organizations 
has effectively remained a ‘black box’ in research to date” (Kroeger & Bachmann, 
2013: 253).  
In this chapter I will be zooming in on the relationship between boundary spanning and 
trust by asking the question: What is the role of boundary spanners and how do these 
boundary spanners influence perceived trustworthiness of vendor-side actors and the 
vendor organization? 
The chapter will progress as follows: First, by drawing on recent scholarly work on 
boundary spanning I will define boundary spanning and the role of boundary spanning 
in distributed teamwork; and I will introduce an analytical framework for 
understanding boundary spanners’ role in developing trust. Second, I will apply this 
analytical framework on the most significant boundary spanners. Third, based on the 
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analysis of boundary spanning activities, I will discuss some the main findings and 
reflect on how boundary spanning activities could support positive assessments of 
trustworthiness and thus pave the way for reaching, what Palus et al. (2013) calls “the 
nexus effect”. Finally, I will sum up the chapter in the section ‘Concluding Remarks’. 
Theorizing on Boundary Spanning and Trust 
Boundary Spanning Theory 
”Through their practices, agents are constantly engaged in shaping fields of 
practices as well as the boundaries that separate these fields.” (Levina & 
Vaast, 2008: 309) 
While it may be tempting to identify boundaries in specific empirical settings a priori 
we must acknowledge that boundaries are never a priori constructs that can be taken 
for granted. Rather, boundaries are, as Levina & Vaast (2008) rightly point out shaped 
by actors. Thus, in order to identify boundaries in real-life empirical cases we must not 
retreat to a priori assumptions about boundaries being problematic, for instance by 
claiming that the collaboration between two organizations will always impose 
boundaries worth investigating. Indeed, there may be a boundary, but this boundary 
may not always be perceived as a faultline (Cramton & Hinds, 2005), but can be 
unproblematic or even unnoticed. Rather, we must look for perceived differences 
(Palus et al., 2013) that instigate a demarcation between the two organizational groups 
in their collaboration. In the last chapter I have outlined how the actors socially 
construct groups; and I argue that these constructions denominate such difference. 
Thus, the analysis in this chapter will be based on the findings reported in the last 
chapter. 
However, it is important to note that a focus on differences does not automatically 
entail a focus on challenges and problems. Difference may just as well be enablers 
making way for new possibilities. Palus et al. (2013) stress that “[b]oundaries in the 
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workplace are experienced in two different ways. They may be experienced as conflict-
ridden barriers that limit human potential, restrict innovation, and stifle organizational 
and societal change. Or, boundaries may also be experienced as new frontiers at the 
intersection of ideas and cultures, where breakthrough possibilities reside” (p. 206). 
Within the boundary spanning literature five types of boundaries are found to be the 
most prevalent, namely horizontal boundaries between functions and expertise; vertical 
boundaries between different levels of status in a hierarchy; geographic boundaries; 
demographic boundaries for instance between actors with different nationalities, 
income or religious conviction; and stakeholder boundaries (Langan-Fox & Cooper, 
2013). Arguably, the last type of boundary, the stakeholder boundary, can be 
conceived of as a “catch-all” type as boundaries which cannot be categorized using one 
or more of the other four types is captured by the stakeholder boundary type.  
The boundary spanner is thus an actor who spans such boundaries by engaging in 
boundary spanning activities and “[i]n the broadest sense, boundary-spanning activities 
are actions undertaken to connect entities separated by a boundary.” (Søderberg & 
Romani, 2014). While the literature on boundary spanning often identifies actors with 
management responsibilities as boundary spanners (Levina & Vaast, 2008) it is by no 
means a role that can be fulfilled solely by actors with managerial responsibilities. 
Rather, all actors can be boundary spanners, but the literature on boundary spanning 
signifies that boundary spanners must possess certain qualities. For instance Langan-
Fox & Cooper (2013) assess that boundary spanners must have “a diverse knowledge 
base, draw on a wide range of expertise” (p. 1) and continue characterizing the 
boundary spanners as follows: [they] “are change agents, are flexible, mobile, multi-
skilled, and more than anything, connected and networked across a wide range of 
people in departments and units, both inside and outside the organization. Such 
individuals become legend and folklore in organizations: they are individuals who 
everyone wants to know, or, would like to know and to be seen with. Influence and 
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power accrues to the effective boundary spanner” (ibid.) However, it is worthwhile 
noticing that boundary spanning is not necessarily an activity that actors engage 
deliberately in. Indeed, in some cases boundary spanning is a conscious effort, but 
actors may also be engaging in boundary spanning inadvertently (Levina & Vaast, 
2013). 
Thus, while boundary spanners can be found in all parts of the organizational 
hierarchy, it requires power to be a successful boundary spanner. Such power may be 
gained from a relative surplus of “economic, intellectual, social, and symbolic capital” 
Levina & Vaast, 2008: 323) accumulated by the boundary spanners. That is, the 
boundary spanners are dependent on for instance managerial position (symbolic and 
economic capital), their subject matter expertise, experience or educational background 
(intellectual capital) or their connectedness in the organization(s), which enable them 
to use their network (social capital) to span boundaries. Thus, actors “who have 
accumulated more capital than others are able to influence others and maintain their 
own privileged positions” (Levina & Vaast, 2013: 288) 
While boundary spanning always has the purpose of connecting two or more groups in 
some way or another, the goal of the boundary spanning activities fall – according to 
Levina & Vaast (2013) – in two categories, transactive and transformative, “depending 
upon whether its practices preserve or transform the shared fields of practice in which 
they take place” (Levina & Vaast, 2013: 287). The aim of transactive boundary 
spanning is to provide translation across the boundaries and to transfer information 
between different contexts. The transactive boundary spanner is in other words 
preoccupied with making sure that transactions are handled as smooth and frictionless 
as possible. On the other hand, transformative boundary spanning aims at producing 
novel relations among actors, where the boundary spanner’s role is to act as both 
translator and negotiator with the purpose of changing the ways actors interact. In the 
words of Søderberg & Romani (2014) the “[t]ransactive mode preserves existing 
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relations in the shared fields of practice in which they take place, whereas [the] 
transformative mode changes the shared fields of practice in which they take place” (p. 
4). 
The conceptualization of boundary spanning as two different modes, namely 
transactive and transformative, resembles ‘The Boundary Spanning Leadership Model’ 
developed by Palus et al. (2013), where the authors argue that boundary spanning 
progresses from a great divide characterized by actors belonging to distinctively 
different groups with no (known) commonalities to a state of nexus effect where “ideas 
connect in new ways at the intersection of group boundaries, creating something new, 
facilitating a significant change, or solving a problem that can only be realized when 
groups work together” (Palus et al., 2013, 211). 
Palus et al. (2013) found six categories of boundary spanning practices, namely 
buffering, reflecting, connecting, mobilizing, weaving and transforming. Palus et al. 
(2013) explain that three “successive strategies for boundary-spanning organize the 
practices: The initial strategy of managing boundaries (featuring the practices of 
buffering and reflecting) leads to the strategy of forging common ground (featuring the 
practices of connecting and mobilizing), and finally the strategy of discovering new 
frontiers (featuring the practices of weaving and transforming)” (p. 211) are progressed 
through in order to obtain the nexus effect. The model devised by Palus et al. (2013) 
connects very well to contributions on boundary spanning from other streams of 
literature (Søderberg & Romani, 2014), such as, for instance, the Mapping-Bridging-
Integrating model (DiStefano & Maznevski, 2000) coming from the literature on cross-
cultural management. 
Arguably, the first three practices where group identities are defined within each group 
(buffering); where groups are sensitized to each others’ values and expertize 
(reflecting); and where person-to-person linkages are established in order to establish 
inter-group trust (connecting) enable the groups to interact in a transactive way. The 
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two following practices, where a common purpose and shared identity across groups 
are crafted (mobilizing); and where the groups are encouraged to maintain their own 
distinctiveness while integrating each group in a larger common whole (weaving); are 
practices aimed at being able to cross boundaries and create new identities 
(transforming). 
Palus et al. (2013) explain that the sixth practice, transforming, “can be thought of as a 
gestalt, as the integrated totality of the six boundary-spanning practices. It is the 
explicit intent of transforming that defines it as a practice – to crosscut boundaries of 
identity in search of new and emergent possibilities. When this occurs, problems that 
were previously intractable can be resolved, and solutions that felt far beyond reach, 
become not just viable but fully realizable. This is the Nexus Effect fully realized” (p. 
215). This suggests that when the nexus effect is realized boundaries are effectively 
spanned and become non-boundaries and what were earlier two groups, is now one 
common group where the earlier work practices are transformed and the group is 
reaping the benefits of the transformative boundary spanning efforts. When reaching 
this stage the boundary spanner has rendered himself obsolete.  
Boundary Spanning and Trustworthiness 
Palus et al. (2013) argue that the practice of connecting is important to build trust 
between actors from different groups. Consequently, in order to obtain effective 
transactive as well as transformative boundary spanning they see trust as a necessary 
mean – and something that happens in a specific practice, the practice of connecting. 
While I do agree to the necessity of trust I argue, however, that we must refine our 
view on trust and acknowledge that trust is not something that is stable and has a “once 
implemented it will work forever” logic to it. Rather, trust is, as I have argued in 
Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’ an ongoing process, characterized by suspension 
(Möllering, 2006). Rather than confining the important trust building, I argue that it 
should be conceived of as an ongoing process that starts with the practice of buffering 
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and continuous throughout the practice-spiral to transforming. I argue that this 
processual view on trust building is already – inadvertently – build into the ‘Boundary 
Spanning Leadership Model’ developed by Palus et al. (2013). However, a more 
refined view on trust is needed to excavate how the model can in fact be seen as a 
model for trust building. To elaborate, I will walk through the six steps of the model 
with a trust perspective in mind.  
The cornerstone of the first practice, buffering, is to create safety. Palus et al. (2013) 
point out that actors “cannot collaborate effectively across boundaries until they first 
feel protected and safe within their own group” (p. 212). Therefore, they suggest 
practicing differentiation before pursuing any form of integration between the groups, 
which many “find counterintuitive and mistakenly pursue integration before the groups 
feel sufficiently safe within their own identities” (ibid.). I argue that this practice of 
creating a safe environment is in fact the first step towards establishing trust as it 
“enhances members’ willingness to share their knowledge and skills, and as a result, 
they are not only better able to identify and utilize more effective performance 
strategies” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 864). As I have argued in Chapter II: ‘Theory on 
Trust’ a perception of psychological safety improves team members’ engagement as 
they are not refraining themselves from sharing ideas and expressing opinions, due to 
fear of unknown consequences. The primary aim of the second practice, reflecting, is 
to foster respect among inter-group actors by gaining insights into each other’s values 
and expertise. Again, this is closely tied to trust building, insofar the foundation for a 
trusting work environment is positive assessments of the counterpart’s abilities, 
integrity and benevolence, which to a great extent is synonymous with values and 
expertise. The third practice, connecting, is aimed at linking actors across groups on an 
individual level and hereby establish “inter-group trust – a state of mutual confidence 
and integrity that develops when boundaries are suspended and new relationships are 
built” (Palus et al., 2013: 213). What is important is to note that this trust cannot and 
will not be created without the two prior practices. Arguably, Palus et al. (2013) treat 
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trust – as much of the management literature – as the salt and pepper of the recipe for a 
effective organizational setup: It is hardly given attention, but considered as something 
that “should just be there”. However, I argue that Palus et al. (2013) implicitly (and 
inadvertently, I suspect) have established a reasonable foundation through the first two 
practices, to actually be able to say that trust can and should be created by connecting.  
While I do agree that an initial level of trust can be established by the means of 
connecting I argue that trust development only starts here. It is not a strong form of 
trust and it is not the only form of trust that is necessary in an effective inter-
organizational collaboration. The fourth practice, mobilizing, evolves around building a 
community with a common purpose and a shared identity. Arguably, this is also an 
important step in the creation of trust. However, it is a different kind of trust that is at 
stake here, namely a collective form of trust, where actors cannot solely rely on 
interpersonal trust across boundaries, but must also develop trust in ‘the other’ group 
as well as the new shared group i.e. the community. In order to develop such a 
community and mobilize actors to engage in doing so, assessments of trustworthiness 
again become important; however, this time at a collective level. Consequently, actors 
must be able to assess ability and integrity at a collective level – that is, of the other 
organization. This collective trust becomes even more important in the fifth practice, 
weaving, where “new collaborations across groups with a common purpose” (Palus et 
al., 2013: 215) is instigated as these new collaborations result in “inter-group 
interdependence – a state of collaborations and collective learning that develops when 
boundaries are interlaced within a larger whole” (op.cit. p. 215). The keyword here is 
interdependence, signifying that the nature of the relationship changes from a state 
where the collaborators are not directly dependent on each other to complete a task, to 
a situation where they are. Such interdependence introduces the need for higher levels 
of trust as the risk is substantially higher, when one is dependent on another party to 
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fulfill one’s own obligations than in situations where the contribution of others does 
not directly affect one’s ability to perform own tasks, but “only” the overall result.  
The sixth practice, transforming is defined as “the integrated totality of the six 
boundary-spanning practices” (Palus et al., 2013: 215), where the actors recursively 
“cut against the grain of their respective boundaries, thereby opening themselves up to 
change” (ibid.). Arguably, this requires that the perception of groups change from 
being an ‘us and them’ thinking to an ‘us’ thinking; and in terms of trust this 
movement towards ‘us’ thinking requires that trusting behavior is “more affective and 
intuitive rather than calculative” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 865). Trust thus shifts from 
being solely cognition-based to also being affect-based, on an organizational level. 
Within the vast majority of trust literature collective forms of trust are assumed to be 
purely cognitive (Schoorman et al., 2007). This is countered by Kroeger & Bachmann 
(2013) who maintain that “actors can develop normative [affect-based] trust in an 
organization” (p. 260) if and when they can relate to the guiding ideas and values of 
that organization. Consequently, affect-based trust in an organization relies on  “having 
formed a correct impression of the organization’s normative principles” (ibid.), which I 
argue is necessary in order to open up to changes imposed by the break-down of group 
boundaries and establishment of ‘us’ thinking as the sixth practice of transformation 
requires.  
Two Types of Boundary Spanners: Intermediaries and Connectors 
The third practice devised by Palus et al. (2013) is, as said about connecting, which 
they elaborate as a practice where person-to-person linkages are established. The 
choice of the word, connecting, is important here because it outlines the core activity 
of the boundary spanner, namely as someone who connects actors from disparate 
groups to each other. As opposed to this one could also devise of a boundary spanner 
as an intermediary stands between two groups of actors and acts as a translator. A 
boundary spanner acting as an intermediary may, in the short run, arguably achieve the 
 261 
same result, namely effective collaboration between two groups. However, I argue that 
there is a significant difference between the two types of boundary spanning in the 
longer run. Arguably, the success of an intermediary is tied to an immediate, practical 
and instrumental connotation, it is about making effective collaboration possible as fast 
as possible. In contrast, succeeding as a connector is essentially about rendering 
oneself unnecessary. That is, when a boundary spanner acts as a connector he is 
supporting actors from the two groups in interacting directly. To stay with the 
translation metaphor employed earlier, one can say that the connector essentially helps 
actors learn each other’s languages or find a common language. 
The difference is also important because it addresses two different scholarly 
perspectives on boundaries, namely a social institutionalized perspective and an 
emergent and dynamic perspective (Corporaal et al., 2013). In the social 
institutionalized perspectives boundaries are conceived of as relatively stable and 
demarcating discontinuity in context and relations (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005), 
whereas the perspective on boundaries as emergent and dynamic emphasizes that 
boundaries are socially constructed as they arise from differences in practice (Levina 
and Vaast 2008, Watson-Manheim et al. 2012) and thus also are subject to change, 
when practices change. Given my social constructivist stance, I argue, in line with both 
Levina & Vaast (2008; 2013) and Palus et al. (2013) that boundaries are indeed 
emergent and dynamic and thus connecting what at first seem as disparate groups is 
indeed possible, which, in the longer run can facilitate that the actors engage directly 
with each other without the aid of the boundary spanner. This does not suggest that 
adhering to an emergent and dynamic social constructivist perspective rejects that 
boundary spanners can – and do – act as intermediaries, but merely that it is possible to 
act as a connector and influence the negotiation of boundaries, too. 
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Trust-Preparatory Boundary Spanning Activities 
Above I have argued how ’The Boundary Spanning Leadership Model’ developed by 
Palus et al. (2013), by the means of the review of trust literature provided in Chapter II, 
can be utilized as a model for trust development. I have pointed to how the six 
practices of boundary spanning need to be expanded in order to cater for trust 
development. Thus, I have argued that trust is not something that can be established as 
”by the flick of a switch” in a specific practice, bur rather something that must be 
carefully catered for throughout the boundary spanning practices.  By doing so, I argue 
that ‘The Boundary Spanning Leadership Model’ is significantly augmented, but at the 
same time this model provides a significant and solid foundation for understanding 
how boundary spanning and trust development intersect.  
Furthermore, I have tentatively aligned ‘The Boundary Spanning Leadership Model’ 
with Levina & Vaast’s (2013) two modes of boundary spanning. Below is an 
illustration of how the six practices devised by Palus et al. (2013) and Levina & 
Vaast’s (2013) two modes of boundary spanning are connected (figure 8.1).  
The model furthermore aligns the main objectives for creation of trust that I have 
presented above two the theoretical constructs from Palus et al. (2013) and Levina & 
Vaast (2013). Finally, the model introduces what I call trust-preparatory boundary 
spanning which I will attend to in greater detail below. 
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In line with Palus et al. (2013) I conceive of the first two practices as preparatory as 
they are preambles to actual collaboration. Consequently, they are sequentially placed 
before what Levina & Vaast (2013) call transactive boundary spanning and are a 
necessary preparation for the same. Thus, in terms of trust development the main 
objective for the boundary spanner is to establish a foundation for trustful collaboration 
by first creating psychological safety within the group and subsequently to facilitate 
assessments of “the other’s” ability and integrity. I call this trust-preparatory boundary 
spanning activities at the interpersonal level. If this boundary spanning activity is 
completed successfully (and provided that the actors find reason to make positive 
assessments of their counterparts’ abilities and integrity) the actors can engage in a 
transactive boundary-spanning mode characterized by interpersonal trust. 
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Insofar, the organizational goal is to “transform the shared fields of practice” (Levina 
& Vaast, 2013: 287) and thus proceed to a transformative mode of boundary spanning, 
the next challenge is to establish collective trust. In order to do so the boundary 
spanners are tasked with paving the way for assessments of ability and integrity at a 
collective level. That is, to assist the actors from one organizational entity in 
(positively) assessing the other organizational entity at a collective level, where it is the 
organization’s ability and integrity, rather than that of the individual counterparts that 
is assessed. This boundary-spanning effort initially takes place in parallel with actual 
collaboration among the actors, who at this point in time is engaged in a transactive 
mode of collaboration. However, in order to achieve the highest level of collaboration 
– and experience the nexus effect (Palus et al., 2013) – there is a second step to the 
trust-preparatory boundary spanning activities at the collective level, namely the 
facilitation of affect-based trust. According to Palus et al. (2013) actors will only be 
able to engage in the sixth practice of transforming and unleash the potential of 
enabling reinvention insofar they can relate to each other across groups in a way where 
they conceive of themselves as belonging to a common ‘us’, which requires them to be 
able to positively relate to the guiding ideas and values (Kroeger & Bachmann, 2013) 
of what was initially perceived as “the other group”. Arguably, this requires positive 
assessments of benevolence (Meyer et al., 1995) and thus the challenge for the 
boundary spanners in terms of establishing trust is to facilitate that actors are positively 
relating to the other group’s values; and where the actors “develop and institutionalize 
repertoires or ways of signaling trust and trustworthiness” (Kroeger & Bachmann, 
2013: 254) across groups. 
At the outset of this chapter I introduced the research sub-question: What is the role of 
boundary spanners and how do these boundary spanners influence perceived 
trustworthiness of vendor-side actors and the vendor organization in the eyes of the 
client-side actors? By taking departure in the analytical identification of groups in the 
empirical context laid forth in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I will first 
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describe the boundary spanners’ position in the empirical field; and by means of the 
analytical model devised above I will analyze how the boundary spanners influence 
trustworthiness, by focusing on trust-preparatory boundary spanning activities at the 
interpersonal level and trust-preparatory boundary spanning activities at the collective 
level, respectively. 
As the main concern of this chapter is to understand how the boundary spanners 
influence trustworthiness specifically and not as such how the boundary spanners in 
general influence collaboration the boundary spanning theories from Levina & Vaast 
(2008; 2013) and Palus et al. (2013) introduced above will not be the main focus. 
These theories have been introduced to devise of an analytical framework in which I 
can capture how trustworthiness and boundary spanning is connected, not to be 
analytical instruments in their own right. Thus, the terminology provided by Levina & 
Vaast (2008; 2013) and Palus et al. (2013) will be put to use when relevant in the trust 
and trustworthiness discourse.  
Boundary Spanning Actors’ Position in the Field 
In Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I have identified three significant, socially 
constructed groups in the empirical field and thus also three boundaries that requires 
boundary-spanning activities: a national boundary, an organizational boundary and a 
geographical boundary. Similar to all three groupings is that the client-side actors 
stands on one side and the offshore vendor-side staff on the other – however, the latter 
with a few notable exceptions, namely the actors who as per their job descriptions are 
bound to have frequent contact with the client-side actors. Between these two groups 
stand the native Danish vendor-side actors and the onsite-allocated Indian vendor-side 
actors, who – as argued in Chapter VII – are fast enrolled in the group of the 
knowledgeable few, when they are deployed onsite and as a consequence span 
organizational and national boundaries. Thus, four clusters of boundary spanners 
surface: The native Danish vendor-side actors; the Indian vendor-side actors deployed 
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onsite; the vendor-side actors who given their functional roles act as intermediaries; 
and the OMC management team, which I label the managerial boundary spanners. In 
the remainder of this section I will take a closer look at how the four clusters of 
boundary spanners are positioned as boundary spanners.  
Common to all four clusters of boundary spanners is that they are all employed in the 
vendor organization. However, while their organizational affinity is of course relevant, 
I have – for the sake of readability – chosen to designate them without their 
organizational affiliation. Hence, the four clusters of boundary spanners will be 
designated as a) the Danish boundary spanners, b) the onsite-deployed boundary 
spanners, c) the functional boundary spanners, and d) the managerial boundary 
spanners in the remainder of this chapter. 
The Danish Boundary Spanners 
Throughout my fieldwork it has become abundantly clear that the native Danish 
vendor-side actors are instrumental in making the collaboration between the vendor 
and the client work. They have a privileged position due to their dual organizational 
affiliation: All of them are former employees of the client, who during the first wave of 
outsourcing were moved to the at-that-time vendor and subsequently, when the new 
vendor was chosen, they became employees of the vendor. The client-side actors 
perceive them as colleagues and they perceive the client-side actors as colleagues, too 
(see Chapter V for a more elaborate discussion of this). Furthermore, the vendor-side 
actors acknowledge their importance and find them instrumental to the collaboration, 
as they “understand the environment […] and [can] translate that to the offshore 
[actors] […] bringing that knowledge to us” (Interview #23).  
By observing office life at the client’s office it does not take much time to realize that 
this cluster of boundary spanners take up an important role. They are approached by 
the client-side actors several times each day, where they are asked to look into some 
more or less concrete issues and they do so willingly. In a similar way, they are often 
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used by the offshore vendor-side managers and employees to convey messages, solve 
problems and act as intermediaries, when something complex or something which 
constitutes a potential problem, such as a negative report on progress that needs to be 
conveyed to the client-side. Interesting, however, is not just what this cluster of 
boundary spanners do, but also how they do it. By and large they are used as 
intermediaries. That is, when something complex or problematic needs to be conveyed 
from one group to another, they are put in charge of communicating this, but they do 
so in a fashion where a message is given to them and they convey the message without 
directly involving the originator of the message. To a certain extent this resembles the 
character of the messenger we know from old western movies, who are trusted with an 
important message, which he crosses the prairie in all kinds of weather to faithfully 
convey to the recipient.  
Interestingly, and continuing the analogy – it seems they never have to wear protective 
armor or a sign saying “Don’t shoot the messenger”. In Shakespeare’s tragedy ‘Antony 
and Cleopatra’ the latter threatens the messenger who is conveying that Antony 
married another, to which the messenger replies: “gracious madam, I that do bring the 
news made not the match”. However, in this empirical context it seems that such a 
disclaimer is not needed. On numerous occasions I have overheard bad news conveyed 
to the client-side actors by the Danish boundary spanners and in no instance has the 
discontent about the message displayed by the client-side actors been aimed at the 
messenger, bur rather at the vendor organization.  
In a similar vein, I have on several occasions observed phone meetings between the 
client-side actors and the vendor-side actors, where one of the Danish boundary 
spanners has been present. Just like the Danish boundary spanners are able to interact 
in the open-office setting explained above without “being shot”, his role in the phone 
meetings are also executed without the boundary spanner being in the line of fire 
himself, despite critical comments made by the client-side actors on the vendor’s way 
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of handling certain tasks and issues. On the contrary, I have on two such occasions 
observed how one of the client-side actors have muted the microphone in order to 
discuss why “they” – that is, the vendor-side actors – are not handling a task the way it 
is expected. On these two occasions the boundary spanner has clearly not been 
considered as a member of  “them” by the client-side actors, but on the contrary treated 
as a colleagues, as a part of the “us” by the client-side actors (Field Notes 20130213; 
20130910).  
With regards to the relationship between the Danish boundary spanners and the Indian 
vendor-side actors, the Danish boundary spanners are also used as intermediaries. The 
Indian vendor-side actors – both offshore and onsite – all speak highly about the 
Danish boundary spanners and stress their importance in the collaboration. However, it 
is worthwhile noticing that they do so without expressing any form of collegiality. 
They are perceived as instrumental in the collaboration, but even though they are 
formally employees of the vendor’s organization, they are not thought of as colleagues, 
as the quote below illustrates: 
“Obviously if we have our own resource we don’t have to spend as much as 
we do on them and if you know that your resource in India can do the job 
over here, then obviously we will have them [Indian vendor-side actors] 
here. The reason they are here is we don’t have a guy for that place yet.” 
(Interview #5 – vendor-side actor) 
In the quote I have underlined how the Indian vendor-side actor constructs us versus 
them dichotomies and it is clear that the Danish boundary spanners are excluded from 
the we-group, consisting of the rest of the vendor-side team.  
Within the boundary spanning literature a boundary spanner is characterized by being 
connected and having a network across a wide range of people (Langan-Fox & Cooper, 
2013). With regards to the Danish boundary spanners it is striking how the relationship 
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with actors from their own organization is characterized by lack of connectedness and 
network. Thus, it is by no means surprising that their role as boundary spanners is by 
and large limited to that of an intermediary. While the client-side actors treasure them 
as colleagues, they simply do not enjoy a position in their own organization that 
enables them to connect actors from the two groups.  
The Onsite-Deployed Boundary Spanners 
The onsite-deployed vendor-side actors constitute a second group of boundary 
spanners. As I have shown in Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ the vendor-side 
actors that are deployed onsite quickly enjoy positive assessments of their abilities, 
integrity and benevolence and, as argued in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ 
they are rapidly included in the group of the knowledgeable few when they start to 
work at the client’s premises.  
Within their own organization they are also considered important actors, whose 
engagements and abilities are praised by the vendor-side management (Interview #23; 
Field Notes 20130909, 20131219) and thus they are not selected as the vendor’s onsite 
representatives by chance, but rather because their competences are assessed as 
important assets at or in the client’s organization. Throughout my observation studies 
as well as during interviews it has become evident that they, much like the Danish 
boundary spanners, act as intermediaries, whose presence eases communication of 
complex or problematic issues. But in addition to their role as intermediaries I have on 
some occasions also observed them act as connectors by explaining organizational 
processes in the vendor organization to client-side actors; by referring client-side actors 
to subject matter experts in the vendor organization; introducing the client-side actors 
to them; and by emphasizing significant contributions and competences by offshore 
vendor-side actors during phone and video meetings. These kinds of boundary 
spanning activities are worth noticing, because they constitute examples of trust-
preparatory boundary spanning activities in which the onsite-deployed boundary 
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spanners use the trust bestowed in them to render their offshore colleagues and their 
organization trustworthy in the eyes of the client-side actors. I will return to this point 
later in this chapter in much greater detail.   
The Functional Boundary Spanners 
The third cluster of boundary spanners, the functional boundary spanners, is comprised 
of various actors who are assigned a boundary spanning role vis-à-vis their functional 
role. Specifically, the cluster consists of the two incident managers and the change 
manager. Arguably, this cluster consists of actors with quite different roles. However, 
they also have significant similarities, namely that they are all working in India at the 
OMC and thus far away from the client-side actors, and their abilities to interact face-
to-face with client-side actors are limited to once or twice per year. Furthermore, given 
their functions all entail the role of an intermediary however in different scenarios.  
In Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I have shown how the 
incident managers are instrumental in communicating the occurrence of critical 
incidents as well as the progress, challenges and resolve of the same. They do so by 
adhering strictly to a standardized process, where they are in charge of engaging with 
the client-side actors themselves but also for assembling a team at the OMC and 
coordinating conference calls, where the OMC team briefs the client-side actors on the 
current status and next steps in resolving the issue. As I have also shown in Chapter 
VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ the relationship between the incident 
managers and the client-side actors is amicable and the incident managers are 
acknowledged and rewarded for their good work. Thus, much like the onsite-deployed 
vendor-side actors, the incident managers are trusted by the client-side actors and can 
use their position as trusted collaborators to further the trustworthiness of the OMC 
staff as well as the vendor organization and hereby ultimately facilitate trustful 
relations. 
 271 
Much like the incident managers, the vendor-side change manager is also instrumental 
in coordination between client-side and vendor-side actors, when changes to the 
technical infrastructure are implemented. However, as the change manager – as 
reported in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ – does not enjoy 
the same level of acknowledgement by the client-side actors as the incident managers 
do, the change manager does not have the same privileged position from where he can 
engage in trust-preparatory boundary spanning between the two groups. Continuing the 
analogy from earlier in this chapter, the change manager is quite often in a position 
where he is taking the heat for the vendor-side team’s lack of adherence to the standard 
processes related to change and release management. An example is the very first 
change board meeting I observed (Field Notes 20130219), where one of the client-side 
actors engaged with a vendor-side technical lead responsible for the technical part of a 
specific change. The client-side actor was repeatedly asking about the technical 
solution to make sure that this solution did not conflict with other pending changes. 
Prior to this questioning the change manager had asked the client-side actor if he had 
any questions and after posing his questions and getting satisfactory replies from the 
technical lead he mutes the microphone and says: “Dammit, that is what he [the change 
manager] is supposed to ask about before the meeting. That’s his job” (Field Notes 
20130219).  
The situation above is very illustrative for the relationship between the client-side 
actors and the vendor-side change manager as it clearly shows that the client-side 
actors do not trust the vendor-side change manager to perform what they perceive as 
his duty and that they need to take on control – not to make sure the change manager 
got it right, but to make sure that it is done at all. Arguably, had the change manager 
enjoyed the same level of acknowledgement of his competences and engagement as is 
the case with the incident managers, the onsite-deployed vendor-side actors and the 
Danish boundary spanners, the situation would be different. In such a case the trust 
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bestowed in him could facilitate trust in the offshore vendor-side actors and in the 
vendor’s ability to meet expectations.  
The Managerial Boundary Spanners 
The last cluster of boundary spanners, the managerial boundary spanners, consists 
primarily of two actors, namely the Head of the OMC who is also the Service Delivery 
Manager for operations and the Service Delivery Manager for application 
development, who reports to the Head of the OMC. The role of these two boundary 
spanners evolves around managing their subordinates, the vendor-side actors, head 
problem solving in critical incidents and engage with client-side managers in strategic 
development of the collaboration as well as report on the work being done on an 
aggregated level. That is, they have a dual role, where they are the primary contact 
persons for strategic issues for the senior managers in the client’s organization and they 
are the primary representatives for the vendor when problems arise, and those who 
engage with the operative client-side actors. On occasions other vendor-side actors are 
brought in for specific purposes and assist or supplement the two primary boundary 
spanners in this cluster. For instance the global head of the media industry service line 
is brought in on strategic discussions that exceed the scope of the current contract and 
heads of specialized units are brought in to discuss their specific areas of expertise if 
the vendor sees an opportunity to engage with the client in a new area.  
The cluster of managerial boundary spanners has an important role in representing the 
vendor organization towards the senior management from the client and given their 
engagement with client-side decision makers they are arguably instrumental in 
bringing in new business from the client as well as maintaining the current level of 
business. The importance of this cluster of boundary spanners is substantial given the 
fact that they are the only interface the client-side CIO, who is the overall responsible 
for the outsourcing engagement, has with the vendor organization. In his own words, 
when asked about the frequency and type of communication he has with the vendor-
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side actors: “No interaction. Only with the managerial level – and in an ordinary week 
I do not have contact with them. Zero – not a single email or anything. We have a 
steering group meeting once a month, that’s it” (Interview #4). Thus, in addition to 
standardized reports and input from his own subordinates, the highest ranking officer 
in the client’s IT organization makes decisions based solely on input from the 
managerial boundary spanners from the vendor’s organization. 
Trust-Preparatory Boundary Spanning Activities 
Within the offshore outsourcing collaboration the four clusters of boundary spanners 
are all, in each their way, instrumental to bridging boundaries and connecting groups. 
As I have argued in the theoretical section of this chapter the boundary spanners are 
charged with two primary tasks in order to facilitate trust between groups. First, they 
are to engage in trust-preparatory boundary spanning activities at the interpersonal 
level in order to facilitate interpersonal trust between individual members of the 
different groups; it includes establishing psychological safety within the group and 
subsequently, at the individual level, rendering positive assessments of actors from the 
other group possible. Secondly, they are to engage in trust-preparatory boundary 
spanning activities at the collective level in order to facilitate trust in the other group, 
which includes rendering positive assessments of the other group possible at a 
cognitive level and subsequently at an emotional level.  
At the Interpersonal Level 
With regards to the perception of psychological safety among the client-side actors I 
maintain that a psychological safe work environment is well catered for. Among the 
client-side actors there seems to be a strong cohesion. They support each other and 
throughout my observation studies it has become clear to me that they also enjoy a 
great deal of management support from client-side senior managers. The senior 
management repeatedly mentions the importance of the client-side actors in running 
the outsourced IT-setup; and among the client-side actors there is a strong sense of 
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collegiality and mutual respect. Arguably, the historical background of IT-outsourcing 
in the client company contributes positively to the feeling of psychological safety 
among the client-side actors. Unlike many other outsourcing endeavors, where a 
certain percentage of the total workforce is outsourced and the remaining employees 
live with a constant anxiety of being ‘next in line’ in terms of being laid off and 
substituted by less salary-heavy resources offshore, this specific outsourcing 
engagement outsourced all IT and had only one IT-employee remaining back in 2007. 
His task was to build a new client-side IT-organization capable of managing the 
outsourced IT activities. That is, all current staff has been hired to do exactly what they 
are doing. Furthermore, the internal IT-department has been growing steadily over the 
last five years, with no examples of employees being laid off due to increased 
outsourcing – on the contrary, the complexity of engaging in full-scale outsourcing has 
demanded more internal resources.    
However, while Palus et al. (2013), stress the importance of establishing safety within 
the group, this does not mean that external factors do not have an impact on the 
perception of psychological safety among the client-side actors and, given their 
position, the boundary spanners are the ones whom the client-side actors’ 
psychological safety is most prone to be influenced by. However, I argue that none of 
the four clusters of boundary spanners have a negative impact in the client-side actors’ 
perception of psychological safety: The Danish boundary spanners are by and large 
considered colleagues; and the onsite-deployed boundary spanners are quickly adopted 
into the group of the knowledgeable few by the client-side actors, and there is 
absolutely nothing that suggests that the client-side actors see their presence as 
threatening in any way. On the contrary, the onsite-deployed boundary spanners are 
seen as a positive asset with regards to improving the offshore-outsourcing 
collaboration. Finally, the managerial boundary spanners as well as the functional 
boundary spanners are also acknowledged as important in order to obtain a sound 
collaboration. Despite the skepticism towards to specific change manager’s abilities the 
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client-side actors acknowledge the importance of the role and do not in any way seem 
negatively affected in terms of psychological safety. That is, despite their doubt in the 
vendor-side change manager’s ability to perform the change management role, this 
does not seem to affect their perception of psychological safety. All things considered, 
one can only characterize the client’s internal IT-department as a psychological safe 
environment.  
Arguably, the perceptions of psychological safety are in place among the client-side 
actors. Thus, the next step in order to facilitate trust between the groups is for the 
boundary spanners to facilitate positive assessments of members of the other group at 
an interpersonal level. However, facilitating such assessments at an interpersonal level 
requires that actors from the two groups be exposed to each other. Arguably, the 
cluster of boundary spanners I have labeled the functional boundary spanners  - the 
incident managers and the change manager – do exactly that in each their way by 
introducing vendor-side actors working on a given task to the client-side actors, and 
the managerial boundary spanners also contribute to establishing interpersonal 
connections between actors from the two groups, for instance by putting subordinates 
in the driving seat at team presentations during the client’s visit at the OMC, where the 
head of the OMC consequently took upon himself a very anonymous role and made 
room for his subordinates to engage directly with the client-side actors. During one of 
my first one-on-one talks with the Head of the OMC I cautiously enquired about how 
he perceived his own role, because I – given my previous experience in working with 
Indians and engaging with Indian managers – found his somewhat anonymous 
approach striking and unusual. 
He explains to me that it is very important for him to empower his people. To 
have them talk themselves and meet with the client-side visitors. (Field Notes 
20130910)  
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During later talks, when I re-visited the OMC early in 2014, we had a chance to talk 
more about this role. At one point during this visit and after I had had the chance to get 
to know him better and build a better sense of rapport we were in his car on the way 
out to dinner and I told him that I found his approach striking, for the very reason 
mentioned above. He explained to me that he saw it as a central part of his job to aid 
his subordinates in engaging directly with the client-side actors and added that he was 
well aware that his management philosophy was somewhat different than most Indian 
managers, but that his experience nevertheless told him that it was important for the 
success of the collaboration that the managers do not become bottlenecks (Field Notes 
20140123).   
Thus, both of the offshore clusters of boundary spanners are using their own positions 
to facilitate interaction between client-side and vendor-side actors. They act as 
connectors. The same cannot be said about the two clusters of boundary spanners 
stationed onsite, at the client’s premises in Denmark. While they are arguably the two 
most significant clusters of boundary spanners by virtue of co-location and their daily 
contact with the client-side actors, they are predominantly acting as intermediaries, 
who take on tasks from the client-side actors front stage, engage with the relevant 
vendor-side actors back stage – invisible to the client-side actors, and reappear front 
stage with a solution. Thus, how such tasks are solved are rendered invisible to the 
client-side actors; it is a black box, where vendor-side actors unknown to the client-
side actors engage in problem solving of which the outcome is presented by the two 
clusters of onsite boundary spanners. While this may to some extent be efficient and in 
line with the tactical purpose I claim that it is also problematic, which I will return to 
when I discuss opportunities for advancing trustworthiness later in this chapter. 
At the Collective Level 
In order to engage in a transformative mode of collaboration where the actors from 
each group are willing and able to adapt to each other’s ways of working and transform 
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their own work practices it is arguably necessary to establish trust at a collective level. 
In order to do so the “other” collective must be assessed as trustworthy be actors on an 
individual as well as an aggregate level. Thus, the question is whether and how 
trustworthiness assessments of the vendor-side organization are rendered possible to 
the client-side actors by the four clusters of boundary spanners. We have already 
established that the client-side actors perceive all four clusters of boundary spanners 
(with the notable exception of the change manager) as trustworthy. The client-side 
actors are thus willing to place important tasks in the hands of the boundary spanners. 
However, the interesting question is whether the boundary spanners when acting as 
intermediaries are ascribed indispensability or if a continuous perception of success is 
ascribed to collective ability and integrity of the vendor organization. Are the boundary 
spanners assigned prerogative traits; or do the client-side actors perceive them, over 
time, as interchangeable with other vendor-side actors with similar qualifications? 
Before commencing into an analysis of collective trustworthiness in the specific case a 
few words on what a collective is, is necessary. As the word suggests a collective is a 
collection of actors grouped together. In this perspective rendering assessments of 
trustworthiness possible is a question of rendering enough individual actors’ 
trustworthiness and by doing so enabling the client-side actors to draw generalized 
conclusions about the collective based on a foundation of an adequate number of 
positive assessments of trustworthiness. In other words, the boundary spanners must 
connect the client-side actors to an arbitrary number of vendor-side actors, depending 
on the “trust thresholds” of the client-side actors. That is, the client-side actors will 
assess the collective as trustworthy when they have assessed enough individuals as 
trustworthy to conclude that it is representative for the vendor organization. If we 
follow this line of thinking about collectives, one can argue that facilitation of 
assessments of the collective’s trustworthiness are impeded by the aforementioned 
black boxing of tasks because this practice renders the offshore vendor-side staff 
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invisible to the client-side actors. The argument applies to the onsite-deployed 
boundary spanners as well as the Danish boundary spanners who are routinely black 
boxing the contributions of the offshore vendor-side actors. By “protecting” the client-
side actors from understanding the nature of the contributions of the offshore vendor-
side actors, the client-side actors are effectively unable to assess the trustworthiness of 
them as they can only rely on insufficient control mechanisms, as argued in Chapter 
VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ as well as on the efforts carried out by 
the two last clusters of boundary spanners, namely the managerial boundary spanners 
and the functional boundary spanners, who, as described earlier are in fact connecting 
the client-side actors with the offshore vendor-side actors. 
But we can also conceive of a collective as something different, namely something 
more than merely a bundling of individual actors. If we follow this line of thinking 
connecting is not the only way to render positive assessments of trustworthiness 
possible. Indeed, acting as an intermediary may actually be helpful to render positive 
assessments of a collective possible insofar the boundary spanners successfully 
manage to position themselves as actors speaking and acting on behalf of the 
collective. That is, a position where they function as a link between the two sides and 
where they actively engage with the client-side actors to promote the trustworthiness of 
the vendor’s organization and organizational capabilities and values. By doing so they 
are arguably able to use their own trustworthiness to promote the organization’s 
trustworthiness, not by connecting client-side actors to the entire organization, but by 
representing the organization. Let us take a look at whether, and how, this is done in 
the concrete empirical settings by the four clusters of boundary spanners.   
By the very nature of their job the functional boundary spanners do to a high degree 
represent their organization, when they connect client-side actors with functional 
specialists at the OMC. Not because of the connecting itself, but rather because they 
demonstrate (or fail to demonstrate) their organization’s ability to execute the tasks at 
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hand. In my observation studies at the client’s headquarters in Copenhagen, I have 
repeatedly witnessed how important well-functioning processes are to the client-side 
actors’ perception of the offshore outsourcing collaboration. Thus, the smooth 
execution of processes as agreed upon seems to be an important aspect of 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the client-side actors; and the functional boundary 
spanners are indeed the primary representatives of such processes. I argue that the 
successful execution of these processes renders positive assessments of ability as well 
as integrity of the vendor organization. In a similar way, the cluster of managerial 
boundary spanners also represents their organization, both at an operational level, 
when they take charge of important tasks, and at a strategic level, when they engage 
with the client-side management to discuss improvements and new avenues for 
collaboration. When doing so, I have repeatedly observed them reference to how they 
have solved similar tasks for other clients (Field Notes 20130501; 20130815; 
20130901; 20130911). This way, they utilize the trustworthiness vested in them by the 
client-side actors to promote their organization’s abilities and integrity. These practices 
of representing, can also be described as the fifth practice from Palus et al. (2013), 
weaving, where the work practices of the groups are integrated in a larger common 
whole with consideration to the groups’ own distinctiveness. 
The two last clusters of boundary spanners – that is, the onsite-deployed boundary 
spanners and the Danish boundary spanners – are, as argued above, primarily acting as 
intermediaries and at the same time they are the ones with the highest degree of 
exposure to the client-side actors. By carrying out their jobs in a way that is 
acknowledged and appreciated by the client-side actors one can reasonably claim that 
they too are representing their organization and there is no doubt that their functions as 
being “the glue” (Interview #2) is instrumental in making the collaboration a success. 
However, it is striking that they, given their privileged position, do not seem to render 
assessments of trustworthiness at a more emotional level towards the collective 
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possible. During and after I accompanied the client-side delegation on the week-long 
trip to India, I spoke to several of the client-side actors, who expressed that they were 
positively surprised by the efforts, commitment and engagement that the offshore 
vendor-side actors show (Field Notes 20130911; 20130912, Interviews #11; #12; #15; 
#16). Interestingly however, when I during informal conversations while we were in 
India asked them what their impression of the OMC was, the first remark made by all 
of these client-side actors was not about the vendor-side actors professionalism, but 
rather about the positive impression they had had of the vendor organization’s “softer” 
side. In each their way they expressed that they had benefitted by the visit to the OMC 
as they had come to understand that the vendor organization treat their employees well 
in terms of working conditions, such as a reasonable maternity leave; have a 
reasonable working environment in office, and are committed to an agenda of 
corporate social responsibility for instance by employing people with physical 
disabilities and giving to charity. All these things were surprising to them and 
instigated a much more positive attitude towards the vendor organization in the client-
side employees as compared to their attitude prior to the visit.  
Thus, I find it striking how little the client-side actors know about the “do-good” 
activities that the vendor organization engages in – striking how little is done to present 
the vendor as benevolent to the client-side actors. Arguably, the positive assessment of 
benevolence that facilitates affect-based trust is not just about benevolence in general, 
but rather about assessments of the trustee’s benevolence specifically towards the 
trustor. However, I argue that the generalized and specific assessments of benevolence 
cannot and should not be separated. As elaborated in Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’ 
cognition-based and affect-based trust is hard to separate in practice as trusting is not 
an either-or state, where a trustor can have either cognition-based or affect-based trust 
in a trustee. Rather, the relationship between cognition-based and affect-based trust is a 
continuum, where “the impact of cognitive trust [cognition-based] fades and the impact 
of affective [affect-based] trust increases” (Greenberg et al., 2007: 332) over time. I 
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argue that establishing emotional bonds is not just a case of perceiving that the trustee 
has good will towards the trustor, but also a perception of the trustee being good-willed 
in general. That is, developing affect-based trust towards an actor, who is perceived as 
good-willed towards me, but ill willed in general seems inconceivable. Thus, 
facilitating positive assessments of the vendor-side’s benevolence in general is 
conducive for affect-based trust in the vendor.  
The onsite boundary spanners do little, if anything, to facilitate positive assessments of 
the vendor’s collective with regards to representing the vendor as benevolent in 
general, but how about the vendor’s benevolence specifically towards the client? 
Throughout my observation studies I have not come across situations where client-side 
actors have reported of benevolent actions by the vendor organization. Surely, there are 
many episodes where individual vendor-side actors are perceived as benevolent 
towards the client (as reported in this chapter as well as Chapter V: ‘Challenged by 
Distance’), but I have not encountered situations where the vendor organization as a 
collective is being perceived as benevolent. I speculate that this is not necessarily 
because the vendor-side actors do nothing to render the vendor organization benevolent 
towards the client, but rather has to do with the context, namely a contractual 
agreement, where the client-side actors assume, that any and all vendor-side actions 
that could appear to be signs of a benevolent collective are interpreted as a sort of 
“preventive maintenance”. That is, the vendor organization is often perceived as 
accommodating beyond the scope of the contractual underpinning, but in every single 
instance I have been talking to client-side actors about such accommodating acts, the 
act has been acknowledged as being accommodating, but always followed by a 
comment on the underlying motive of keeping the client happy. For instance, one of 
the client-side actors told me that “they [the vendor] will do whatever it takes to keep 
us [the client] happy. We’re a strategically important client – not necessarily the 
biggest, but we’re important to showcase their [the vendor’s] abilities to the 
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Scandinavian market” (Field Notes 20130423). This suggests that the vendor may 
actually be benevolence towards the client, but whether or not their actions are a token 
of benevolence or strategic thinking is practically unimportant, as the client-side actors 
never perceive these actions as benevolent, but rather as strategic. 
Opportunities for Advancing Trustworthiness 
Throughout this chapter I have shed light on four clusters of boundary spanners and 
their influence on client-side actors’ perceptions of vendor-side trustworthiness at an 
individual as well as a collective level. By the means of this analysis it should be clear 
that the four clusters of boundary spanners indeed play an important role connecting 
client-side actors with vendor-side actors in the offshore outsourcing engagement that 
constitute the empirical foundation for this dissertation.  
I have argued that they do so by taking upon themselves a role of either an 
intermediary or as a connector. As argued earlier in this chapter the difference between 
those two roles is important, because they signify two distinctively different ways of 
acting as boundary spanners: The intermediary stands between two groups of actors 
and acts as a translator, whereas the connector engages actively in bringing the groups 
together. Thus, while the boundary spanner may in the short run achieve the same 
result by acting as an intermediary and by acting as a connector, namely effective 
collaboration between two groups, there is a significant difference between the two 
types of boundary spanning in the longer run: By acting as an intermediary the 
boundary spanner will continuously be the center of attention, a bottleneck so to speak. 
In contrast, by acting as a connector the boundary spanner will improve actors’ ability 
to collaborate and ultimately render himself unnecessary.  
The vast majority of boundary spanning activities in the empirical context I am 
investigating are characterized by being intermediary actions. Interestingly, it seems 
that the two clusters of boundary spanners that are located offshore at the OMC are 
indeed acting as connectors when they connect their vendor-side colleagues with the 
 283 
client-side actors, but the two clusters of boundary spanners located onsite at the 
client’s office in Denmark are by and large exclusively acting as intermediaries. By 
doing so, I argue that they are in fact maintaining status quo or perhaps even fortifying 
the boundaries, rather than contributing to dissolving them. Let me elaborate on this 
claim. 
As argued in previous chapters there are several factors that challenge the offshore 
outsourcing collaboration between the client and the vendor. First, the client-side 
actors experience lack of transparency at an organizational as well as an individual 
level. That is, they do not seem to understand how the vendor organization works with 
regards to functional division of labor. On the contrary, they perceive the vendor 
organization as characterized by silos and in order to cope with the complexities of the 
vendor organization, they turn to the trusted actors from the two clusters of onsite 
boundary spanners for help. Had the two clusters of onsite boundary spanners engaged 
with the client-side actors as connectors by helping the client-side actors to understand 
the organizational and functional structures of the vendor organization it is likely that 
the client-side actors would eventually come to terms with these structures, develop 
trust in the vendor and learn to navigate themselves without the need for an 
intermediary. In a similar vein, the client-side actors do not perceive offshore vendor-
side actors as committed, engaged and proactive – that is, they do not perceive the 
vendor-side actors as trustworthy with regards to integrity and benevolence. In order to 
get things done, they approach the two clusters of onsite boundary spanners, who take 
upon them the responsibility of a given task and become intermediaries through which 
progress as well as challenges on the tasks is communicated. Second, the client-side 
actors perceive the offshore vendor-side actors as less knowledgeable, thus they do not 
perceive them as trustworthy with regards to ability. In contrast, the two clusters of 
boundary spanners working onsite are included in the group of the knowledgeable few 
and are used as knowledge intermediaries. That is, because the boundary spanners are 
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perceived as able, they are drawn upon by the client-side actors to explain business and 
technical details to the offshore vendor-side actors, instead of engaging in such an 
explanation themselves. While this practice obviously makes sense from the client-side 
actors’ time-economy perspective and is indeed also in line with the very reason for 
having vendor-side actors stationed onsite, I argue that acting as transparency and 
knowledge intermediaries in the long run have a negative impact as the vendor-side 
actors working from onsite become increasingly indispensable, as this work practice 
becomes salient. In other words, when the boundary spanners are engaging as 
intermediaries and are successful in doing so the client-side actors perceive them as 
increasingly trustworthy with regards to ability, benevolence and integrity, while the 
perceived trustworthiness of the offshore vendor-side actors remains low or even non-
existing.  
Given the fact that these two clusters of boundary spanners are strategically placed 
onsite to ease the collaboration one could argue that acting as intermediaries is exactly 
doing what they are supposed to do, namely catering for a collaboration that is as 
frictionless as possible. However, if we return to the theoretical foundation for this 
chapter and the boundary spanning leadership model devised by Palus et al. (2013), we 
must acknowledge that when boundary spanners act as intermediaries the collaborating 
organizations miss out on the possibility of being woven together into a larger common 
whole and subsequently on creating new and common identities and practices and 
hereby transforming into one common group and working in a transformative mode, 
characterized by collective trust. Thus, acting as an intermediary in the longer run is 
problematic. As argued earlier the vendor-side actors are very keen on servicing the 
client and the popular saying ‘the client is always right’ depicts the relationship 
between client-side and vendor-side actors very well. By acting as intermediaries the 
boundary spanners fortify this “one way adaptation”, in which the client-side actors 
can hand off collaborative actions to the boundary spanners as soon as it requires more 
of their attention than what is convenient. Thus, the client-side actors are not expected 
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to display collegiality by for instance helping the offshore vendor-side actors in 
developing knowledge and they are not expected to make themselves acquainted with 
the vendor’s organization and how it functions. 
Said differently, we have seen how the vendor-side boundary spanners have a unique 
position to help improve the collaboration. Because they are perceived as trustworthy 
by the client-side actors and possess the necessary capital in terms of especially 
relations and knowledge, they have the power to influence the relations between client-
side actors and offshore vendor-side actors and to facilitate positive assessments of 
trustworthiness of the vendor and the vendor-side actors. However, because the two 
clusters of boundary spanners that are most exposed to client-side actors primarily act 
as intermediaries, this potential is left unrealized. Because the boundary spanners do 
not engage in facilitating such trust building the previously identified challenges with 
regards to transparency and knowledge are left unsolved. The gaps are not bridged: 
The problems are not solved. Rather, by acting as intermediaries the boundary 
spanners provide a temporary fix, not a sustainable solution – and the gaps between the 
client and the vendor remains, because the client-side are never prompted to assess the 
trustworthiness of the offshore vendor-side actors, who therefore are not perceived as 
trustworthy.      
The Powerful Boundary Spanner 
Langan-Fox & Cooper (2013) rightly conceive of boundary spanners as people, who 
“more than anything, [are] connected and networked across a wide range of people in 
departments and units” (p. 1). By the virtue of their connectedness boundary spanners 
become instrumental in developing collaboration across groups – in this case of 
offshore outsourcing, specifically between client-side actors located in Denmark and 
vendor-side actors located in India; and by the virtue of their connectedness 
“[i]nfluence and power accrues to the effective boundary spanner” (ibid.). I argue that 
a great deal of this influence and power stems from the trust vested in them. Because 
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they are perceived as trustworthy, the actors relying on the boundary spanners are able 
to have referral trust (Jøsang et al., 2006) in their counterparts. However, this requires 
that the boundary spanners are engaging as connectors, rather than as intermediaries. 
In cases where the boundary spanners are acting as intermediaries they are indeed also 
able to be effective as Langan-Fox & Cooper (2013) point out, however, it is a very 
short-term oriented effectiveness aimed at solving the immediate problems and 
challenges at hand.  
On the contrary, when boundary spanners act as connectors they are able to facilitate 
long-term effectiveness, as they are weaving the two groups together and thus 
facilitating the nexus effect (Palus et al., 2013), where groups are dissolved and actors 
work together in a larger common whole. Arguably, this is exactly what happens when 
the managerial boundary spanners as well as the functional boundary spanners connect 
client-side actors with offshore vendor-side actors, as I have shown earlier in this 
chapter. When these two clusters of boundary spanners connect client-side actors with 
offshore vendor-side actors they facilitate positive assessments of the offshore vendor-
side actors’ trustworthiness by rendering these actors actions and contributions visible 
at an interpersonal level. By repeatedly connecting actors at an interpersonal level the 
client-side actors are exposed to an array of offshore vendor-side actors and gradually 
they are likely to start to assess the vendor-side collective as trustworthy. Indeed, 
boundary spanners have that power, but it requires that they are conscious about the 
importance of their boundary-spanning role, which is not always necessarily the case 
(Levina & Vaast, 2013). It also requires that they have the courage to render 
themselves redundant in the long run, because that is exactly what will happen when 
the two groups reach the nexus effect and work together as one common entity.  
In the empirical case I am investigating this obviously constitutes a dilemma for one of 
the clusters of onsite boundary spanners, whose jobs are by and large justified by the 
lack of nexus effect and consequently being successful in connecting the two groups is 
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likely to have a negative impact on their careers: The Danish boundary spanners are 
likely to find themselves unemployed should they manage to succeed in connecting the 
two groups. Compared to having vendor-side actors working offshore, they are a heavy 
burden in terms of salary and, as a significant part of the business case in offshore 
outsourcing is customarily ascribed to the lower wages of a work force working out of 
Asia, there is indeed a risk that the vendor will have no incentive to keep them on-
board, should their boundary-spanning roles become obsolete. But I have no reason to 
speculate that they are deliberately acting as boundary spanners in a sub-optimal way: 
Both the Danish boundary spanners and the onsite-deployed boundary spanners are 
repeatedly staged as important actors by the client-side actors as well as both managers 
and non-managers from the vendor organization and they are also repeatedly praised 
for the way they are doing their job. That is, they are rewarded for their roles as 
intermediaries, where they, on a daily basis, are easing the collaboration between the 
client-side actors and the offshore vendor-side actors – and there are no expectations 
stated that any of the two clusters of onsite boundary spanners act as connectors. 
Rather, the success criterion is that of an immediate instrumental one, where the 
boundary spanners fix concrete breaches in communication, coordination and 
knowledge with a short-term focus only. So, they are definitely doing their jobs – and 
they are doing so in a way that is perceived as successful.  
While the short-term focus is not surprising – and completely in line with past research 
on globally distributed team work, for instance Cramton & Hinds (2005) who find that 
“[m]anagers of internationally distributed teams often are tempted to reduce 
interdependence between distributed groups as much as possible because of 
communication and coordination difficulties” (p. 258) – I do challenge whether the 
notion of success is reasonable seen from a financial as well as a collaborative 
perspective in the longer run. While boundary spanners are indeed powerful actors, 
their influence is not necessarily always positive and productive – in fact, boundary 
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spanning can have a counter-productive effect, where the power of the boundary 
spanners are – inadvertently – used to maintain and perhaps even fortify the very same 
boundaries that they are intended to bridge or at best break down. In such cases, the 
boundary spanners are in fact not boundary spanners, but rather powerful gatekeepers, 
who, given their trustworthiness surplus, are ascribed prerogative traits and considered 
indispensable.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I sat out to answer the research question: What is the role of boundary 
spanners and how do these boundary spanners influence perceived trustworthiness of 
vendor-side actors and the vendor organization? I have done so first by introducing a 
framework for understanding the role of trustworthiness in boundary spanning. By 
introducing trustworthiness in the boundary spanning leadership model devised by 
Palus et al. (2013), I have shown how obtaining the nexus effect requires that the 
boundary spanners themselves are perceived as trustworthy and subsequently that they 
are able to engage with the actors in trust-preparatory boundary spanning activities at 
an interpersonal and at a collective level. On the basis of this analytical framework I 
have shown how the clusters of boundary spanners to some extent do facilitate such 
trustworthiness, when they act as connectors between disparate groups. However, I 
have also shown how the boundary spanners, when acting as intermediaries, are in fact 
hindering such positive assessments of trustworthiness and thus blocking the way 
towards transforming the collaboration between two disparate groups into a state 
characterized by advanced interdependence, where the collaboration is reinvented and 
the two groups have transformed into a unity, and reached the nexus effect. Ironically, 
it seems that the actions of boundary spanners may in some cases be counter-
productive even though it appears that they are successful, because their success is 
measured on a short-term scale instead of a long-term scale. In particular, this is the 
case for the two clusters of boundary spanners working onsite at the client’s premises 
 289 
in Copenhagen. These two clusters of boundary spanners are comprised of actors who 
are indeed trusted by the client-side actors and use the trust bestowed in them when 
acting as intermediaries. However, by doing so they may indeed be instrumental in 
making the collaboration as smooth and frictionless as possible, but they also do this at 
a cost: When acting as intermediaries they maintain the boundary between offshore 
vendor-side actors and client-side actors, whose perceptions of vendor-side 
trustworthiness is kept at low level. Boundary spanners can be conceived of as 
important organizational change agents in inter-organizational collaborations, but if the 
success is measured on how they contribute to solving concrete challenges, their 
actions are in fact in danger of being those of a gatekeeper, rather than those of a 
boundary spanner.  
Indeed, a thorough analysis of boundary spanning activities entails a lot more than 
developing an understanding of the role of boundary spanners’ in promoting 
trustworthiness. Another avenue of boundary spanning research in this concrete 
empirical setting could be to look at negotiations of power as Levina & Vaast (2008) 
do, when they theoretically engage with Bourdieu’s practice theory. One could also 
apply a sensemaking approach as Corporaal et al. (2013) do, to further the 
understanding of the perception of boundaries and subgroup dynamics (Cramton & 
Hinds, 2005) in this case of offshore outsourcing collaboration; or devote attention to 
boundary spanners’ role in promoting intergroup learning to further understanding of 
the conditions attached to knowledge sharing in globally distributed teams, which has 
received only limited scholarly attention (Cramton & Hinds, 2005). However, by 
introducing trustworthiness as a factor in boundary spanning I argue that we are able to 
obtain a more nuanced, fine-grained and comprehensive understanding of the role of 
the boundary spanner: We cannot merely introduce trust as an uncomplicated 
prerogative for boundary spanners. Rather, we must employ a more refined view on 
trust and trustworthiness and acknowledge that it is an ongoing process, which is 
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bound to influence any practice-oriented model for spanning boundaries. In this 
chapter I have taken outset the boundary spanning leadership model devised by in 
Palus et al. (2013) and shown how trust and trustworthiness has an impact throughout 
the boundary spanning process. By including development of perceived 
trustworthiness and ultimately trust as an integral part of boundary spanning activities 
this chapter contributes to boundary spanning theory by introducing trust-preparatory 
boundary spanning activities and the distinction between connector and intermediate, 
which signifies the importance of how boundary spanners go about their boundary 
spanning activities.  
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PART III 
CHAPTER IX: THE PATCHWORK OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Within organizational research trust is often considered as important, but yet 
something that is “just added”, much like salt. I started out this dissertation by staging 
trust as the secret ingredient of organizational life: Trust is not salt, but rather a 
complex, ambiguous ingredient – a masala – which should be granted attention, not 
least because it is in one way or another prerogative in most, if not all, forms of 
organizational collaboration.  
From the trust literature we know that successful collaboration in globally distributed 
teams is dependent on trust, but we also know that establishing trust in such globally 
distributed teams is a difficult task, because of the inherent difficulty in establishing 
oneself as perceived trustworthy in a globally distributed context. Therefore, I sat out 
to answer the overall research question: “How can vendor-side actors, as individuals 
and as a collective, be constructed as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the 
client-side actors?” 
The overall research question reflects my social constructivists stance: I am not asking 
whether the vendor-side actors are trustworthy or what they themselves can do to be 
perceived as trustworthy. Rather, I ask how they can be constructed as trustworthy, 
indicating the importance of the context in rendering someone or something 
trustworthy; and acknowledging that a variety of constructs influence perceptions of 
trustworthiness.  
Throughout my ethnographic fieldwork four such constructs have emerged as 
significant moderators of perceived trustworthiness of the vendor-side actors at an 
individual and a collective level. It is these four constructs that I have analyzed in 
conjunction with the primary construct, trustworthiness, in each their chapter. In this 
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chapter I will first re-iterate the primary findings from the four analytical chapters. 
Subsequently, I will consider opportunities for advancing trustworthiness by re-
introducing three of the prevailing ideas and management techniques on establishing 
trust, introduced in Chapter II: ‘Theory on Trust’.  
Re-iterating the Analytical Results 
In the first analytical chapter, Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’, I have analyzed 
the perceived challenges of globally distributed collaboration and how distance 
influences the actors’ perceptions of their counterpart’s trustworthiness. The chapter 
argues that co-location facilitates positive assessments of trustworthiness, whereas 
geographical distance inhibits the same: When actors from the two organizations are 
working in a co-located manner they make positive assessments of their counterparts’ 
trustworthiness with regards to ability, integrity and benevolence. However, when they 
have not been exposed to working in a co-located manner the client-side actors refrain 
from assessing the abilities of the vendor-side actors at an individual level; they draw 
negative conclusions about the integrity of the vendor-side actors; and they refrain 
from assessing benevolence, which leads to the negative conclusion that the vendor-
side actors not benevolent. I have argued that the difference in perceived 
trustworthiness is related to three main challenges associated with working 
geographically dispersed: The reluctance to engage directly with each other across 
geographical distance; perceived lack of knowledge among the offshore vendor-side 
actors; and lack of transparency. This lack of transparency has an organizational 
connotation and an interpersonal connotation and I have argued that the collaboration 
practice, where status and progress on tasks is communicated via a standard IT-system, 
leaves only little room to convey contextual information and skews information 
towards reporting results and thus leaves out important information on how these 
results have been (or have not been) reached. This stands in stark contrast to co-located 
work, where passive face time (Elsbach et al., 2010) plays an important role in 
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conveying contextual information. In a nutshell, the argument I produce is this: When 
actors are confined to dealing with each other by the means of highly abstract reporting 
regimes, they loose touch with the complexities of handling the actual task that their 
counterparts’ face; and thus they are inclined to produce negative perceptions of 
trustworthiness, insofar goals are not met as expected, regardless of whatever reason 
there may be to this lack of goal adherence, as such reasons are never conveyed.  
The role of IT systems in informing about task status and progress is further explored 
in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’, where the primary aim has 
been to understand how control mechanisms are used in the collaboration between 
client and vendor; and how the use of control mechanisms affect client-side 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of vendor-side actors. Specifically, based on an 
analytical framework I have devised drawing on inspiration of the works of Das & 
Teng’s (1998) and Weibel’s (2007) I analyze what is being controlled (namely output, 
process and workplace behavior); how such control is performed (via standard 
specifications monitoring, evaluation and feedback; and rewards and sanctions); and 
finally how the various forms of control that are instigated influence perceived 
trustworthiness.  
With regards to output control, I have shown how the contractually specified service 
level agreements (SLA) impose significant output control, where the aforementioned 
IT systems are the most predominant manifestations of the SLA’s in the daily 
collaboration. With regards to process control I have shown how the adherence to the 
ITIL framework, a standardized ISO certified ‘best practice’ framework for IT 
operations used worldwide in a magnitude of different industries and types of 
organizations to ensure common practice, impose standardized ways of handling a 
variety of processes related to IT operations. In the empirical context I have been 
investigating the most important one’s are the change management process and the 
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incident management process, as these two standard specifications are the one’s the 
client-side actors are most exposed to.  
By and large it is primarily the offshore vendor-side actors, who are exposed to output 
and process control, whereas the onsite vendor-side actors workplace behavior is 
controlled by the means of normative control. With regards to normative control I have 
shown that this is primarily exercised on the vendor-side actors who are working 
onsite. I have argued that informality; collaboration; and taking responsibility are the 
standard specifications of workplace behavior, which is evaluated by the means of co-
location itself; and that these evaluations are predominantly positive. That is, by the 
means of normative control the onsite vendor-side actors are conceived of as valuable 
collaborators; and they are rewarded by continuous praise by the client-side actors.  
This stands in contrast to the offshore vendor-side actors, who are rarely subjected to 
normative control as collaboration across geographical distance is kept at an absolute 
minimum. In this scenario the actors engage in the least collaborative effort (Clark & 
Brannen, 1991), characterized by the absence of social interaction beyond common 
courtesies and straight-to-the-point communication on the rare occasions that they have 
phone meetings. The remainder of the time, with the notable exception of client-side 
visits to the OMC in India, the collaboration is by and large characterized by formally 
agreed upon interactions – that is, output and process control.  
Based on the analysis of the use of control I turn focus to how the use of these control 
mechanisms influence perceptions of trustworthiness. The main findings are that 
control can be a substitute for trust, an inhibitor to trust and a trust catalyst. The first 
finding – that control can substitute trust – is by no means controversial. It is well 
described within the control literature and thus not surprising. The second finding – 
that control can be an inhibitor to trust – has also been under scrutiny by control 
researchers. However, it is worthwhile noticing that while the output controls can be 
substitutes for trust, they can at the same time inhibit trust, because the focus of output 
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control is on contract adherence, which stands in contrast to the values that the client-
side actors perceive as central. That is, output control effectively hinders the offshore 
vendor-side actors to show responsibility and collaborative efforts as the output control 
rigidly summarizes their effort into measurements that render the individual 
contribution by offshore vendor-side actors invisible.  
Finally, my analysis shows that control can in fact be a catalyst for trust, which only to 
a very limited extend has been covered by prior scholarly efforts. Most scholarly work 
on the relationship between trust and control argue in line with Das & Teng (1998) that 
“control mechanisms will undermine the level of trust among partners” (p. 501). In 
contrast to conventional wisdom my analysis shows that insofar adherence to standard 
specifications is evaluated positively, control can lead to trust. Specifically, output 
control and process control leads to positive assessments of trustworthiness of the 
offshore vendor-side actors as collectives, when the applied control mechanisms show 
that standard specifications are met. Additionally, normative control leads to positive 
assessments of trustworthiness of the onsite vendor-side actors because the co-location 
enables monitoring of vendor-side actors’ adherence to standard specifications of 
workplace behavior; and via such monitoring the client-side actors acknowledge that 
the onsite vendor-side actors as individuals adhere to the same values and work in a 
way that is similar to that of the client-side actors themselves. Thus, the chapter 
contributes with an analysis that suggests that intelligently applied control can in fact 
be conducive to perceptions of trustworthiness and development of trust. 
In Chapter VII ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I investigate the role of culture in the 
offshore outsourcing collaboration between the client and the vendor. I do so by 
adopting an interpretivists perspective, and thus reject that we can look at dichotomies 
such as India/Denmark or client/vendor as a priori constructs. Rather, to understand if 
and how culture plays a role in the collaboration we must follow how culture unfolds 
in practice and construct an a posteriori understanding of culture and cultural 
296 
differences by following how the actors make sense of each other, and how they 
establish boundaries and construct in-groups and out-groups. By investigating how 
cultural boundaries are enacted in practice the purpose of the chapter has been to 
answer the research question: How is vendor-side actors’ trustworthiness affected by 
enactments of cultural boundaries? 
By following the actor-level constructions of groups I have identified four significant 
groupings: One based on national stereotyping done by the client-side actors; one 
based on organizational affinity; one based geographical location; and one grouping 
that includes all actors. Additionally, I have argued that boundary objects (Barrett & 
Oborn, 2010)  – that is, the IT systems that I have analyzed as output control in 
Chapter VI – are in fact fortifying cultural boundaries. The argument expands on the 
reasoning laid forth in Chapter VI, where I found that output control was inhibiting 
positive assessments of trustworthiness and argues that boundary objects inhibits 
positive assessments of trustworthiness across organizational boundaries. Conversely, I 
have found that presentational rituals (Kunda, 1992) are breaking down the same 
boundaries. Specifically, when the client-side actors in general, and the client-side CIO 
in particular, engage in presentational rituals during visits to the OMC they are in fact 
constructing one common culture, characterized by a ‘we are in it together’ discourse. 
However, given the rarity of the visits to the OMC and the fact that this discourse is 
abandoned as soon as the client-side actors return to Denmark, where they again 
engage in stereotyping national differences, the presentational rituals have a limited 
and temporary effect.  
By following actor-level constructions of group dichotomies I have shown that there is 
a fourth antecedent to trust at play in this context of offshore outsourcing collaboration, 
namely proactiveness as a significant part of being perceived as trustworthy has to do 
with displaying such proactiveness. In the offshore outsourcing collaboration that 
constitute the empirical foundation for this dissertation, the client-side actors attribute 
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the perceived lack of proactiveness to national characteristics of ‘the Indians’, who are 
perceived as more hierarchically oriented and collectivistic. On the basis of this 
stereotypical judgment the client-side actors reason that ‘the Indians’ do not feel the 
same personal responsibility towards their work as they do themselves. Consequently, 
the vendor-side actors are perceived as order-following to a degree where they have 
little interest in doing what is best, but, on the contrary, are preoccupied with doing as 
told. In other words, ‘the Indians’ are conceived of as re-active employees that need to 
be micro-managed.  
However, by drawing on findings from the two preceding analytical chapters, I have 
argued that the perception of the offshore vendor-side actors as re-active may be 
justified, but that the client-side reasoning is misleading. That is, ‘features’ tied to their 
national-cultural heritage provide only a shallow, ‘easy and convenient’ explanation; 
and in this chapter I offer another – and more nuanced – explanation as to why the 
offshore vendor-side actors may come across as lacking proactiveness, which signifies 
the importance of the context in which the collaboration happens: First, this 
explanation draws on the challenges of distributed collaboration, where the actors are 
experiencing lack of knowledge and transparency and find interacting directly with the 
offshore vendor-side actors difficult. Interestingly, the onsite vendor-side actors 
working in close proximity with the client-side actors break free of the stereotyping: 
They are no longer perceived as ‘re-active Indians’, but as individuals who are 
repeatedly praised for their abilities and their good work. However, the fact that the 
client-side actors do not perceive the Indians working onsite as re-active, does not 
seem to prompt them to change their perceptions of Indians in general and consider 
that the perceived lack of proactiveness may be a result of something other than 
national-cultural features. 
Second, the contextualized explanation also draws on the power distribution between 
the client-side actors and the vendor-side actors, characterized by a “the client is 
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always right” thinking, where I have shown how the client-vendor relationship is 
constructed as a relationship where the vendor-side actors are expected to service the 
client; to understand; and to adapt to the client’s way of working. Third, one could 
argue that this power distribution should lead to a situation where the vendor-side 
actors en bloc adapt to the client’s demand for proactiveness. However, I have shown 
that the scarce use of presentational rituals provides amble reasons why this is not so: 
Such presentational rituals are detached from the daily work and only performed twice 
per year, when the client-side actors visit the OMC. Thus, they are indeed rituals rather 
than an embedded part of everyday practice and they forfeit their purpose of 
establishing unity and empowering the offshore vendor-side actors to engage 
proactively. The fourth, and final, part of the explanations draws on my analysis of 
boundary objects, where I show that the use of boundary objects, such as the incident 
management IT system, instigated as coordination mechanisms aimed at easing 
coordination across distance are imposing a “management by numbers” regime, where 
the work performed by actors who are not co-located with the client-side actors is 
rendered invisible and where all incentives are aimed at meeting SLA requirements, 
not at enabling proactive behavior. The chapter concludes that in this context boundary 
objects are in fact counterproductive to staging the vendor-side actors as trustworthy, 
as they impede proactiveness. Rather, they are culturizing the collaboration by building 
walls around cultural groups and reinforcing the same.  
In Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness Boundary’ I have shed light on the 
boundary spanners influence on perceived trustworthiness by posing the research 
question: What is the role of boundary spanners and how do these boundary spanners 
influence perceived trustworthiness of vendor-side actors and the vendor 
organization? I do so by introducing a framework for understanding boundary 
spanners’ role in furthering perceived trustworthiness, theoretically underpinned by my 
scholarly understanding of trust and trustworthiness laid forth in Chapter II and by 
recent work on boundary spanning by Levina & Vaast (2008; 2013) and Palus et al. 
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(2013). On the basis of this analytical framework I also introduce two types of 
boundary spanners, namely intermediaries and connectors, where the first stands 
between two groups and acts as a translator, whereas the latter connects members of 
the two groups and supports actors from the two groups in interacting directly with 
each other. 
The analytical results of this chapter show how the clusters of boundary spanners 
facilitate positive assessments of trustworthiness, when they act as connectors between 
disparate groups. However, the analysis also shows how the boundary spanners, when 
acting as intermediaries, are in fact hindering such positive assessments of 
trustworthiness, which inhibits the actors from reaching what Palus et al. (2013) call 
the nexus effect, where the two groups have transformed into a unity and the 
collaboration is characterized by a high degree of interdependence. Thus, while the 
vast majority of boundary spanning efforts can be characterized as that of an 
intermediary these efforts, I have argued that in some cases they are counterproductive 
even though it appears that they are successful; because their success is measured on a 
short-term scale instead of a long-term scale.  
This is in particular the case for the boundary spanners working onsite at the client’s 
premises in Copenhagen. The client-side actors conceive of these boundary spanners as 
highly trustworthy collaborators and they are considered instrumental in making the 
collaboration as smooth and frictionless as possible. However, by acting as 
intermediaries they maintain the boundary between offshore vendor-side actors and 
client-side actors, whose perceptions of vendor-side trustworthiness is kept at low 
level.  
I end the chapter by concluding that while the intermediary role of the boundary 
spanner may be effective in the short run the consequence is that the collaboration will 
increasingly be relying on the boundary spanner, who becomes a bottleneck and a 
gatekeeper. In order to break down boundaries and cater for long-term efficiency in the 
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collaboration, the boundary spanners should act as connectors, which ultimately mean 
rendering themselves unnecessary, when the nexus effect has been reached. 
Opportunities for Advancing Trustworthiness 
The findings from the four analytical chapters, re-iterated above, inform the overall 
research question, which reads: “How can vendor-side actors, as individuals and as a 
collective, be constructed as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-side 
actors?” In the remainder of this chapter I suggest three trustworthiness-increasing 
initiatives informed by the analytical results in conjunction with three of the prevailing 
ideas and management techniques on managing trust outlined in Chapter II: ‘Theory on 
Trust’. These are: psychological safety, social interaction and task interdependence. 
Psychological Safety in a Broader Perspective 
From the trust literature we know that a work environment characterized by a high 
degree of perceived psychological safety among the actor is conducive to development 
of trust. Because trust is inevitably connected to perceptions of risk, lowering risk 
makes trusting easier. That is, it is more likely that someone is willing to trust me to 
pay back 10 USD I have lend, than 10.000 USD, simply because the risk is lower. 
Thus, if the work environment is perceived as a psychologically safe environment 
where actors “believe they can participate openly and actively without fear of suffering 
adverse personal consequences, such as being derogated for their ideas and 
observations or for the manner by which they express them” (Schaubroeck et al., 2011: 
864) it is conducive for developing trust.  
In Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness Boundary’ I have argued that within 
their own group the client-side actors do indeed have a psychological safe work 
environment. Unlike many other outsourcing endeavors, where a certain percentage of 
the total workforce is outsourced and the remaining employees live with a constant 
anxiety of being ‘next in line’ in terms of being laid off and substituted by less salary-
heavy resources offshore, this specific outsourcing engagement outsourced all IT and 
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had only one IT-employee remaining, who was given the tasks of building a new 
client-side IT organization capable of managing the outsourced IT activities. Thus, all 
current client-side actors have been hired to do exactly what they are doing; and their 
manager, the client-side CIO, repeatedly acknowledges their contribution as a vital part 
of making the offshore outsourcing engagement a success. However, the historical 
background of this offshore outsourcing collaboration is indeed a special case. Thus, in 
a broader perspective of offshore outsourcing, where many employees in companies 
that are outsourcing IT activities are indeed in a risk of being replaced by less salary-
heavy IT professionals in countries such as India, Philippines, Brazil or Eastern 
Europe, the psychological safety of the employees is indeed not a trivial matter, but 
can be expected to be a significant barrier to collaboration effectiveness.   
Furthermore, the notion of psychological safety is not only relevant to client-side 
actors. On the contrary, I argue that perceptions of psychological safety are equally 
important to the vendor-side actors. In this particular case of offshore outsourcing 
collaboration, where taking responsibility by being proactive are conceived of as 
central aspects of what constitute ‘good’ workplace behavior in the eyes of the client-
side actors, psychological safety among the vendor-side actors is in fact instrumental: 
Acting proactively as opposed to simply following orders arguably requires courage 
and willingness to fail. As failure is inherently associated with risk, proactiveness 
requires a platform of psychological safety that eliminates or at least diminishes 
perceived negative consequences of failure. Put differently, if the perceived risk of 
failing is reduced, the likelihood that vendor-side actors are willing to take a leap of 
faith (Möllering, 2006) and act in a proactive manner is increased. Thus, insofar the 
construction of vendor-side actors as trustworthy collaborators requires that they 
display proactiveness; a psychological safe vendor-side environment is necessary.  
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Social Interaction 
The importance of social interaction for building trust is repeatedly mentioned within 
the trust literature; and we know that professional relationships where the involved 
actors invest time in getting to know each other on a personal level are typically 
characterized by being more trusting than professional relationships where actors only 
engage with each other on a strictly professional level. This is also reflected in the 
empirical settings I have been researching where the client-side actors exhibit 
significantly more trust in the vendor-side actors they have had the opportunity to 
engage with on a more social level, than the one’s where they have not. Thus, to 
construct the vendor-side actors as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-
side actors increasing social interaction is a viable strategy because “social networks 
clearly matter for trust as trustors and trustees are embedded in relationships with each 
other”, which Möllering (2006: 196) reminds us of.  
As it seems that social interaction happens automatically, without the need for 
deliberate nudging when actors are co-located, the quick fix solution would obviously 
be to simply increase co-location by for instance deploying more vendor-side actors 
onsite and more frequent and longer client-side visits to the OMC. However, such a 
solution would obviously also affect the business case negatively. But I argue that 
there is amble opportunity to facilitate more social interaction, and hereby paving the 
way for more trust between actors, without necessarily increasing co-location, even 
though Berry (2013) assesses that creating trust “may be the greatest challenge in 
building successful virtual teams” (p. 10). 
First, using technology to deliberately imitate co-located work practices, for instance 
by greeting each other good morning and goodbye via instant messenger every day; 
and by developing a practice where types of communication that the actors would deal 
with face-to-face if they were co-located is never conveyed via email, but instead via 
richer ICT, such as videoconferencing, webcam chat or phone, is arguably conducive 
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for developing social relations, because it would legitimize interaction across distance 
that does not have a strictly professional purpose. In Chapter V: ‘Challenged by 
Distance’ I have suggested more radical initiatives, such as leaving webcams and 
sound on for a longer period of time without necessarily having to speak to each other 
all the time; or booking calendar time, where it is agreed that remote colleagues have 
first priority and can make contact at any point in time and hereby signaling 
availability and interest. Other initiatives could be to arrange cross-locational gaming 
or arrange virtual coffee meetings. I argue that it is of less importance what is being 
done to imitate co-location. Rather, what is important, is that communication and 
collaboration via ICT is infused with social interaction and not merely used in a 
straight-to-the-point manner, the leaves no room for the actors to socialize.  
Secondly, I argue that a deliberate use of boundary spanners as connectors would also 
be conducive for social interaction; insofar these boundary spanners are tasked with 
connecting client-side actors with offshore vendor-side on more than just a 
professional level. As I have discussed in Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness 
Boundary’ it is striking how little the client-side actors know about the “do-good” 
activities that the vendor organization is engaged in. While the boundary spanners 
themselves are good at interacting socially with everybody – arguably, one of the traits 
that makes them boundary spanners – their boundary spanning activities is almost 
exclusively focused on professional topics. However, I argue that their knowledge 
about both organizations, about cultural characteristics of the different groups and 
about the individual actors is an important potential, which is yet to be realized. As we 
know from Sackmann et al. (2011): “When people with different cultural backgrounds 
meet, a natural behavior is to stick with people from the same group” (p. 149) and I 
argue that the boundary spanners have a unique position, given their relative surplus of 
social capital, to pull actors from the different groups together and pave the way for 
increased social interaction, insofar social and cultural integration is put on the agenda 
304 
and they deliberately expand their boundary spanning activities to include connecting 
actors at an interpersonal level, too. Arguably, social interaction can also be obtained 
by deliberately designing work processes that facilitate social interaction, which I will 
attend to below.   
However, there is another connotation to social interaction, namely that it enables 
normative control. Indeed, the more social interaction the better the possibility to 
conduct normative control. Arguably, the two cannot be separated. Thus, catering for 
social interaction is not just conducive to trust development in itself, but also because it 
increases the possibility to monitor adherence to standard specification of workplace 
behavior, which, as argued in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’, 
is a catalyst to trust.  
Task Interdependence 
From Schaubroeck et al. (2011) we know that working towards a common and well-
defined goal is conducive for development of trust; and Chung & Jackson (2011) 
report that task interdependence has a positive impact on actors’ attitudes towards each 
other. That is, the more interdependent teams work, the higher the probability of 
developing trust among the team members. This resonates well with the analytical 
findings in this dissertation, where the client-side actors perceive vendor-side actors 
working close together them as more trustworthy than vendor-side actors with whom 
they have less frequent interactions. While physical proximity is undoubtedly an 
important factor I argue that this is not the only factor that explains the difference in 
perceived trustworthiness as those offshore vendor-side actors with whom the client-
side actors are closely tied to in terms of collaboration are perceived as trustworthy 
too; The reciprocal interdependence (Chung & Jackson, 2011), which characterizes 
these collaborations are arguably also an important factor. That is, because the actors 
are mutually dependent on each other’s contributions they are more likely to assess 
each other as trustworthy.  
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Throughout the analytical chapters I have introduced a number of factors that supports 
this claim: First, in Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I have shown that the use 
of boundary objects are reinforcing socially constructed groups and hereby 
strengthening us-and-them dichotomies. As these boundary objects by decomposing 
tasks are creating a highly abstract view of the efforts put into a given tasks, they are 
culturizing the collaboration and works against unity and task interdependence, which 
results in a fragmented understanding of the others’ contributions. Interestingly, 
boundary objects have a much less prominent role when actors from the two 
organizations have frequent interaction and reciprocal interdependence. Secondly, as 
addressed in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’, control can be a 
catalyst for trust; and arguably reciprocal interdependence, characterized by cyclical 
communication about a task is a strong form of control as it enables actors to gain 
insights in not only the quality and timeliness of the end delivery, but also throughout 
the process. This way the actors are continuously able to assess each other’s abilities 
and integrity.  
Thus, high degrees of task interdependence can facilitate construction of the vendor-
side actors as trustworthy collaborators. However, while a high degree of task 
interdependence is conducive for trust development it arguably also requires trust to be 
prepared to accept the inherent risk associated with high task interdependence. 
Therefore I believe that applying a principle of gradualness is important. One may 
speculate that engaging in unwarranted high task interdependence may have 
detrimental influence on the perceived psychological safety; and as lack of 
psychological safety is counterproductive to trust development, gradual increase in the 
importance of tasks subjected to reciprocal task interdependence is advisable.  
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CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
Conclusion 
“Trust is pivotal in a global virtual team to reduce the high levels of 
uncertainty endemic to the global and technologically based environment.” 
(Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999: 792) 
In an ever more globalized world we are faced with the challenges of collaborating 
across geographical distance. One of the many manifestations of globalization is the 
increasing tendency for western firms to strategically outsource activities to Asia 
(Windrum et al., 2009) and throughout the last two decades it has become increasingly 
popular to engage in offshore outsourcing of IT activities (Contractor et al., 2010). 
Success in such endeavors depends significantly on the participants’ abilities to work 
in distributed teams; and developing trust between organizations and geographically 
dispersed actors is, in the words of Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999), pivotal. However, the 
management literature has devoted little attention to trust (Nienaber et al., 2014).     
Throughout this dissertation I have put trust and trustworthiness center stage in my 
ethnographic study of an offshore outsourcing collaboration between the client, a 
leading Danish media company, and the vendor, one of the largest Indian IT service 
providers; which was embarked upon in 2012 and includes all of the client’s IT-
operations. From the body of literature on trust we know that development of trust is 
dependent on positive assessments of trustworthiness. Therefore, the main objective of 
this dissertation has been to develop an understanding of how vendor-side actors – as 
individuals as well as a collective – are rendered and rendering themselves trustworthy 
in the eyes of the client-side actors. Thus, I have applied a selective focus, since it is 
primarily vendor-side trustworthiness in the eyes of the client-side actors that is being 
investigated. I have done this for two reasons: First, because the nature of such an 
offshore outsourcing collaboration presents unique challenges to the client-side with 
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regards to financial and operational risks: While any offshore outsourcing contract has 
built-in incentives aimed at animating the vendor to provide services according to 
agreement, ultimately the client bears the bigger risk – it is their business and financial 
penalties are never adequately compensating for loss of revenue. Consequently, in 
order to engage in offshore outsourcing the client must have confidence that the vendor 
is able to fulfill contractually agreed obligations. That is, they must trust the vendor. 
Secondly, my ethnographic studies have provided much more empirical material to 
substantiate this client-side focus than had I chosen a vendor-side perspective.  
On the basis of this selective focus I have posed the following main research question: 
How can vendor-side actors, as individuals and as a collective, be 
constructed as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-side 
actors? 
I have engaged with the overall research question by applying an interdisciplinary 
perspective, where trust and trustworthiness are not isolated theoretical constructs, but 
rather dynamic constructs that influence and are influenced by other constructs. 
Through my ethnographic fieldwork four such constructs have emerged as significant 
moderators of perceived trustworthiness of the vendor-side actors at an individual and 
a collective level: Distance, Control, Culture and Boundary Spanning. These four 
constructs have been analyzed in conjunction with the primary construct, 
trustworthiness, in each their chapter. Together with the opportunities for advancing 
trustworthiness discussed in Chapter IX: ‘The Patchwork of Trustworthiness’, they 
inform the answer to the overall research question. 
In conclusion, vendor-side actors are constructed as trustworthy collaborators at an 
individual level, when they are working in geographical proximity with their client-
side counterparts. In contrast, when vendor-side actors have not been exposed to 
working in a co-located manner with their client-side counterparts they are perceived 
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as less trustworthy. This perception is related to three main challenges associated with 
working geographically dispersed: The reluctance to engage directly with each other 
across geographical distance; perceived lack of knowledge among the offshore vendor-
side actors; and lack of transparency. These three challenges are fortified by the use of 
formal control of offshore vendor-side actors, as these controls are boundary objects 
that provide highly abstract and un-contextualized information and thus render 
individual efforts invisible; glorify adherence to standard specifications and thus 
inhibit proactiveness, which is a central value to the client-side actors; and invoke 
minimal interaction and thus fuel us-and-them dichotomies as well as cultural 
stereotyping. In other words – and in line with conventional wisdom – at an individual 
level formal control is predominantly an inhibitor to trust development in the offshore 
outsourcing engagement that constitutes the empirical foundation for this dissertation, 
as such control effectively hinders the offshore vendor-side actors to show 
responsibility and collaborative efforts.  
However, I have also argued that there are instances where formal control is conducive 
to trust – where formal control is a trust catalyst – which suggests that process and 
output control is not always bad in terms of trust development. In fact, at a collective 
level output control can be conducive to trust, when expectations are met. What is 
important in terms of trust development is that the formal control mechanisms that are 
implemented render trustworthiness visible instead on invisible. That is, formal control 
should also provide transparency into how work is being done, rather than just focus on 
what is being done. As discussed in Chapter IX: ‘The Patchwork of Trustworthiness’ a 
higher degree of task interdependence is a promising avenue for developing trust, 
because it enables the client-side actors to rely less on un-contextualized information 
provided by the means of boundary objects; and to rely more on the contextualized 
control that reciprocal task interdependence introduces. Thus, we can conclude to 
things: First, vendor-side collectives are constructed as trustworthy collaborators by 
the means of output control, insofar expected performance goals are met. Secondly, 
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with regards to trustworthiness at an individual level we can conclude that 
contextualized and continuous output and process control can construct the vendor-
side actors as trustworthy collaborators.   
In contrast to the formal control that offshore vendor-side actors are subjected to, the 
onsite vendor-side actors are primarily subjected to normative control. By the means of 
normative control these actors are assessed as trustworthy, as they adhere to the 
standard specification of workplace behavior, namely informality; collaboration; and 
taking responsibility. Furthermore, the normative control is conducive to breaking 
down us-and-them dichotomies and the onsite vendor-side actors are not subjected to 
cultural stereotyping, but rather acknowledged as individuals. Thus, by subjecting 
vendor-side actors to normative control, they are constructed as trustworthy 
collaborators in the eyes of the client-side actors.  
With regards to culture I have shown how the offshore vendor-side actors are subjected 
to national stereotypes. They are conceived of as more hierarchical and as collectivists, 
who are incapable of displaying proactiveness and have to be micro-managed. 
However, my analysis also shows that when vendor-side actors are working onsite or 
have significant direct interactions due to their job functions they are in many cases not 
subjected to the same stereotyping by the client-side actors. They are no longer 
perceived as ‘re-active Indians’, but as individuals who are repeatedly praised for their 
abilities and their good work. Furthermore, I have shown how the contextualization 
that happens when client-side actors visit the OMC is beneficial to establishing a more 
nuanced picture of the client-side actors’ offshore collaborators that is less prone to 
cultural stereotypes. In conclusion, when cultural stereotypes are disbanded and the 
vendor-side actors are acknowledged as individuals they are constructed as 
trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-side actors. 
In the fourth and final analytical chapter I have put the role of boundary spanners under 
scrutiny; and I have argued that two modes of boundary spanning are enacted – that of 
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an intermediary and that of a connector. The vast majority of boundary spanning 
efforts can be characterized as that of an intermediary, which is counterproductive to 
developing trust in the vendor-side actors, despite appearing successful in a short-term 
perspective. Conversely, the analytical findings suggest that when the boundary 
spanners act as connectors they are in fact facilitating positive assessments of 
trustworthiness. Thus, when boundary spanners act as connectors the vendor-side 
actors are constructed as trustworthy collaborators in the eyes of the client-side 
actors.  
Implications & Future Work 
In each of the four analytical chapters I have suggested implications for practice as 
well as implications for theory. Furthermore, in Chapter IX: ‘The Patchwork of 
Trustworthiness’ I have attended to a number of opportunities for advancing 
trustworthiness in practice fuelled by the body of literature on trust and contextualized 
with my analytical findings. In this section I will briefly recap these implications. First 
I will re-iterate the practical implications. Subsequently I will re-iterate the theoretical 
implications presented in the analytical chapters as well as more general implications 
for theory provided by the dissertation as a whole. 
Implications for Practice 
In Chapter V: ‘Challenged by Distance’ I have argued that in order to advance positive 
assessments of trustworthiness in an offshore outsourcing collaboration characterized 
by geographical dispersion actors cannot depend on contextual confidence (Child & 
Möllering, 2003), as this is weak. In co-located teams, contextual information passed 
on via the physical proximity itself, can lead contextual confidence following a 
principle of gradualness, as the actors gradually and continuously gather contextual 
information about each other and hereby pave the way for developing trust. Thus, in 
co-located teams the risky business of trusting is gradually expanded in a speed that is 
proportional with the gathering of contextual confidence. The same principle of 
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gradualness cannot readily be applied in geographically distributed teams. In such 
distributed teams contextual information is only scarcely available as the actors are not 
absorbing information about each other continuously, but only when they – more or 
less often – actively interact with the virtual counterpart. Therefore, in order to develop 
a foundation for trust actors need to actively engage in trust building by applying 
active trust (Child & Möllering, 2003). However, active trust development in 
geographically dispersed requires that technology is readily available and used; and 
that they actively seek to compensate for the lack of contextual information by 
imitating the form of dialogue that occurs when they are co-located and hereby 
increase passive face time (Elsbach et al., 2010) in the virtual office space. 
In Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ I propose that control can in 
fact be a catalyst to trust, despite conventional wisdom claiming the opposite. 
Therefore I suggest that intelligently applied control can be a good strategy for 
establishing trustworthiness. By intelligent I signify that control can indeed become an 
inhibitor to trust if one is not carefully designing the control mechanisms that are put 
into use. In the specific empirical setting I have been investigating, where 
responsibility and collaborative efforts are central values in the eyes of the client-side 
actors, I suggest that formal control mechanisms that render vendor-side adherence to 
these values visible can have a positive influence on the perception of vendor-side 
trustworthiness. Furthermore, I suggest that normative control also has a positive 
impact on perceived trustworthiness, which can be catered for by increasing social 
interaction between actors that are not physically co-located.  
In Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ I suggest that insofar the client-side actors 
disband national stereotyping, by breaking out of the iron cage that Hofstede puts 
around culture and understand culture as dynamic construct where human agency plays 
a vital role, positive assessments of trustworthiness would have substantially better 
conditions to emerge. Rather than making sense of perceived re-active behavior as 
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something related to national culture, I encourage that the client-side actors 
acknowledge that the context has a significant impact on the vendor-side actors’ ability 
to be proactive. Specifically, I point towards the perceived challenges of collaboration 
in geographically dispersed teams; the way the roles of ‘the client’ and ‘the vendor’ is 
negotiated, which is characterized by a ‘the client is always right’ discourse; the 
limited use of presentational rituals aimed at establishing unity; and finally how 
boundary objects are counter-productive to proactiveness, as contextual factors that 
inhibit proactiveness.  
In Chapter VIII: ‘Spanning the Trustworthiness Boundary’ I argue that despite their 
best intention the boundary spanners are in fact maintaining status quo and in some 
cases even fortifying the boundaries, rather than contributing to dissolving them; and I 
suggest that revising the role of the boundary spanner and instigating a long-term 
perspective in which boundary spanning activities are aimed at connecting members of 
disparate groups, rather than merely acting as an intermediary between them, would be 
conducive to positive assessments of trustworthiness. 
Finally, in Chapter IX: ‘The Patchwork of Trustworthiness’ I suggest three managerial 
efforts that are likely to increase the perceived trustworthiness of the vendor-side 
actors, namely catering for a psychologically safe work environment that enables the 
vendor-side actors to take a leap of faith and be proactive; increasing social interaction; 
and advancing task interdependence. 
Implications for Theory 
This dissertation contributes to the trust literature and the literature on global work 
with an in-depth empirical study. As Möllering (2006) points to trust is a unique and 
powerful concept but little effort has been put on “reconnect[ing] our sophisticated 
ideas about trust to bigger research agendas in the social sciences” (p. 193). In line 
with Möllering (2006) I argue that “the question of how actors can form positive 
expectations of others is among the most basic questions that can be asked in the social 
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sciences” (p. 194) and this dissertation’s primary aim has been to address this basic 
question in the specific context of offshore outsourcing. By doing so, I contribute to 
the trust research community, which in general is oriented towards quantitative 
research and lab experiments, with an ethnographic study that offers an in-depth 
analysis of a concrete empirical context. Additionally, only a very limited focus within 
trust research has been aimed at understanding trust in a global, distributed context and 
it has been the ambition of this dissertation to add to that body of knowledge, too. 
Furthermore, it has been the goal of this dissertation to engage in interdisciplinary 
research, where trust is not researched as an isolated construct, but rather as a part of a 
dynamic and complex empirical context; and thus to connect to other research agendas 
within the field of social science.  
In a similar vein, Hinds et al. (2011) point out “that global work has become 
increasingly widespread in the last two decades” (p. 138). However, they also find that 
“global work, although a pervasive phenomenon, has been under-examined in the 
management literature” (ibid.) and “few empirical studies of global work have actually 
been published in the management literature” (ibid.). Thus, it has also been the 
ambition of this dissertation to contribute to management literature with a longitudinal 
empirical study of global work.  
In addition to contributing to the trust research community and the literature on global 
teams with an ethnographic and interdisciplinary analysis of offshore outsourcing 
where trust and trustworthiness are analyzed in conjunction with other constructs – 
distance, control, culture and boundary spanning – the dissertation also suggests a 
number of concrete theoretical contributions, which I will attend to below.  
The analysis provided in Chapter VI: ‘Flipping the Switch on Trust and Control’ 
suggests an implication to theory related to the relation between trust and control. My 
findings suggest that control can be a substitute to trust, an inhibitor to trust and a trust 
catalyst. While the first two are well described in earlier scholarly work, the last 
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finding – that control can be a trust catalyst – has only received very little attention. 
Most scholarly efforts on the relationship between trust and control argue that control 
undermines trust; and thus my finding that insofar adherence to standard specifications 
is evaluated positively control can lead to trust suggests that we may need to rethink 
the relationship between the two constructs. Thus, I argue that we should abandon the 
belief that control is detrimental to trust and signals lack of trust. Rather than seeing 
control as a sign of lack of trust, we should consider control as a potential to establish 
trust. Control provides transparency and thus the right form of control is conducive to 
assessing others’ trustworthiness, which, if evaluated positively, leads to trust – and 
therefore control can be a trust catalyst. 
In Chapter VII: ‘Trusting Across Cultures’ the concept of presentational rituals 
(Kunda, 1992) is one of the theoretical constructs I use to make sense of enactments of 
culture in the empirical settings. I believe that the notion of ‘presentational rituals’ is a 
powerful construct with significant explanatory power. However, in Kunda’s (1992) 
original work there are three types of presentational rituals, but non of them can 
account for presentational rituals, where subordinates are put in the driver’s seat as 
they are talking up. Arguably, this notion of talking up is a significant construct in 
organizations, such as the client-side organization in my empirical context, where 
proactive subordinate behavior is considered valuable. As this notion of proactive 
behavior has become quite common in today’s organizations I argue that the talking up 
presentational ritual is a significant addition to Kunda’s three types, as this allows for a 
more elaborate understanding of how employee agency is manifested in modern 
organizations. Thus, Chapter VII contributes to theory by introducing a fourth type of 
presentational ritual, namely talking up. 
The analysis of boundary spanning and trustworthiness in Chapter VIII introduces two 
theoretical contributions. First, I argue that we are able to obtain a more nuanced, fine-
grained and comprehensive understanding of the role of the boundary spanner by 
 315 
recognizing that trust is an important construct, as it is bound to influence any practice-
oriented model for spanning boundaries. Therefore, I suggest that we introduce trust 
and trustworthiness as an integrated part of boundary spanning. Specifically, I take 
outset in the boundary spanning leadership model devised by in Palus et al. (2013) and 
show how trust and trustworthiness have an impact throughout the boundary spanning 
process. Thus, by including development of perceived trustworthiness and ultimately 
trust as an integral part of boundary spanning activities this chapter contributes to 
boundary spanning theory by introducing trust-preparatory boundary spanning 
activities as an integrated part of Palus et al.’s (2013) process model for boundary 
spanning leadership. 
Secondly, I introduce a distinction between acting as a connector and acting as an 
intermediate, which signifies the importance of how boundary spanners go about their 
boundary spanning activities. I conceptualize the intermediary as someone whose 
success has an immediate, practical and instrumental connotation. That is, the 
intermediary is making effective collaboration possible as fast as possible. In contrast, 
when a boundary spanner acts as a connector he is supporting actors from the two 
groups in interacting directly with each other, instead of being a layer between them. 
Furthermore, I have shown that a boundary spanner acting as an intermediary may in 
the short run facilitate effective collaboration, but in the long run the intermediary is in 
fact maintaining status quo; and in some cases even fortifying they very same 
boundaries that he is engaged in bridging. Instead of spanning or dissolving boundaries 
the intermediary becomes a gatekeeper. In contrast, by acting as a connector the 
boundary spanner will improve actors’ ability to collaborate and ultimately render 
himself unnecessary.   
Future Work 
Indeed, instances of global work have increased significantly over the last two decades, 
as Hinds et al. (2011) rightly point out; and the IT industry is a good example hereof, 
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where many IT organizations, being IT companies or IT divisions in companies from 
other industries, have begun a journey into becoming global and multi-cultural 
organizations, with staff split across different locations in different countries 
(Contractor et al., 2010). As outlined above there is amble opportunity to contribute to 
social science with empirical studies of global work; and I believe that there is amble 
opportunity to study trust and trustworthiness in an empirical context of global work in 
general – and global IT work in specific – too. Below I shall briefly outline three 
suggestions for future empirically founded studies of trust in a context of global IT 
work. 
The empirical foundation or this dissertation has been an offshore outsourcing 
engagement. Arguably, the fact that it is an outsourcing scenario with two different 
organizational entities involved introduces unique complexities. I suggest that future 
work should look into captive offshoring, where a company has established its own 
legal entity in the offshore country, as I speculate that this could provide a more clean-
cut empirical foundation, where organizational distribution plays a smaller role. 
Another avenue of future research on trust in global IT teams could be to take a closer 
look at the vendor-side perspective. I have argued why my focus has been on the 
client-side actors’ perceptions of vendor-side trustworthiness, but nevertheless I 
believe that taking a vendor-side perspective and investigating their trust in and 
perceptions of client-side actors trustworthiness, is called for. As mentioned I would 
not have had adequate data to support such an investigation, which is undoubtedly 
partly related to the fact that most of my empirical research has been conducted at the 
client’s premises. However, I believe that a vendor-side focus could probably elaborate 
significantly on the challenges related to acting with proactiveness. Interestingly, on 
many occasions when I have engaged with vendor-side actors, during interviews as 
well as informal conversations, they have elaborated on the importance of client-side 
actors trusting them, but without suggesting that their own trust in client-side actors is 
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important. On some occasions I have specifically addressed this question by asking 
vendor-side actors about the necessity of trusting the client; and on several occasions I 
have been answered first by a puzzled look on their faces; and subsequently a remark 
in the lines of “I suppose so”. To me this does not suggest that vendor-side trust in the 
client is unimportant, but rather that it is heavily under-exposed.  
Finally, I believe that empirical research on global work that entails more than two 
locations, and perhaps even more than two organizational entities too, is a promising 
path for future research. Indeed, such truly global work may introduce a whole new 
level of complexity to scholarly work. In addition, it seems that within the IT industry 
there is a movement towards increasingly complex delivery models, including 
locations all around the globe and multi-vendor setups. Thus, the IT industry is 
breaking new ground, providing new vistas for scholarly contributions on global 
collaboration. 
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